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Preface
This is the first publication of The Integration of the European Second
generation international project known as TIES. The project started in
2003 with a preliminary study, funded by the Swiss Stiftung für Bevölk-
erung, Migration und Umwelt (BMU), which allowed us to form the
TIES study group, comprising partners from eight European countries.
Maurice Crul and Hans Vermeulen from the Institute for Migration
and Ethnic Studies (IMES) at the University of Amsterdam acted as the
first international coordinators of the TIES team. Jens Schneider suc-
ceeded Hans Vermeulen upon his retirement. The Netherlands Inter-
disciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) was made responsible for
the international coordination of the TIES survey. Jeannette Schoorl and
Ernst Spaan were the first NIDI tandem for this particular task, with
Liesbeth Heering and George Groenewold eventually taking over. Dur-
ing 2004 and 2005, the TIES study group met in four international
workshops to discuss the development of a common research design.
The next step was to secure funding for the TIES survey itself. The
German Volkswagen Stiftung was the first to support our efforts by
granting funds for a core part of the project: a survey held in five coun-
tries among second-generation Turks and a native comparison group.
Additional national and international funding requests (including two
ESF ECRP applications) enabled the TIES group to add three more
countries and to include two additional groups. The budget for the coor-
dination and implementation of the survey now totals about 2.5 million
euros. Funding agencies in the Netherlands include NWO and NWO-
ESF EUROCORES, the Ministry of Justice (DCIM), the cities of Amster-
dam and Rotterdam as well as the Royal Academy of Sciences of the
Netherlands. Their funding enabled us to start the TIES project in
2005.
From the very start, a principal objective of the TIES team has been
to produce policy-relevant outcomes and to communicate these out-
comes to policymakers, migrant organisations and other relevant actors
on the local, national and European levels. Publication of a second TIES
report is expected to coincide with this Dutch country report. The for-
mer will be launched by the National Urban Knowledge Centre (KIEM)
under the title of De Tweede Generatie: Last of Kapitaal voor de Steden
(‘The Second Generation: A Burden or a Source of Capital for the Cities’). A
draft version of this manuscript, which addresses the issues at stake for
‘at-risk’ and successful second-generation youth, provided the input for
a workshop in May 2008 with policymakers and representatives of im-
migrant organisations from Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The Dutch
country report and the ultimate KIEM publication will be used as input
for the national round table conference on the TIES project in October
2008.
The Dutch country report is only one in a series of eight such reports
that are due to be published in 2008 and 2009. The international di-
mension is, of course, the most important added value of the TIES pro-
ject. For the first time ever, we will be able to compare the Dutch sec-
ond generation with other second generations in as many as seven
other European countries. A number of international comparative publi-
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1 Introduction
Maurice Crul and Liesbeth Heering
Immigration, combined with the subsequent integration of newcomers,
forms one of the foremost challenges to Europe’s increasingly heteroge-
neous cities. Second-generation integration – meaning integration by
children of immigrant parentage born in the country of migration – is
crucial to this process, for it is these children who constitute a growing
share of metropolitan youth today. Thus, research on second-generation
issues is particularly pertinent because it may answer many current-day
integration questions. In theory, second-generation children should
have the same chances and opportunities as children of native-born
parents. In determining whether or not this is the case, the relative po-
sition of second-generation members with regard to education and la-
bour force participation is often viewed as a robust measure of group
integration as a whole. The older children born to labour migrants are
now finishing their educational careers and are beginning to enter the
labour market in considerable numbers. The first true assessment of
second-generation integration can now be made.
This publication on the Dutch situation investigates how the integra-
tion of second generations is proceeding in various domains, including
housing, education, the labour market, social relations and finally iden-
tity and family formation. Section 1.1 gives an introduction to the his-
tory of TIES project. Section 1.2 describes the project’s theoretical and
methodological backgrounds, and Section 1.3 provides details about the
Dutch study.
1.1 The TIES project
The year 2005 saw the birth of a comprehensive international research
project on second generations in eight European countries. It was
named ‘TIES’, an acronym for The Integration of the European Second
generation (www.tiesproject.eu). The general project coordination was
put in the hands of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
(IMES) at the University of Amsterdam. The Netherlands Interdisciplin-
ary Demographic Institute (NIDI) was given the task of coordinating
the international survey included in the TIES project.
TIES studies the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, the former
Yugoslavia and Morocco in seven EU member states and Switzerland.
The term ‘second generation’ here refers to those children of immi-
grants who were born in the country of immigration and who are cur-
rently aged between eighteen and 35. For the purpose of comparison, a
group of native-born age peers has been included, of whom both par-
ents were born in the survey country itself. In our publications, the lat-
ter group is referred to as ‘the comparison group’. This label, as op-
posed to other options like ‘native Dutch’ or simply ‘Dutch’, was chosen
for two reasons: firstly, the second-generation Turks, Moroccans and
former Yugoslavs also included in the study are, by definition, native-
born and many, if not the majority, have the nationality of the country
of birth. Secondly, some members of our comparison group are them-
selves of mixed ethnic background. In the Netherlands, for instance,
the group also includes respondents of ‘third-generation’ Surinamese or
Indonesian background, to name but two examples.
The criterion of ethnic group used in the TIES study and throughout
this report is therefore a purely demographic one. In this report, the
terms ‘Turkish’ and ‘Moroccan’ simply refer to the fact that either one
or both of the respondents’ parents were born in Turkey or Morocco:
the terms do not index ethnic and/or national belonging or citizenship,
and are explicitly not a juxtaposition to ‘being Dutch’. Likewise, being a
member of the comparison group only refers to the fact that both par-
ents were born in the Netherlands: such membership should not be un-
derstood as a synonym for ‘Dutch’ or ‘native’.
We are aware of the fact that many immigrants from Morocco or Tur-
key identify themselves with categories other than national ones. Within
the Turkish second-generation group of our study, there is a small
group of respondents identifying itself as Kurdish, and in the Moroccan
second generation, there is considerable group identifying itself as Ber-
ber. We found, however, that in both second-generation groups, identifi-
cation with these minority categories blend well with self-identification
as Turkish or Moroccan (see the chapter on identities for more specific
results in this regard).
Since migration presents itself primarily as an urban phenomenon,
the TIES project is currently being realised in fifteen cities across eight
countries: Paris and Strasbourg in France; Berlin and Frankfurt in Ger-
many; Madrid and Barcelona in Spain; Vienna and Linz in Austria; Am-
sterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands; Brussels and Antwerp in
Belgium; Zurich and Basle in Switzerland; Stockholm in Sweden. In
the majority of the cities, the focus will fall on three different groups:
two second-generation groups and a comparison group. The two respec-
tive second-generation groups consist of people of Turkish or Moroccan
descent living in the Netherlands and Belgium and people of Turkish or
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former Yugoslavian descent living in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
In France and Sweden, funding could only be secured for one second-
generation group (consisting of people of Turkish descent) and a com-
parison group. Due to the fact that the influx of labour migrants in
Spain occurred at a later stage, the Spanish project will only include
Moroccans and a comparison group.
Most of the comparative European studies on integration carried out
so far have focused on immigrants in general. The heterogeneity asso-
ciated with the categories ‘immigrants’ or ‘children of immigrants’
makes it difficult to ensure truly international comparability. Studying
specific ethnic groups with similar starting positions (in this case, being
part of the second generation) makes it easier to draw up cross-national
comparisons and to assess the importance of the receiving context in in-
tegration processes. The TIES project aims to analyse the relative effects
of specific city and national contexts in promoting or hampering the in-
tegration of the second generation.
1.2 Theoretical and methodological backgrounds
The study of the second generation in Europe will test key assumptions
on integration and integration theory. Stemming from different theore-
tical perspectives, our analytical grid seeks to test a range of hypotheses
and will address major theoretical issues in the debates on integration.
We believe this will be the most effective strategy for our research.
We make use of two theoretical approaches in particular: the citizen-
ship approach and the institutional approach. The citizenship approach
assumes that national immigration and integration policies constitute
one of the major determinants of the integration process (Brubaker
1992; Castles & Miller 1993; Joppke 1999). This approach is of particu-
lar relevance for issues such as ethnic and religious identity formation,
transnationalism and family formation and partner choice (Heckmann
et al. 2001). At the same time, the institutional approach seems particu-
larly suited for the study of structural integration. A number of the se-
nior researchers in our project team (Crul & Vermeulen 2003, 2006;
Crul & Doomernik 2003; Herzog-Punzensberger 2003; Simon 2003)
developed this new line of thinking in a special issue of International
Migration Review (no. 37, vol. 4) (Crul & Vermeulen 2003, 2006). These
authors show that variations in educational and labour market status
can be linked to differences in national educational institutional ar-
rangements (starting age of compulsory schooling, number of school
contact hours in primary school, school system characteristics and prac-
tices of early or late selection in secondary education) and different
ways of formalising transitions to the labour market (in particular, the
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emphasis placed on apprenticeship systems) in the respective countries
(cf. Faist 1995; Muus 2003).
The second-generation groups in the TIES project not only belong to
an ethnic minority group, but also find themselves in a very low class
position. This has prompted a discussion on the role of class and cul-
ture in integration problems and whether or not these two factors are
intertwined in ways that are difficult to unpack analytically (Crul &
Thomson 2007).
A further question is how cultural and structural integration inter-
relate. Do cultural maintenance and a strong ethnic identity hamper
socioeconomic integration, or do they generate cultural and social capi-
tal that facilitates it? We will try to determine how relevant the theory of
segmented assimilation (Portes & Rumbaut 2001) is to the European
context.1
Gender will occupy a prominent place in our study. As we tentatively
established in International Migration Review’s special issue on the sec-
ond generation in Europe, the educational careers of second-generation
adolescents differ according to gender in the three ethnic target groups,
and labour market careers of male and female young adults differ from
country to country.
The central aim of the TIES project is to provide what would be the
first systematic cross-national comparison of the second generation in
Europe. This kind of internationally comparative, empirically grounded
research into integration processes is still very rare, especially because
it is technically very complicated, and almost no infrastructure exists for
such work. As a first step in the TIES project, a common questionnaire
for administration in all eight countries was developed. Its main topics
include education, labour market position, income, housing, ethnic and
religious identity, social relations, gender roles, partner choice and
transnationalism. In all modules, questions on experiences related to
discrimination take up a prominent position. In addition to the inter-
national survey, the national partners gathered information on national
and local institutional arrangements as well as general and group-speci-
fic policies (including anti-discrimination schemes) targeting the chil-
dren of immigrants.
In each country, we held interviews with 500 members of each ethnic
group, divided across the participating cities, and 500 members of the
same age included in the comparison groups. Table 1.1 gives an over-
view of the targets set for the survey in the eight countries involved.
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1.3 The TIES project in the Netherlands
The Netherlands, especially when compared with other European coun-
tries, has so far conducted an impressive amount of research on the
position of immigrants and their children. Until recently, the most im-
portant survey in the Netherlands was the ‘Sociale Positie en Voor-
zieningengebruik Allochtonen’ (SPVA), which was meant to assess the
social position and use of public services by immigrants. This survey
was repeated every four years from 1988 to 2002. It focused on the four
major immigrant groups (Surinamese, Antilleans, Moroccans and
Turks) residing in the Netherlands. SPVA findings have frequently been
used for the periodic compilation of national minority reports, the main
source of information on immigrants and their children in the Nether-
lands. In the SPVA, household heads were interviewed by means of an
extensive questionnaire; their partners and children were given a shor-
ter questionnaire. The survey focused on four major cities and nine
medium-sized cities.
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The ‘Survey Integratie Minderheden’ (SIM) on minority integration
recently replaced the SPVA survey (Dagevos et al. 2007). While the
SPVA targeted heads of households for most of the information col-
lected, SIM made use of a national sample of individuals. This constitu-
tes a fundamental change, resulting in a more equal gender distribution
in SIM compared with the earlier SPVA surveys. However, since SIM is
a national survey, it also means that fewer cases are covered in the lar-
ger cities.
The TIES survey targets individuals in a particular age range, rather
than heads of households. It was designed in such a way that members
of the three ethnic groups (i.e. second-generation Turks, Moroccans and
the comparison group) were sampled in the same context: that is, in
the same neighbourhood in each city. The number of second-generation
interviewees from Amsterdam and Rotterdam included in the TIES sur-
vey equals the number of both in-between and second-generation youth
aged fifteen and over in the SIM survey for the whole of the Nether-
lands. The fact that SIM intends to include people above the age of 35
means that SIM’s in-between generation will be substantive. The ulti-
mate actual overlap in eighteen- to 35-year-old respondents of the sec-
ond generation will therefore be small. Obviously, the SIM survey of
2006 is the best national reference point with which to compare the
TIES survey findings. Both surveys were conducted by Bureau Veld-
kamp in Amsterdam. Procedures followed in the field were therefore
highly similar. A complete technical description of the sampling proce-
dures and the fieldwork of the TIES survey can be found in Appendix 1.
In close cooperation with IMES, NIDI was responsible for the fieldwork
carried out in the Netherlands.
Compared with the SIM survey, the most important added value of
the TIES survey is its exclusive focus on second-generation youth. The
larger number of second-generation youth included in the TIES survey
allows more complex analyses for this group in particular. Also new in
the Dutch context is the detailed gathering of timeline data related to
education and the labour market, which makes it possible to reconstruct
school and labour market careers. Another important difference of the
TIES survey is its focus on the two largest cities in the Netherlands.
This makes our findings especially interesting for Amsterdam and
Rotterdam.
This particular TIES publication for the Netherlands contains first,
basic and mainly descriptive findings on all the main topics of the
Dutch TIES survey. Most chapters start with a short description of the
relevant structural and policy contexts of the issues at hand. The back-
ground information on, for instance, labour market policies or the
Dutch educational system has a twofold purpose: it serves not only as a
basis for interpreting survey results, but also as an introduction to some
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of the basic features of the Dutch (policy) context for a non-Dutch audi-
ence. This volume ends with a concluding chapter in which our main
findings are discussed and related to one another. A Dutch translation
of this particular chapter (especially for the benefit of our Dutch reader-
ship) can be found at the back of this volume.
More complex analyses of specific topics will be published in TIES
papers and articles, comparative publications and PhD studies. Most of
these follow-up publications will be made available through the TIES
website: www.tiesproject.eu.
Note
1 For the debate on segmented assimilation, see Alba and Nee (2003); Crul and
Vermeulen (2003); Waldinger and Perlmann (1998); Vermeulen and Perlmann
(2000).
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2 Migration history and demographic
characteristics of the two second-generation groups
Gijs Beets, Susan ter Bekke and Jeannette Schoorl
2.1 Introduction
To improve understanding of the second generation, this chapter re-
views the history and demography of the Turkish and Moroccan groups.
It looks in more detail at why they happen to be as large as they are in
the two major cities of the Netherlands, where their parents originate
and how the two groups are composed demographically. Where possi-
ble, the two groups are contrasted with the comparison group (i.e. per-
sons with both parents born in the Netherlands). Section 2.2 deals with
immigration trends and migration policies in the Netherlands, while
Section 2.3 describes the size and age-sex composition of the population
of Turkish and Moroccan descent in Amsterdam and in Rotterdam. Sec-
tion 2.4 provides a further breakdown of demographic characteristics
among second-generation Turks and Moroccans in Amsterdam and in
Rotterdam, and section 2.5 draws conclusions.
2.2 Immigration trends and migration policy: a brief historic
overview1
Up until the 1970s, the Netherlands did not consider itself an immigra-
tion country, although, from the early 1960s onwards, more people
were entering the country than leaving it. As a consequence of the eco-
nomic boom following the end of World War II, labour shortages in the
industrial sector led to an increasing demand for low-skilled workers.
As a temporary solution, low-skilled male workers were recruited from
southern European countries such as Italy (1960) and Spain (1961),
and later on also from Turkey (1964) and Morocco (1969). Many of
these so-called ‘guest workers’ worked in the textile industries, road
construction and other labour-intensive sectors (Van Amersfoort 1986;
Nicolaas et al. 2003) and settled in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and
cities in Twente and Brabant (Butter 2000).
Figure 2.1 shows the immigration of people with Turkish or
Moroccan citizenship from 1969 onwards. Since the presence of these
guest workers was considered a temporary solution to labour shortages,
both by the government and the migrants themselves, the immigrants
arrived ‘alone’, leaving their families behind and hoping to return to
their home country after a few years (Van Amersfoort 1986). The oil cri-
sis in 1973 and the following economic downfall put an end to the re-
cruitments from abroad. Most Spanish and Italian guest workers re-
turned to their country of origin due to positive economic developments
in their home countries, but many Turks and Moroccans stayed in the
Netherlands (Van Wissen & De Beer 2000). From 1973 onwards, the
immigration from Turkey and Morocco increased. In addition to some
illegal labour migration, this was mainly the result of family reunifica-
tion and – later on – family formation (Nicolaas et al. 2003). The share
of female immigrants from Turkey and Morocco rapidly increased to
over 50 per cent (see Figure 2.2), with the exception of 1975 when, as a
consequence of a one-time regularisation procedure, almost 15,000 ille-
gal workers (mostly male and about half of them Turks or Moroccans)
received a legal status (Nicolaas & Spangers 2000).2
In 1980, immigration from Turkey and Morocco reached a peak, when
17,500 Turks and 10,400 Moroccans immigrated to the Netherlands. In
the early 1980s, more restrictive labour migration policies were intro-
duced, which channelled the entrance of high-skilled immigrants. This
proved beneficial to the Dutch labour market and prohibited low-skilled
migration (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2007). Furthermore, a visa require-
ment was introduced for Turks and Moroccans, and stricter rules were
set for family reunification (Van Wissen & De Beer 2000). Both these
measures and the economic recession were probably what resulted in a
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substantial drop in immigration from Turkey and Morocco: in 1984 only
4,800 Moroccans and 4,100 Turks immigrated into the Netherlands.
Besides changes in labour migration, a new integration policy was in-
stituted. In their report on Ethnic Minorities (Wetenschappelijke Raad
voor het Regeringsbeleid 1979), the Scientific Council for Government
Policy pleaded for recognition of the fact that several immigrant groups
had settled in an effectively permanent way in the Netherlands and
most likely would not return to their country of origin (Van Amersfoort
1986). This led to the ethnic minorities policy report Minderhedennota
(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983), which proposed equality in
the socio-economic domain (particularly in the labour market, education
and housing), and paid particular attention to women and youth. Al-
ready by the end of the 1980s, these policies were being criticised
mainly for their failure to integrate the ethnic minorities in the labour
and education domains. It was thought that policies had been too
strongly focused on subsidising migrant organisations. Family reuni-
fication and, in particular, marriage migration (family formation migra-
tion) were now perceived as a problem that hindered the integration of
individuals and families in Dutch society. Nevertheless, in the second
half of the 1980s immigration of Turks and Moroccans increased again,
as the result of further marriage migration and continuing economic
growth. Family migration increased in the second half of the 1980s. By
the early 1990s, migration overall started to decrease, as did shares of
women migrants.
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Statistics Netherlands is one of the few statistical offices in the world
to employ a definition of the immigrant and indigenous population that
includes information on the native-born descendants of immigrants. The
Dutch population registers collect information on country of birth and ci-
tizenship, as well as on country of birth of both parents. Statistics Nether-
lands refers to ‘allochtonen’, or persons of foreign descent, as those who
were either born abroad themselves (the ‘first generation’) or those who
were born in the Netherlands to at least one parent born abroad (the ‘sec-
ond generation’). The population of Turkish descent in 2007 now
amounts to 364,300 and that of Moroccan descent to 323,200.
There is considerable discrepancy between outcomes of data by coun-
try of birth, by nationality and by descent (i.e. the combination of data
by country of birth and parents’ country of birth). In 2006, for instance,
according to data from Statistics Netherlands, the number of Turkish ci-
tizens in the Netherlands was 86,200, and the number born in Turkey
(irrespective of nationality) was more than twice as large (196,000).
The population of Turkish descent was again almost twice as large:
364,300. For Moroccans, the figures are comparable: 98,900 (citizens),
168,600 (country of birth) and 323,200 (descent).
The difference between these figures is to a large extent due to the
combined effect of naturalisation trends and fertility. According to
Dutch law, the main way to obtain Dutch nationality is through birth to
a Dutch father (ius sanguini) or, since 1985, to a Dutch mother. Before
the Nationality Act of 2003, foreigners who applied for the naturalisa-
tion procedure were granted citizenship if they had (legally) resided in
the Netherlands for at least five years, had a sufficient command of the
Dutch language and were clear of serious criminal record (Groenendijk
2004). With the Nationality Act of 2003 some further restrictions were
introduced, the most important of which is the formal naturalisation
exam in which the applicant’s degree of integration is tested. Such
restrictions led to a 67 per cent decrease in applications between 2002
and 2004. About half of the applicants failed the test, while under the
more lenient pre-2003 rules, only 1 to 2 per cent of the applications
were denied for reasons of insufficient integration. The requirement to
renounce one’s original nationality was temporarily abolished (1992-
1997); the 2003 act also lists a number of exemptions. Currently, 63
per cent of those acquiring citizenship through the naturalisation proce-
dure keep their original nationality (Van Oers et al. 2006). For those
with Moroccan nationality, this is up to 100 per cent, as they cannot
even renounce their citizenship, according to Moroccan law.
The third generation (i.e. grandchildren of immigrants) do not have
to apply for naturalisation. They receive Dutch citizenship automatically
based on the principle of ius soli, i.e. their birth in the Netherlands. The
Nationality Act of 2003 also provides for the possibility of the second
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generation acquiring Dutch nationality, based on the same principle.
Since 1985, children of immigrants – if they were born in the Nether-
lands and have resided in the country since birth – may also receive
Dutch citizenship by the simpler ‘option’ procedure. This procedure was
extended to several other categories in the Nationality Act of 2003. The
option procedure is less rigorous in the sense that it exempts applicants
from the integration requirement and the obligation to renounce one’s
original nationality. However, since 2003’s act came into effect, an inves-
tigation of public order is nonetheless instituted and a fee is charged,
just as in the regular naturalisation procedure (Van Oers et al. 2006).
2.3 People of Turkish and Moroccan descent in Amsterdam and
Rotterdam
The TIES project was carried out in the two largest cities of the Nether-
lands. In 2006, Amsterdam had 743,000 inhabitants and Rotterdam,
589,000. Both metropolises are located in the western part of the coun-
try and belong to the Randstad, a densely populated string of cities
within a short distance of each other encircling the country’s so-called
‘Green Heart’, a mostly rural and relatively sparsely inhabited area. Am-
sterdam and Rotterdam are the most significant economic centres in
the country, and their economic power is enhanced by the international
airport Schiphol being located a short distance from Amsterdam, and
by the large Europoort transfer port of Rotterdam. Schiphol and Euro-
poort raise a large share of the national income.
It is precisely these two cities that have attracted many immigrants
since the 1960s, more so than elsewhere in or outside the Randstad,
although The Hague comes close. Currently, Amsterdam is the world’s
leading city with regard to the number of different nationalities repre-
sented by its inhabitants (about 175).
Turkish and Moroccan migration trends to the two cities are compar-
able to the ups and downs of the national trends (see Figure 2.3). In
general, Amsterdam has attracted more migrants than Rotterdam. And
although Amsterdam is home to more Moroccans, Turks have migrated
in larger numbers to Rotterdam. In 2006, of all people of Moroccan
descent living in the Netherlands, 20.2 per cent lived in Amsterdam
and 11.3 per cent in Rotterdam. For people of Turkish descent these per-
centages are 10.5 for Amsterdam and 12.4 for Rotterdam.
In both cities, the share of migrants (first generation) and migrant
descendants (second generation) among the total population is high: 49
per cent in Amsterdam and 46 per cent in Rotterdam. In the Nether-
lands as a whole, the number is 19 per cent. Among this national per-
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Figure 2.3 Total population (top), Dutch population (bottom) and total number of Turks +
Moroccans in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, by age group, absolute numbers, 2006
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Figure 2.4 First- and second-generation Turks (top) and Moroccans (bottom) in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam, by age group, absolute numbers, 2006
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centage, people of Turkish descent form the largest group, then fol-
lowed by people of Surinamese and Moroccan descent.
Surinamese comprise the largest group in both cities. The population
of Moroccan descent is, at 9 per cent, the second largest group in Am-
sterdam, while people of Turkish descent form 5 per cent of the total
Amsterdam population. In Rotterdam, Turks are, at 8 per cent, the sec-
ond largest group and Moroccans follow closely at 6 per cent.
In both cities and for both groups, the share of first-generation immi-
grants is still larger than that of the second generation. In 2006, there
were 65,400 people of Moroccan descent living in Amsterdam, of
which 47 per cent belong to the second generation. The population of
Turkish descent in Amsterdam is only half as numerous: 38,300 in to-
tal, of which 43 per cent is of the second generation. In Rotterdam, peo-
ple of Moroccan descent number at 45,200 and those of Turkish des-
cent, at 36,700; the shares of the second generation are 47 per cent and
48 per cent, respectively.
In both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, first-generation Moroccans and
Turks are heavily concentrated in age groups of 30 years and upwards;
the second generation is concentrated in age groups of up to twenty
years (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). People of Turkish and Moroccan descent
form only a small share of the total population, though this is much
less the case in the younger age groups. Up to age twenty, about a quar-
ter of the two cities’ total population is of Turkish or Moroccan descent;
between the ages of twenty and 30, about one in six; between the ages
of 30 and 40, one in eight.
2.4 Demographic characteristics of the second generation in the
TIES survey
We now turn to a description of the basic demographic characteristics
of the TIES survey population. From the previous section, it became
apparent that, even though they are only between eighteen and 35 years
old, our respondents belong to the second generation’s oldest age
groups at present. It was noted, furthermore, that Amsterdam is home
to more people of Moroccan descent than is Rotterdam, but that Rotter-
dam is home to more people of Turkish descent than is Amsterdam.
2.4.1 Demographic characteristics of the second generation
The age and sex distribution of the survey population corresponds with
that based on official statistical data of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The
second generation is still relatively young: within the survey age range
of eighteen to 35, those in their late teens and early twenties (second-
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generation Moroccans) and those in their twenties (second-generation
Turks) form the majority (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Over the two cities com-
bined, the Moroccan second generation is younger than the Turkish,
and both are younger than the comparison group. Second-generation
Amsterdam Turks are, at 24.7 years, on average one year older than the
second-generation Amsterdam Moroccans, though they are 3.5 years
younger than the Amsterdam comparison group. Second-generation
Turks in Rotterdam are more than two years older than second-genera-
tion Rotterdam Moroccans and only 2.5 years younger than the Rotter-
dam comparison group.
A large majority of the second-generation Turks and Moroccans – 94
and 93 per cent, respectively – has Dutch nationality (Table 2.3). Among
them, many have Turkish or Moroccan citizenship as well. Second-
generation Turks more often have such dual nationality than second-
generation Moroccans. This result is surprising because, according to
Moroccan law, one cannot give up his or her Moroccan nationality.
However, it may be possible that, in some cases, parents of second-
generation Moroccan respondents did not register their children after
Table 2.1 Age distribution, by ethnic group and sex in Amsterdam
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
18-19 13.9 8.3 20.8 17.2 1.9 3.4
20-24 31.8 44.8 43.9 43.0 21.7 22.5
25-29 37.4 31.9 24.1 29.7 32.6 32.2
30-36 16.9 14.9 11.2 10.1 43.7 41.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean age 24.8 24.5 23.4 23.8 28.1 28.0
Standard deviation 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.6 4.3
N 109 128 119 123 123 136
Table 2.2 Age distribution, by ethnic group and sex in Rotterdam
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
18-19 8.4 9.2 31.3 23.9 5.1 7.9
20-24 46.7 37.6 40.5 46.9 21.7 28.1
25-29 29.3 36.8 21.4 17.4 34.4 19.7
30-36 15.6 16.5 6.8 11.8 38.8 44.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean age 24.8 25.4 22.4 23.2 27.7 27.6
Standard deviation 4.3 4.6 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.3
N 133 130 127 124 127 126
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birth to acquire Moroccan citizenship. Those who do not actually have a
Moroccan passport reported single, rather than dual, citizenship. Just
over half of second-generation Turks (52 per cent) and Moroccans (57
per cent) indicated that they received Dutch nationality at birth. There
are no statistically significant differences by ethnic group and sex.
Those who did not receive Dutch nationality at birth were, on average,
sixteen to seventeen years old when they naturalised.
Not all second-generation Turks and Moroccans grew up in the same
neighbourhood as where they were living at the time of the survey. In
general, about four to five out of every ten second-generation Turk or
Moroccan lived somewhere else3 during their early to mid-teenage years
(Table 2.4). There are statistically significant differences by ethnic
group, though not by sex. Members of the comparison group are con-
siderably more mobile: more than eight out of ten lived somewhere else
during their early to mid-teens. In this regard, there is some difference
between Rotterdam and Amsterdam, in that Amsterdam is home to a
slightly more mobile population.
2.4.2 Demographic characteristics of the parents
In terms of survey eligibility, at least one parent of a second-generation
Turkish respondent had to have been born in Turkey and at least one
parent of a second-generation Moroccan respondent had to have been
born in Morocco, while the requirement for the comparison group was
to have had both parents born in the Netherlands. Table 2.5 shows that,
Table 2.3 Citizenship, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Dutch only 35.4 52.2
Dual 58.6 40.4




Table 2.4 Neighbourhood of residence during early to mid-teens (ages 12-16), by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Same as now 57.1 55.6 16.1
Different 42.9 44.4 83.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 434 409 470
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of almost all second-generation respondents, both parents were born in
Turkey or Morocco. Just 6 per cent of the Moroccan second generation
had a father or mother born in the Netherlands or, in a few cases, an-
other country. For second-generation Turks, the percentage was even
lower: a mere 3 per cent has a parent who was born in the Netherlands
(in most cases, it was the mother).
Some parents had migrated to the Netherlands at a fairly young age.
One of the survey questions pertained to the place where parents had
lived the most up until age fifteen. Around 3 per cent of the fathers and
6 per cent of the mothers of both second-generation Turkish and
Moroccan respondents were already in the Netherlands at that time of
their life. Thus, for this minority of respondents, not only were they
themselves socialised and educated in Dutch society, but so was one of
their parents.
First-generation Turkish parents mainly originate from five provinces
located in the centre of Turkey: Kayseri, Karaman, Sivas, Ankara and
Yozgat (Map 2.1). First-generation Turkish fathers in Amsterdam mainly
come from Ankara, whereas first-generation Turkish mothers in Am-
Map 2.1 Main areas of origin of Turkish parents are coloured dark grey.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey
Table 2.5 Parents’ country of birth, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Both in Turkey/Morocco 96.8 93.9
Father in Turkey/Morocco, mother in the Netherlands 2.5 2.9
Father in the Netherlands, mother in Turkey/Morocco 0.5 1.1
Father in Turkey/Morocco, mother elsewhere 0.0 1.4
Father elsewhere, mother in Turkey/Morocco 0.2 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0
N 500 488
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sterdam come from Ankara and Karaman. First-generation Turkish
fathers and mothers in Rotterdam both originate mainly from Kayseri
(not statistically significant).
Almost three out of ten first-generation Moroccan parents come from
the country’s north-east Oriental region. Another approximately 16 per
cent originates from Tanger-Tetouan (Morocco’s most northern area op-
posite Gibraltar) or from Taza-Al Hoceïma-Taounate, also in the north
(see Map 2.2). First-generation Moroccan parents in Amsterdam origi-
nate more often from Tanger, while those in Rotterdam more often
from Taza (this fact is statistically significant).
The majority of the fathers arrived in the Netherlands during the per-
iod 1965-1974, and most mothers, between 1975 and 1984. The figures
in Table 2.6 correlate with overall immigration trends observed for the
Netherlands as a whole (see Figure 2.1).
Table 2.6 Parents’ year of immigration, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Mother Father Mother Father
<=1959 0.1 2.1 1.0 4.7
1960-1964 2.3 6.7 2.3 8.7
1965-1969 10.2 18.4 4.8 24.8
1970-1974 24.4 31.0 21.8 25.9
1975-1979 36.9 26.5 33.1 23.9
1980-1984 17.7 11.9 27.2 7.3
>= 1985 8.3 3.4 9.9 4.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 391 394 396 394
Map 2.2 Main areas of origin of Moroccan parents are coloured dark grey.
The two southern-most regions on the map reflect the Western Sahara. Although Morocco
recognises the area as its own so-called Southern Provinces, the issue of sovereignty re-
mains internationally disputed.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morocco
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Only a few first-generation Turkish and Moroccan fathers have been
in the Netherlands for less than twenty years; the majority of them have
lived in the country for at least 30 years. Their average duration of resi-
dence is about 33 to 34 years, being a little longer for the Moroccans
than for the Turks. We can speculate on the reason for this difference,
though it is not statistically significant: is it only chance, or have differ-
ential emigration rates affected the average duration of residence? The
process of family reunification started earlier among Turks than it did
among Moroccans, which is still reflected in the slightly lower overall
duration of residence of the first-generation Moroccan mothers (28.6
years) when compared to that of first-generation Turkish mothers (29.7
years) (see Table 2.7). Reasons for parents to come to the Netherlands
correspond with what is known from the migration literature: three-
quarters of both the first-generation Turkish and Moroccan mothers mi-
grated because of marriage or family reunion reasons, while two-thirds
of the first-generation Turkish fathers and four-fifths of the Moroccan
fathers migrated for work.
What is the current situation of respondents’ parents? Already de-
ceased by the time of the survey were about 2 per cent of first-genera-
tion Moroccan mothers, 4 per cent of first-generation Turkish mothers
and 4 per cent of mothers in the comparison group. Corresponding fig-
ures for deceased fathers are as follows: 9 per cent among the Moroc-
cans, 10 percent among the Turks and 10 per cent among the compari-
son group. The lower survival ratio for the fathers is most likely related
to their older age structure: the survey data on parents who are still
alive indicate that first-generation Turkish mothers are an average of 50
years old and first-generation Moroccan mothers, 51, while mothers
born in the Netherlands, 56. Turkish fathers are an average of 54 years
old, Moroccan fathers, 57, and the fathers of the comparison group, 58.
Table 2.7 Parents’ duration of residence in the Netherlands, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Mother Father Mother Father
<=19 years 2.1 1.3 4.2 1.3
20-24 years 16.4 7.3 20.0 6.8
25-29 years 30.1 23.9 32.6 16.9
30-39 years 45.7 51.7 39.2 55.1
>=40 years 5.7 15.8 4.1 20.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean duration (years) 29.7 32.7 28.6 33.9
Standard deviation 5.6 6.7 6.3 6.6
N 376 362 389 363
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The age difference between Moroccan spouses is considerably larger
than that of the other two groups. This phenomenon is consistent with
what is known from statistics on age differences upon marriage in Mor-
occo and in Turkey. Respondents in the comparison group are twice as
likely as second-generation Turks and Moroccans to have parents with
an age difference of less than one year or to have a mother who is older
than her spouse.
If both parents are still alive, practically all are married: 98 per cent
of first-generation Turkish parents, 96 per cent of first-generation
Moroccan parents and 95 per cent of the comparison group’s parents.
About one-third of the parents still only hold the nationality of their
country of origin (Table 2.8). Around 60 per cent of parents have dual
citizenship. This means that the majority of the parents are also Dutch
by nationality. Comparing the parents with their children, we see that
holding only Dutch nationality is more common for the second genera-
tion. One-third of the Turkish second generation have only Dutch citi-
zenship, as compared to less than 5 per cent of their parents; half of the
Moroccan second generation reports having Dutch citizenship only
(despite the fact that according to Moroccan law it is not possible to give
up Moroccan citizenship), as compared to about 4 per cent of their
parents.
The survey also contains indicators of parents’ educational level and
employment status just before their migration to the Netherlands. Both
indicators are based on answers by the second-generation respondents.
More than half of the first-generation Moroccan and Turkish mothers
and almost half of these fathers did not attend school or only had
primary education (Table 2.9). Mothers, more often than fathers, and
Moroccans, more often than Turks, did not attend school at all. Attend-
ing only a Koran school was more characteristic of first-generation Mor-
occans than first-generation Turks.
Having parents who reached a high level of education is rather com-
mon among the comparison group – more than a quarter of the
mothers of the comparison group and even a larger share of the fathers
Table 2.8 Parents’ citizenship, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Mother Father Mother Father
Both 61.4 59.3 56.9 58.6
Only Dutch 3.8 4.4 4.7 3.3
Only country of origin 32.8 32.6 34.8 32.6
Do not know 1.9 3.7 3.6 5.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 482 494 467 483
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is highly educated. Among first-generation Moroccan and Turkish
fathers, this is less than 8 per cent, and the figures are even lower for
the mothers.
With respect to parents’ employment status before coming to the
Netherlands, we see from Table 2.10 that more than half of the first-
generation Turkish and Moroccan fathers had a paid job or business.
Only 8 per cent of the first-generation Moroccan mothers and 10 per
cent of the first-generation Turkish mothers had a job before migrating.
Table 2.11 gives some further information on the father’s job vis-à-vis
its SBC level (the Dutch standard occupational classification). The ma-
jority of both first-generation Turkish and Moroccan fathers had a job at
the lower or secondary level. Only 3 per cent of the Turkish fathers and
Table 2.9 Parents’ (highest) level of education, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Mother Father Mother Father Mother Father
Did not attend school 16.8 7.3 39.7 21.2 0.2 0.8
Only attended a Koran
school, religious lessons
0.2 0.6 2.1 8.9 0.0 0.0
Primary school 46.9 40.8 20.4 22.7 5.2 6.9
Lower vocational
education
7.5 11.2 3.8 4.9 19.1 14.5
Lower general
secondary education
11.5 11.2 10.3 6.0 17.6 9.4
Middle vocational
education
3.8 10.6 7.1 9.2 22.6 16.5
Higher general
secondary education
1.3 2.0 2.0 3.1 6.6 6.4
Tertiary education (Bachelor) 1.5 4.0 0.9 3.0 16.8 20.4
Tertiary education (Master) 1.6 1.8 0.2 0.8 6.4 18.4
Do not know 9.0 10.5 13.5 20.1 5.5 6.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 500 500 492 492 512 512
Table 2.10 Mother/father worked before migrating to the Netherlands, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Mother Father Mother Father
Yes 10.3 55.8 8.3 62.7
No 84.5 30.5 84.9 19.8
Don’t know 5.3 13.7 6.8 17.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 467 472 460 480
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2 per cent of the Moroccan fathers had a job at the higher or scientific
level before migrating. It has to be taken into account that 15 per cent
of the second-generation Turkish and 23 per cent of the second-genera-
tion Moroccan respondents did not know their fathers job before mi-
grating.
2.4.3 Demographic characteristics of the siblings
One-child families are uncommon among the Turkish and Moroccan
first-generation parents: less than 3 per cent of the Turkish and
Moroccan second-generation respondents report that they do not have
any brothers or sisters; across the comparison group, this figure is al-
most three times as high (8 per cent). Moroccan families are larger than
Turkish ones, while the families in the comparison group are the smal-
lest. The Turkish second generation has 3.0 brothers and sisters on
average; the Moroccan second generation, 5.2; and the respondents in
the comparison group, just 1.6 (Table 2.12).
Table 2.11 Occupation of father before migration to the Netherlands, according to SBC*












Table 2.12 Number of siblings, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
None 1.1 2.3 7.7
1 15.9 3.4 50.8
2 27.8 8.6 25.2
3 27.3 16.7 9.9
4+ 27.8 69.0 6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean 3.0 5.2 1.6
Standard deviation 1.7 2.9 1.2
N 500 493 512
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2.4.4 Household size and position
About one-third of the respondents in the comparison group lives
alone, while another one-third lives with only one other person in the
household. Among the second-generation Turks and Moroccans, three-
quarters live in households of at least three persons (Table 2.13).
Second-generation Moroccans live in households of five or more other
persons more often than second-generation Turks do. There is hardly
any difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam in this respect: in
both cities the household size of the Turkish families is, on average, 3.6
persons, while that of the Moroccan families is 4.1. Among the small
percentage of second-generation Turks and Moroccans who live alone,
there are hardly any women, though slightly more women than men
live alone among the comparison group.
The differences found among second-generation Turks and Moroc-
cans and the comparison group may be partially explained by the fact
that the comparison group is, on average, a few years older, as well as
by the fact that unmarried children in Turkish and Moroccan families
are less likely to leave the parental home. When a division is made ac-
cording to whether respondents have their own household or are still
living in the parental household, we see that the latter are much larger
than the former. We can also detect (from the number of respondents
in Table 2.13) that many more respondents live in their own households
than with their parents, and that, among Moroccans, the percentage
living with parents is the largest, while it is lowest for the comparison
group. This finding is a reflection of the variation in age.
Two-thirds of the Turkish respondents lives in their own households
(i.e. not their parents’ household) (Table 2.14). This share is still less
than that of the comparison group, among whom almost nine out of
Table 2.13 Household size, by ethnic group and type of household
Second generation













1 7.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 38.2 0.0
2 20.0 11.3 23.3 7.2 37.5 13.6
3 25.6 18.9 21.4 7.4 15.0 38.1
4 26.9 34.0 16.0 24.0 7.7 32.9
5+ 20.4 35.7 21.6 61.5 1.5 15.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean 3.4 4.2 3.2 5.3 2.0 3.5
Standard
deviation
1.4 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.0 1.0
N 342 158 277 216 456 56
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ten are found to be living in their own households. Living in one’s own
household for Moroccans is nearly as common (46 per cent) as living
in the household of one’s parents or grandparents (44 per cent). Per-
haps the high share of adult children in Moroccan parental households
is related to the fact that the Moroccans we surveyed are, on average,
younger than the other two groups, and that they tend to marry later
than Turks. In any case, living in the parental household is least com-
mon among the comparison group. Only for Moroccans are there statis-
tically significant differences between men and women.
Main reasons for leaving the home and living independently differ
among the three groups (Table 2.15). Getting married is the most impor-
tant reason for Turks and, though less so, it remains an important reason
for Moroccans. For both Turks and Moroccans, differences by sex were
statistically significant; women were more likely to leave the parental
home for reasons of marriage than men. The most important reason for
Moroccan men to leave the parental home was to live independently. In
the comparison group, pursuing studies was the most important reason
Table 2.14 Household composition, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
One-person household 6.2 3.7 14.6 5.0 32.3 36.4
Respondent in own household 62.0 68.3 35.2 57.4 56.0 55.5
Respondent in household of
parents/grandparents
31.8 27.9 50.2 37.7 11.7 8.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 242 258 246 247 250 262
Table 2.15 Reasons for leaving the parental home in %, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Marriage 38.2 19.9 1.6
Living together 8.2 6.9 15.9
Live independently 22.5 28.1 23.1
Study 13.2 21.3 52.7
Work 3.4 3.1 4.4
Parents went back to country
of origin
3.0 1.4 n.a.
Problems with parents 10.8 6.3 4.5
Other 8.3 20.0 4.6
N 350 300 456
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because respondents could give more than one
reason.
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to leave home. This last figure may be inflated, given that Amsterdam and
Rotterdam are both important centres for higher education. Nevertheless,
among the comparison group, leaving the parental home for education
purposes was more common than leaving in order to cohabit (as opposed
to get married), which came in at second place, and leaving to live inde-
pendently, which came in at third place. Only for the comparison group
did we find statistically significant sex differences for living together; com-
parison group women were more likely to leave the parental home to live
together than their male counterparts. Pursuing studies was the third
most important reason for Turks; Turkish men were (statistically) more
likely to leave the parental home for study than Turkish women.
2.5 Conclusions
The immigration history of the Turkish and the Moroccan populations
dates back to the mid-1960s. Apart from the Surinamese, these two
groups form the largest populations of foreign descent in the Nether-
lands. The country’s two major cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam
have attracted big shares of both groups, with Moroccans being the
more dominant in Amsterdam and Turks in Rotterdam. The first gen-
eration is still larger than the second generation, but the latter is in-
creasing rapidly, relative to the former. One in four Amsterdam and
Rotterdam residents below twenty years old is of Turkish or Moroccan
descent, frequently being a member of the second generation. As family
reunification took place basically between the mid-1970s and the mid-
1980s, the second generation is still young on average, and this is re-
flected in the mean age of our survey population (age group 18-35
years): the Moroccans are, on average, 23.3 years old, the Turks, 24.9,
while the comparison group, at 27.9, is oldest. A large majority of the
second generation has Dutch citizenship – about half of them have held
it since birth – and quite often they hold dual citizenship. In this re-
spect, they differ from their parents, about one-third of whom still does
not have Dutch citizenship.
Most of the second generation’s fathers migrated to the Netherlands
in the period 1965-1974, and most of the mothers in the years 1975-
1984, overwhelmingly because of work (for fathers) or family reunifi-
cation (for mothers). Very few respondents are of ‘mixed’ origin, i.e.
having one parent who was born in the Netherlands. Moroccan parents
largely originate from northern and north-eastern Morocco, Turkish par-
ents originate from central Anatolia, the Asian mainland of Turkey.
A large minority of Moroccans still live at home with their parents,
while the comparison group is most likely to live alone or in their own
household. Turks take a middle position. The age difference between
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the three groups certainly informs some of the explanation, but so do
the cultural values attached to leaving home: Turks and Moroccans,
especially females, tend to live with their parents until they get married,
while it is quite common for comparison group respondents to leave
the parental household upon high school graduation. This latter fact
also explains the relatively high shares of young comparison group
members living alone.
Notes
1 This section draws on papers by Choenni (2000) and Bruquetas-Callejo et al. (2007)
as well as publications by the Netherlands Social and Cultural Planning Office, e.g.
Dagevos & Gijsberts (2007).
2 These individuals were entered into the statistical system as though they were new
immigrants in the year of the regularisation.
3 Just a few respondents indicated that they lived in Turkey or Morocco during their
early to mid-teens. They were listed in the survey as belonging to the second
generation because of eligibility on other grounds.
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3 Housing and segregation
Carlo van Praag and Jeannette Schoorl
3.1 Introduction
Housing is a basic necessity but also a scarce and expensive commodity.
For these reasons, in many countries public authorities do not leave the
distribution of housing entirely to the free market, but intervene in
favour of the low-income groups who find it difficult or impossible to
find decent accommodation on their own. In the present chapter, we
will first look at the housing situation of people of Turkish and
Moroccan descent in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (section 3.2), as well
as at issues of segregation and concentration in the two cities (section
3.3). Housing policies will be discussed in section 3.4. We will then look
in more detail at the housing situation of the second generation in Am-
sterdam and Rotterdam (section 3.5), in comparison with the contextual
data presented in the earlier sections of this chapter.
3.2 Housing situation
In the Netherlands, government intervention in the housing sector used
to be especially strong, and gave rise to an extensive and very complex
system of measures involving many parties of the rental housing mar-
ket and affecting the majority of consumers. While the system was
mostly abolished in the 1990s, the Dutch housing market still clearly
shows remnants of the system. It boasts a relatively large rental sector
(44 per cent of the total housing stock), which is dominated by public
housing (34 per cent of the total housing stock) in the big cities. Notably
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, these features stand out all the more.
The majority of the dwellings there are part of the public rental sector.
Both cities are, moreover, characterised by the relative absence of sin-
gle-family dwellings and the dominance of small flats and the compara-
tively large proportion of older housing (Table 3.1).
While public interference with housing has significantly decreased
over the past decades, some major facilities are still in operation and de-
serve mention. A large part of the rental sector is still subject to price
control, and many tenants pay probably less than the market price.
One-third of the tenants also profit from individual rent relief. What’s
more, house owners can deduct the interest paid on their mortgage
from their taxable income.
As demonstrated by Table 3.1, the housing corporations own more than
half of the dwelling stock in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Owner-occu-
pancy does not occur nearly as much with Turks and Moroccans as with
the comparison group. It is on the rise, however (SCP/WODC/CBS
2005). Outside the two cities the chance of owner-occupancy among peo-
ple of Turkish or Moroccan descent is nearly twice as high as within.
Right from the start, the population of Turkish and Moroccan descent
has been lagging behind the rest of the population, no doubt because of
their relatively low incomes and their concentration in the big cities. In
the past, discrimination in the housing market, by private landlords as
well as public housing corporations, also contributed to these arrears.
Over the last two decades, the gap has narrowed to some extent (SCP/
WODC/CBS 2005). Data displayed in Table 3.2 are derived from the na-
tional WoOn survey (2006) on the housing situation in the Netherlands
undertaken in 2006. Though the sample was rather large (64,000 re-
spondents), it was still too small to shed sufficient light on the housing
situation of particular ethnic groups, such as Turks or Moroccans, in
either Amsterdam or Rotterdam. However, when the two ethnic groups
and the two cities were taken together, the number of cases was suffi-
ciently large to permit the presentation of some basic results.
It becomes clear from Table 3.2 that a greater proportion of Turks or
Moroccans occupy flats or apartments than do members of the compar-
ison group. On the whole, the former’s housing situation is less favour-
able. Their dwellings are smaller than those of the comparison group
and date more often from the 1950s and 1960s, which implies that they
are of lower quality (not yet having been subjected to urban renewal)
than pre-war housing. Turks and Moroccans are less often to be found
in houses built in more recent periods. Because of their larger house-
holds and the fewer rooms available, the average number of persons
per room stands at 1.0, whereas it is only 0.71 for the comparison
group.












Amsterdam 80 53 15 62 59
Rotterdam 71 55 27 45 48
The Netherlands 44 34 71 20 33
Source: www.grotevier.nl
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Table 3.3 shows that the overwhelming majority of Turks or Moroccans,
both in the two big cities and in the country as a whole, are part of the
public rental sector. A much smaller though still sizable share of the
Dutch big-city dwellers also rents from a public housing corporation.
As has been demonstrated by Table 3.1, these corporations own more
than half of the dwelling stock in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Owner-
occupancy does not occur nearly as much with Turks or Moroccans as
Table 3.2 Dwelling characteristics of ethnic groups in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the










Single-family dwellings 35.9 11.5 45.3
Flats/apartment complexes 64.1 88.5 54.7
Building period
Before 1945 36.1 29.5 16.3
1945-1959 10.2 18.3 17.4
1959-1969 9.6 10.8 18.6
1970-1979 9.3 6.9 16.1
1980-1989 15.3 19.6 16.2
1990-1999 15.3 11.9 11.0
2000 or later 4.1 3.1 4.3
Average number of rooms 3.90 3.72 4.02
Surface available (m2)
Living room 32.4 24.4 27.4
Total dwelling 101.7 74.7 93.1
Source: WoON 2006











Owner-occupied 38.6 12.1 23.5
Public rental sector 42.9 79.9 72.0
Private rental sector 18.5 8.0 4.5
Rent and rent subsidy
Gross rent (C per month) 451 379 401
Average rent subsidy for all
tenants (C per month)
24 69 67
Net rent (C per month) 427 310 334
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with the comparison group. It is on the rise, however (SCP/WODC/
CBS 2005). Outside the two cities the chance of owner-occupancy
among Turks or Moroccans is nearly twice as high as within.
Though Turks or Moroccans pay lower gross rents than the compari-
son group, they are eligible for rent subsidy far more often on account
of their lower incomes. As a result, the average net rent they pay lies
considerably under the level of the comparison group.
3.3 Concentration and segregation
In both cities, slightly over 14 per cent of the population is of either
Moroccan or Turkish descent. They are unevenly spread out over the
city. While in many neighbourhoods both groups taken together do not
exceed 5 per cent of the population, in other neighbourhoods, 30 per
cent and over are found (see Maps 3.1 and 3.2). In one Amsterdam
neighbourhood, no less than two-thirds of the population is either of
Moroccan or Turkish descent.
In Rotterdam, the areas in which Moroccans and Turks are concen-
trated still follow the same pattern as that discerned in the 1920s by Park
and Burgess of the Chicago School in sociology. These areas, situated in
a concentric zone (the so-called zone in transition) around the central
business district, are struck by urban blight and offer the cheapest and
Map 3.1 Population of Turkish and Moroccan descent as a percentage of the total population
in postal code areas of Amsterdam, 1 January 2007
Source: GBA Amsterdam
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the worst available housing. In the present situation, urban blight is
hardly a factor anymore, though it can still be maintained that the bottom
of the housing market is, as before, to be found in the neighbourhoods
around the central business district. Originally, Amsterdam presented a
similar picture, with relative concentrations of Moroccan and Turkish
neighbourhoods around the city centre during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Though remnants of this pattern are still discern-
able, the overall picture has become quite different. Moroccans and
Turks show a massive concentration in the post-war neighbourhoods in
the west of the town and more recently, in the north. These neighbour-
hoods date mainly from the 1950s and 1960s and are dominated by the
public rental sector. The pre-war neighbourhoods have become increas-
ingly popular with young urban professionals and have undergone sig-
nificant gentrification. Many dwellings there are now owner-occupied.
As a result, the bottom of the housing market has shifted to more recent
neighbourhoods farther away from the city centre.
Turks and Moroccans live mostly in the same neighbourhoods. Their
mutual segregation (as expressed by the index of dissimilarity) is only
10.6 in Amsterdam and 16.7 in Rotterdam. The corresponding coeffi-
cients of correlation are 0.97 and 0.87, respectively. The neighbour-
hoods in which the two groups are concentrated often have non-western
majorities. In the 36 neighbourhoods with more than 20 per cent Mor-
occans or Turks in their population, 24 have non-western majorities. All
of the eighteen neighbourhoods where more than 30 per cent of the po-
pulation is of Moroccan or Turkish descent have non-western majori-
ties. Maps 3.1 and 3.2 suggest a certain level of segregation of the two
groups from the rest of the population and from the comparison group
population in particular. Table 3.4 can only confirm this assumption.
Map 3.2 Population of Turkish and Moroccan descent as a percentage of the total population
in postal code areas of Rotterdam, 1 January 2007
Source: GBA Rotterdam
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In Amsterdam, a quarter of the Moroccans reside in a number of
neighbourhoods where only 11.5 per cent of the total population is
settled, and half of them are concentrated in an area that lodges no
more than 22 per cent of the total population. If the distributions of
Moroccans and the rest of the population are compared in their totality,
the index of segregation that can be computed stands at 40.6.
The Turks and Moroccans are among the most segregated groups of
the population. Indices of segregation in both cities for the total popula-
tion of non-western descent (including Turks and Moroccans) amount
to 37 (not in Table 3.4).
3.4 Housing policies
Unlike asylum seekers, ethnic groups do not form special target groups
in housing policy. As a result of their comparatively modest incomes
and their concentration in the big cities, Turks and Moroccans are over-
represented in the public housing sector.
The main focus of concern in the two cities has been and still is the
concentration of immigrants in certain neighbourhoods. In the past,
the local authorities in several cities made attempts in the direction of a
dispersal policy, essentially by influencing the housing allocation in
such a way that the growth of the ethnic minorities would be curbed in
districts where they were concentrated, while at the same time entry
into other areas would be promoted.
The prime protagonist was the city of Rotterdam which, as early as
1972, wanted to link the allocation of housing to the ethnic composition
of the neighbourhoods. The programme was annulled by the state as
being discriminatory. Again, in 1979, Rotterdam came up with a similar
proposal, which was likewise aborted on account of fierce opposition























Moroccans 11.5 22.0 40.6 44.8
Turks 8.0 18.9 43.6 49.2
Rotterdam
Moroccans 10.9 22.6 39.3 51.8
Turks 8.0 19.7 41.8 53.4
Source: Statistics Netherlands
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from welfare and immigrant organisations. In later years, attention
shifted from the ethnic composition of specific neighbourhoods to the
ethnic composition of the city as a whole. The local authorities in Rot-
terdam showed a growing concern about the influx of non-western im-
migrants and the simultaneous suburbanisation of more prosperous
comparison group members with impoverishment of the city as a re-
sult. In 2003, the Council adopted a proposal to adapt the Huisvestings-
wet (Housing Act) in such a way that it could be used to restrict the
right of settlement in certain districts of Rotterdam to those with in-
comes above a certain level. In effect, the measure was directed at non-
western immigrants. This time the national government went along
with the Rotterdam authorities, and from 2006 on, the new policy was
officially applied. It is yet too early to assess the effects of this policy on
the composition of the Rotterdam population, but they cannot be very
strong, because only a very limited area of the city is involved (Gijsberts
& Dagevos 2007: 56-59).
Rotterdam has certainly been the most prominent supporter of a dis-
persal policy, but not the only one. Several other municipalities have
been practising dispersal policies without officially announcing them.
Housing corporations frequently maintained a dispersal policy at the
micro-level, aimed at distributing immigrants in a certain way along
streets and blocks (Penninx et al. 1993: 155-157). Moreover, numerous
examples can be given of measures intended at keeping the migrants
out of white neighbourhoods, thus increasing their level of concentra-
tion in other parts of the city.
In the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale urban renewal programmes were
carried out to improve at least the physical environment in the old
neighbourhoods, but better housing did not alter the fact that most old
neighbourhoods remained close to the bottom of the housing market.
Urban renewal was followed in later years by several programmes
aimed at improving the social and economic situation of the inhabi-
tants. In 1994, with the introduction of the policy for large cities known
as the ‘grotestedenbeleid’, the attention shifted from the old neighbour-
hoods to the city as a whole.
Within the frame of the grotestedenbeleid special attention was given
to 56 ‘priority neighbourhoods’. Because of the wide geographical scope
of the grotestedenbeleid, most of these neighbourhoods were to be found
in comparably small towns. With the installation of a new Cabinet in
2007, the focus has been narrowed to 40 of the most problematic ur-
ban areas. All in all, 80 postal districts are involved in this programme,
of which no less than 41 are located in either Amsterdam or Rotterdam
(Bijl et al. 2007: 263–269). Almost without exception, these are the
neighbourhoods with the highest concentrations of non-western ethnic
inhabitants, especially Moroccans and Turks.
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3.5 Housing situation of the second generation
After having sketched the housing situation of the Turkish and
Moroccan population in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, we now turn to
that of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the TIES survey.
As our survey group is between eighteen and 35 years old, some of
them are still living with their parents (see the previous chapter) and, in
that respect, their housing characteristics reflect those of the first gen-
eration. Others live alone, having left their parents’ home, though they
are not, or not yet, living with a partner or a family of their own. Hous-
ing requirements for the three groups differ. Table 3.5 provides an over-
view of the various living arrangements. It is striking that more than
one-third of the comparison group lives alone, while almost 30 per cent
of the young second-generation Turks and well over 40 per cent of the
young second-generation Moroccans continue to live with their parents.
In this chapter we will limit ourselves to an analysis of two groups
only: those living with their parents and/or grandparent(s) and those liv-
ing in a household of their own – mostly as a couple though, in some
cases, as a single-parent family or in other types of household (often
siblings living together or other relatives or friends). Single-person
households are therefore excluded: there are very few such households
among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and, because of
the difference in housing situation and housing requirements, single-
Table 3.5 Household composition, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
One-person household 6.1 3.4 14.4 4.8 32.2 36.5
Respondent in own household 62.2 68.6 35.6 57.3 56.1 55.4
Couple without children 12.2 13.5 6.7 8.3 32.0 26.1
Couple with children 20.7 32.6 6.7 17.9 12.8 17.9
Couple with children and
Others
7.3 3.4 0.0 1.2 0.7 0.3
Couple with others 3.7 2.2 1.1 2.4 0.5 0.5
Single parent with children 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.6 0.0 4.6
Single parent with children
and others
2.4 3.4 4.4 6.0 0.0 0.7
Other households 15.9 10.1 16.7 17.9 10.1 5.3
Respondent in household of origin 31.7 28.1 50.0 38.1 11.7 8.2
In parental household 30.5 27.0 50.0 38.1 11.2 8.2
In grandparental household 1.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 242 258 246 247 250 262
56 CARLO VAN PRAAG AND JEANNETTE SCHOORL
person households cannot conveniently be grouped together with either
of the other categories.
While only a few of the first-generation Turks and Moroccans are
home-owners, the second generation who have left the parental home
are somewhat more prosperous: over one in four second-generation
Turks is an owner-occupier (Table 3.6). They still lag behind the 39 per
cent of the comparison group, however, and this applies even more to
the Moroccans (14 per cent owner-occupiers). Nevertheless, the differ-
ence from the first generation is remarkable.
A large majority of all respondents lives in apartments and, in this re-
spect, there is no difference between the second generation and the
comparison group who have left their parents’ home (Table 3.7). Sec-
ond-generation Turks and Moroccans living with their parents are also
mostly in apartments, but the comparison group is clearly more well-
off: their parents are much more likely to live in single-family or in de-
tached or semi-detached dwellings.
The fact that members of the comparison group still living with their
parents are better-off is reconfirmed by other housing characteristics.
The houses most of them live in were built between the two world wars
and are generally larger and of better-quality construction than the
dwellings built in the period after World War II (Table 3.8).
The homes of their parents are generally larger and have more rooms
(Table 3.9). The difference between the comparison group and second-
generation Turks and Moroccans disappears for those who have set up
a family for themselves. However, this is partly a spurious effect, as the
household sizes of second-generation Turks and especially second-
Table 3.6 Home ownership and rental structure, by living arrangement and ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
In parental/grandparental household
Owner-occupied 2.3 3.3 28.7
Owner-occupied by parents/parents-in-law 4.7 1.6 14.9
Public rental sector 81.4 91.8 49.5
Private rental sector 11.7 3.3 6.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 132 175 49
Own household
Owner-occupied 25.5 13.4 38.9
Owner-occupied by parents/parents-in-law 7.1 4.5 2.3
Public rental sector 60.2 68.7 30.7
Private rental sector 7.1 13.4 28.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 271 198 247
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Table 3.7 Type of dwelling, by living arrangement and ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
In parental/grandparental household
Apartment 81.0 82.0 45.1
Single-family dwelling 16.7 18.0 47.1
Semi-detached/detached dwelling 2.4 0.0 6.9
Other 0.0 0.0 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 132 176 50
Own household
Apartment 75.5 78.3 77.4
Single-family dwelling 20.6 18.8 16.1
Semi-detached/detached dwelling 1.0 0.0 0.8
Other 3.0 2.8 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 280 203 261
Table 3.8 Construction period of dwellings, by living arrangement and ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
In parental/grandparental household
Before 1915 6.7 2.0 2.1
1915-1949 13.3 16.3 22.9
1950-1979 36.7 44.9 31.3
1980-2001 33.3 32.7 39.6
2002 or later 10.0 4.1 4.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Na 100 140 47
Own household
Before 1915 0.0 3.9 11.6
1915-1949 19.2 17.6 38.0
1950-1979 39.7 47.1 27.0
1980-2001 30.1 25.5 17.0
2002 or later 11.0 5.9 6.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Nb 207 160 227
a There were a fairly large number of respondents who could not estimate the period in
which their house was built: 28.6, 18.3 and 5.0 per cent among Turks, Moroccans and the
comparison group, respectively.
b There were a fairly large number of respondents who could not estimate the period in
which their house was built: 25.5, 22.7 and 7.9 per cent among Turks, Moroccans and the
comparison group, respectively.
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generation Moroccans are somewhat larger, and they, on average, thus
have less space per person than the comparison group.
Six out of ten second-generation Turks and Moroccans living with
their parents live in a neighbourhood where at least 30 per cent of the
population is of Turkish or Moroccan origin. For the second generation
living in a household of their own, well over half still live in such neigh-
bourhoods (Table 3.10).
Although a majority of the second generation is satisfied with the eth-
nic composition in their current neighbourhood, about one-third indi-
cates they would rather live in a neighbourhood with fewer other residents
of the same ethnic group. For the comparison group, it is the opposite:
they prefer a neighbourhood with more of their own kind (Table 3.11).
These preferences, not unexpectedly, are influenced by the type of
neighbourhood one is living in: those residing in neighbourhoods
where at least 20 per cent of the population is of Turkish or Moroccan
origin are considerably more likely to prefer fewer other residents of
the same ethnic group than those already living in less segregated envir-
onments (Table 3.12).
Table 3.9 Living arrangements and housing characteristics, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
In parental/grandparental household
Average number of rooms 4.1 4.3 4.6
Average dwelling surface (m2) 80.0 83.7 116.9
Average number of years in current dwelling 12.4 12.8 13.5
Own household
Average number of rooms 3.5 3.4 3.3
Average dwelling surface (m2) 76.3 83.6 80.7
Average number of years in current dwelling 5.2 4.6 3.3
Table 3.10 Degree of neighbourhood concentration,* by living arrangement and ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
In parental/grandparental household
% living in neighbourhoods with
at least 30 % Turks or Moroccans
59.6 59.7 20.2
N 158 216 56
Own household
% living in neighbourhoods with
at least 30 % Turks or Moroccans
53.1 55.6 25.2
N 312 229 276
* Turks and Moroccans as a percentage of the total population in postal code areas
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Table 3.11 Living arrangements and neighbourhood preferences, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
In parental/grandparental household
Prefers same type of neighbourhood 50.0 65.5 42.2
Prefers neighbourhood with lower
% of own ethnic group
42.9 29.3 18.6
Prefers neighbourhood with higher
% of own ethnic group
7.1 5.2 39.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 260 199 256
Own household
Prefers same type of neighbourhood 57.9 54.4 45.0
Prefers neighbourhood with lower
% of own ethnic group
31.6 32.4 7.3
Prefers neighbourhood with higher
% of own ethnic group
10.5 13.2 47.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 128 169 50
Table 3.12 Actual and preferred prevalence level of own ethnic group members in neighbour-
hood, by ethnic group
Second generation Comparison group
Turks Moroccans
At least 20 per cent Turkish/Moroccan population
Prefers same type of neighbourhood 52.5 58.2 33.0
Prefers neighbourhood with lower
% of own ethnic group
39.6 33.7 5.7
Prefers neighbourhood with higher
% of own ethnic group
7.9 8.2 61.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 230 233 160
Less than 20 per cent Turkish/Moroccan pop.
Prefers same type of neighbourhood 63.9 60.0 53.1
Prefers neighbourhood with lower
% of own ethnic group
22.2 23.3 11.2
Prefers neighbourhood with higher
% of own ethnic group
13.9 16.7 35.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 158 135 146
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There is, perhaps surprisingly, little general difference among the
three ethnic groups in their feelings about their neighbourhoods. The
sense of social attachment is relatively strong, but decidedly less so
among those with a household of their own than among those living
with their parents (Table 3.13). In any case, the differences between the
ethnic groups are statistically significant for only two of the items.
Duration of residence in the neighbourhood may influence this out-
come: those in households of their own average have been in their cur-
rent dwelling no more than 3.3 years (comparison group) or up to 5.2
years (second-generation Turks), while the average residence duration
of those living in their parental home is about thirteen years. Roughly
one-third feels negative to very negative about physical aspects of their
neighbourhood, such as garbage lying about and the occurrence of
crime. Less than one in three residents would agree with the statement
that there is hardly any vandalism in their neighbourhood.
Table 3.13 Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing with statement on the quality of life in the




I feel attached to this neighbourhood 62.8 72.6 65.7
I have good contact with my immediate neighbours 65.0 70.5 72.5
People in this neighbourhood hardly know each other* 14.6 8.3 27.5
There is a lot of garbage lying about in the streets of
this neighbourhood
34.1 18.0 30.4
There is a lot of crime in this neighbourhood 34.1 32.8 38.2
There is hardly any vandalism in this neighbourhood 31.0 30.6 20.6
I expect the quality of life in this neighbourhood will
deteriorate next year
41.5 19.4 29.4




I feel attached to this neighbourhood 48.5 53.5 51.2
I have good contact with my immediate neighbours 60.8 62.3 65.4
People in this neighbourhood hardly know each other 28.7 25.7 33.1
There is a lot of garbage lying about in the streets of
this neighbourhood
34.3 29.6 34.2
There is a lot of crime in this neighbourhood 29.7 31.9 29.8
There is hardly any vandalism in this neighbourhood 34.3 32.9 27.6
I expect the quality of life in this neighbourhood will
deteriorate next year*
30.0 24.6 14.9
There aren’t enough good schools in this
neighbourhood
31.0 24.2 18.2
* Differences between groups statistically significant (Kruskal Wallis measure  .001)
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3.6 Conclusions
In both cities, Moroccans and Turks form sizable minorities. Taken to-
gether, they make up 14 per cent of the total population in both cities.
They are not evenly spread out, but rather, concentrated in parts of the
city that have lost favour with the rest of the population. Moroccans and
Turks largely occupy the same neighbourhoods. In quite a lot of these
neighbourhoods, they constitute more than one-fifth – and often, even
more than one-third – of the total population. This implies a certain
amount of segregation from the rest of the population. In both cities,
roughly half of the population of Turkish and Moroccan descent is con-
centrated in a number of neighbourhoods that house only about a fifth
of the total population.
All these observations apply more or less to both the first and the sec-
ond generations. One has to keep in mind that the second generation
for both city populations is still young and consists of about 75 per cent
of children living with their parents. Moreover, members of the second
generation with their own established households are mostly young
adults who have only recently entered the housing market and probably
lack the means to move out of their parents’ neighbourhoods even if
they wish to do so.
Nevertheless, some differences between the generations could be ob-
served. The second generation occupies single-family dwellings some-
what more often than the first. Owner-occupancy was more prevalent in
the Turkish second generation than the first, though they still lag far be-
hind the comparison group members. The Turkish second generation,
though not the Moroccan second generation, could be found somewhat
more often in neighbourhoods dating from the 1980s and later. The
TIES data did not provide information on members of either generation
who had moved out of the city altogether.
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4 Education
Helga de Valk and Maurice Crul
4.1 Introduction
Education is of crucial importance in the lives of young adults. Attend-
ing school is not only a major part of everyday life, but education is a
decisive factor for the future. In literature, educational attainment has
been tied to a host of outcomes in adult life. Education is perceived as
the key for social mobility. This applies to all children, of course, but
may be of even more importance for second-generation youth.
Educational success is related to the opportunities and chances in the
educational system as such, but it also has a correlation with the indivi-
dual characteristics of students and their parents. So, how are second-
generation young adults doing in school? What educational experiences
do they have in primary and secondary education? What characterises
their school career? How well-off are second-generation youth com-
pared with Dutch students? Previous studies often take final outcomes
as their subject of research. In this chapter, we take a more dynamic
perspective and give insights into the different stages of the educational
career of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan young adults and
those of the comparison group. Besides the achievements in primary
and secondary education, we also pay attention to young adults’ experi-
ences in school and the relationship between education and the parental
home. We will give an overview of the rich data on education that the
TIES survey provides.
4.2 The educational system in the Netherlands
One of the pillars of the Dutch educational system is the freedom to
choose a school according to one’s own preferences, be they religious
or ideological. All schools in the Netherlands, including those that are
religious, are state-funded. A pupil is officially expected to enter primary
school when he or she turns four years old. Primary school consists of
eight grades, so children usually leave at age twelve. At the end of pri-
mary school, all children must take a national examination that is cru-
cial for their further school career in secondary school. On the basis of
this test result and the recommendation made by their teacher, they will
be assigned to follow a specific track in the secondary school system.
Figure 4.1 summarises the current educational system in the Nether-
lands and provides an overview of the many ways to navigate it. Lower
vocational education (vbo)1 is the lowest stream of secondary education,
where children with the lowest recommendation from primary school
are placed. Children with a lower general secondary education (mavo or
vmbo-t)2 recommendation or higher usually go to comprehensive
schools that include one stream of preparatory middle vocational educa-
tion (mavo or vmbo-t) and two streams preparing children for tertiary
education (havo or vwo).3 In the first one or two years of comprehensive
school, children with different school recommendations study together
in what are considered intermediary classes. However, most compre-
hensive schools (especially since after 2000) have begun to exclusively
group together children with similar primary school recommendations.
Pupils with a havo diploma can continue on to higher vocational educa-
tion, while pupils with a vwo diploma usually continue on to university.






















1 primary education (PO)
2 pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO)
3 senior general secondary education (HAVO)
4 pre-university education (VWO)
5 practical training (PRO)
6 secondary vocational education (MBO): ½-4 yrs
7 higher professional education (HBO-bachelor)
8 university (WO-bachelor + -master)
Source: Ministry of Education (2007: 158)
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Most children continue to study after they have gained their second-
ary school diplomas. The children with a vbo or mavo (or vmbo-t) diplo-
ma continue on to middle vocational education (mbo). This could mean
a two-, three- or four-year course (either fulltime or part-time). The one-
and two-year mbo tracks have an important component of two- to three-
day weekly apprenticeships. The one- and two-year mbo tracks will lead
to assistant jobs and mostly semi-skilled blue-collar jobs in the labour
market. The three- to four-year tracks usually lead to either blue- or
white-collar skilled jobs at the middle level.
A unique characteristic of the Dutch school system is that pupils can
easily move from one stream to the other. In principle, a pupil could
start at the bottom and move up, step by step, to the highest stream
(taking the ‘long route’ through the educational system). Though it may
take between one and three years longer for this student than for a
non-immigrant pupil to reach the same level, many children of immi-
grants have moved up the educational ladder in this way.
4.3 Educational priority policies in the Netherlands
The government of the Netherlands was one of the first in Europe to in-
itiate special educational policies for the children of immigrants. In
1985, the Dutch Educational Priority Policy was launched. The corner-
stone of this policy was the strong financial injection made available to
primary schools with high percentages of pupils from an immigrant
background. Primary schools were to receive 1.9 times more funding
per pupil of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean descent
(known as CUMI pupils) than for children of parents born in the Neth-
erlands. This provided schools with many children of immigrants a far
more generous budget than schools with few or no children of immi-
grants. Through this mechanism, hundreds of millions of euros have
been invested in the primary school education for the children of immi-
grants over the last 25 years (Crul & Doomernik 2003).
The extra funding in the first years of this policy change was spent
mostly on creating smaller classes, but this did not bring the results
hoped for (De Jong 1997: 160-163). The idea was that the teacher would
be better able to provide individual help and support. Nevertheless, the
percentage of immigrant children in these schools continued to rise to
the point where more than 70 per cent of children in some schools
were from immigrant backgrounds. In practice, this means that ten to
fifteen of the twenty pupils in any given class had learning difficulties.
Even though the teacher would not have to be responsible for 30 to 35
pupils, as in other primary schools, it was still impossible to give indivi-
dual attention to each child. Schools increasingly started to focus on
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new teaching methods, especially those aimed at second-language edu-
cation. The new teaching methods and books were often financed with
extra grants from the city (made available to the larger cities through
the national budget). As a result, conditions in schools with many chil-
dren of immigrants have improved. The classes in these schools are
smaller now (ten to fifteen pupils fewer than in a class with 70 per cent
or more children of parents born in the Netherlands). Moreover, they
often have an extra teaching assistant, the newest teaching methods and
books, as well as the best facilities in terms of classrooms and available
space.
Secondary schools also get extra funding for CUMI pupils. Another
extra source of funding for secondary schools is for so-called Lwoo4
pupils, students who need extra help and support based on a special test
in the last year of primary school. For these pupils, additional individual
assistance is available. A large proportion of the Lwoo pupils are from
an immigrant background. About a third of pupils of Turkish and
Moroccan descent are labelled Lwoo pupils. Secondary schools use most
of their CUMI money to reduce the number of pupils in vmbo classes
and to employ extra assistance for Dutch-as-a-second-language classes
for more recently arrived pupils from abroad. Most of the Lwoo funding
is spent on hiring extra teaching or assistant staff.
4.4 Overview of the educational position of pupils and students
of Moroccan and Turkish descent
The educational priority policies have resulted in gradually improving
results for most children of immigrants in primary schools.5 National
test scores at the end of primary school show that children of immi-
grants are slowly closing the gap separating them from children of par-
ents born in the Netherlands. This also slowly affects the size of the
group that enters the pre-academic streams in secondary education.
However, the majority of pupils of Moroccan and Turkish descent in
secondary education are still to be found in the lowest streams of sec-
ondary school: lower vocational education (vbo) or lower general sec-
ondary education (mavo). Both streams are now combined in vmbo.
Only about 20 per cent of the pupils of Turkish and Moroccan descent
are to be found in the pre-academic tracks that lead directly to higher
education (Gijsbert & Herwijer 2007: 11). Dropout rates for the two
groups in secondary schools have decreased over the years. The most
recent figures show that only 3 per cent of the children of Turkish or
Moroccan descent dropped out of secondary school without a diploma
(Gijsberts & Herwijer 2007: 115).
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The majority (about 75 per cent) of the pupils of Turkish and
Moroccan descent enter middle vocational education after secondary
school (Gijsbert & Herwijer 2007: 117). Half of them follows the one- to
two-year tracks in middle vocational education, and the other half
follows the more prestigious three- or four-year tracks (Gijsbert & Her-
wijer 2007: 118). Dropout rates for the one- and two-year tracks are ex-
ceptionally high (for the one-year track, more than 40 per cent drops
out). Children who drop out or only have a diploma of one year of mid-
dle vocational education in the Netherlands are officially called ‘at risk’
youth. According to the most recent figures of 2006, 56 per cent of the
second-generation Moroccan youth and 63 per cent of second-genera-
tion Turkish youth between the ages of twenty and 34 who have already
finished school can officially be labelled ‘at risk’ youth (Turkenburg &
Gijsbert 2007: 81).
Those who are on a four-year mbo track (about a third of the pupils
of Turkish and Moroccan descent) can potentially continue on to higher
education. In 2006 about a third of the nineteen- and twenty-year-old
youths of Turkish or Moroccan descent was found in higher education
(Jennissen & Hartgens 2006: 20). Since we know that about 20 per
cent of the students of Turkish or Moroccan descent takes the direct
route to higher education, about 15 per cent has reached higher educa-
tion through the so-called long route through mbo.6
4.5 TIES respondents: entry into school
It is often suggested that early entry into school is beneficial for second-
generation pupils. Entering the educational system at a young age
means they have the opportunity to acquire the language of the country
of residence. Future disadvantages could be avoided by getting accus-
tomed to the educational setting at a young age. In line with this, Dutch
policy has put emphasis on the importance of minority children attend-
ing crèches and pre-schooling programmes.
The results from the TIES survey show that the second generation of
Turkish and Moroccan origin enters some type of school/preschool later
than is the case for the comparison group (Table 4.1). We do not find
significant differences in entry age between the sexes or between those
living in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The median age for entry into
school or, for that matter, preschool is around four years of age among
all groups. This seems to imply that the first school experience of most
children is primary school rather than a preschool.
Results on crèche attendance confirm these initial findings (Table
4.2). The second generation differs significantly from the comparison
group in this respect. Around a third of the Turkish second generation
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and a quarter of the Moroccan second generation report having at-
tended a crèche. This percentage is substantially higher among the
comparison group, two-thirds of which have attended a crèche. It is in-
teresting to note, however, that among the Turkish second generation
and the comparison group, the younger cohorts were particularly more
likely to have attended crèches than the older ones. Boys are overall
somewhat more likely to have been in preschool than girls.
4.6 Primary education
For many children, entering primary education is the start of an educa-
tional career. Recent debates have pointed more and more to differ-
ences in the quality and subsequent results achieved by schools in pri-
Table 4.1 Entry into preschool or school, by age and mean ages
Second generation
Age in years Turks Moroccans Comparison group
2 4.0 1.7 8.3
3 9.8 10.4 22.7
4 75.7 79.2 63.6
5 7.5 5.2 4.3
6 2.9 2.3 0.9
7 0.0 1.2 0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 499 489 512
Mean 3.95 3.99 3.66
Table 4.2 Attendance of preschool, by ethnic group and age group
18-24 25-29 30-35 Total N
Second-generation Turks
No 62.2 71.4 78.6 68.5 333
Yes 37.8 28.6 21.4 31.5 141
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 474
Second-generation Moroccans
No 72.0 80.0 70.6 74.0 334
Yes 28.0 20.0 29.4 26.0 128
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 462
Comparison group
No 28.6 25.1 38.9 32.0 153
Yes 71.4 74.9 61.1 68.0 333
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 486
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mary education. But what guides the choice for choosing a specific pri-
mary school? And do these reasons differ between groups?
Our analyses show that the most important reason for attending a spe-
cific primary school was its location in the neighbourhood where the fa-
mily lives (Table 4.3). Although this reason was by far the most important
among all groups, it was even more predominant among the second gen-
eration than it is for the comparison group. The answers given by Turkish
and Moroccan young adults do not differ significantly on this point. The
second reason most often mentioned was that the decision for choosing a
school was left to the parents. For young adults of the comparison group,
this reason was more important than for the second generation. For the
Turkish andMoroccan second generation, the third major reason was hav-
ing siblings already at the school. Although young adults from the com-
parison group mention this reason just as often, their third most impor-
tant deciding factor was the school’s religious denomination. The school’s
reputation was only important for around 10 per cent of all groups.
Practical considerations, like proximity and siblings at school, thus
seem to guide the choice of a primary school more than arguments
about school quality and educational philosophy do. This is particularly
the case for second-generation Turkish and Moroccan young adults. For
the Moroccan second generation we find, however, that the youngest
group (between eighteen and 24 years old) more often mentions school
quality as being an important factor in their choice than do older
Moroccan respondents. For the Turkish second generation and the com-
parison group, a stable percentage over the age groups (around 10 per
cent) reports this factor to be of relevance. Analysis of differences be-
tween the age groups also reveals that the youngest Turkish and
Table 4.3 Reasons given for choosing a primary school in %, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
School in neighbourhood 79.3 80.5 52.1
School without religious denomination 3.4 2.3 9.9
Good reputation 8.0 10.3 9.8
Educational philosophy 0.6 0.6 7.1
Religious denomination 2.3 2.3 16.2
Parents decided 21.3 20.1 37.7
Siblings already attended school 14.4 16.7 13.3
Few immigrants 1.7 1.1 0.6
Acceptance policy school 0.6 0.0 0.3
Other 4.6 2.9 4.5
N 500 493 512
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because respondents could give more than one
reason.
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Moroccan respondents (eighteen to 24 years) mentioned that their par-
ents decided more often than was the case for the older respondents.
The reverse was true for the comparison group: the younger cohorts re-
ported less often that the parents decided. Our findings, furthermore,
indicate that the choice for a certain school seems to be rather stable:
only around a third of all respondents ever changed their primary
schools. No significant differences were found between each of the
groups included in the study.
School is one of the potential places children of both immigrant and
native Dutch origins can meet. There is great debate about segregation
in the educational system and its effects on school results, processes of
integration and the society at large. The TIES survey provides insight
into how school classes in primary education were composed with re-
gard to ethnic origin. Table 4.4 gives an overview of the share of immi-
grant children at primary school distinguished by age group. Overall, it
is obvious that most young second-generation Turks and Moroccans at-
tended primary schools where a substantial share of the children was of
immigrant origin. Respondents of the comparison group had more lim-
ited encounters with children of immigrants. At the same time, there
are clear differences between each of the age groups. The percentage of
respondents claiming that they had no children of immigrants at their
primary schools declines per age group as well as for all groups. This
clearly reflects the changes in the ethnic composition of Dutch society.
However, ethnic segregation also seems to have increased: around half
of the youngest group of the second generation attended a primary
Table 4.4 Share of children of immigrants at primary school, by ethnic group and age group
Age Almost
none









18-24 7.0 12.8 30.2 26.7 23.3 100.0 253
25-29 6.9 25.9 20.7 24.1 22.4 100.0 159
30-36 25.9 33.3 29.6 7.4 3.7 100.0 75




18-24 5.3 19.5 29.2 26.5 19.5 100.0 314
25-29 9.8 31.7 39.0 9.8 9.8 100.0 119
30-36 31.3 25.0 31.3 0.0 12.5 100.0 52
Total 9.0 23.0 32.0 20.0 16.0 100.0 3.1 485
Comparison
group
18-24 57.3 23.6 13.1 5.1 1.0 100.0 151
25-29 71.2 18.9 8.1 1.7 0.0 100.0 156
30-36 79.7 16.2 2.5 1.6 0.0 100.0 201
Total 71.0 19.0 7.0 3.0 0.0 100.0 1.4 508
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school where three-quarters of the students were of immigrant origin.
On the contrary, almost 60 per cent of the youngest comparison group
youth in the TIES survey had no (or almost no) children of immigrants
in their school; another 24 per cent had a quarter at most.
A larger share of the second generation than the comparison group
respondents has repeated classes in primary education (Table 4.5). Men
among all groups are slightly more likely to have repeated classes,
though the differences between men and women are not significant.
The literature has suggested that substantial shares of children of im-
migrants spend some time abroad, most often in their parents’ country
of origin. Our data suggest that only a small percentage (7 per cent) of
the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, overall, spend more than
three months abroad during their period of primary education (Table
4.6). We observe clear differences between the younger and older age
groups of the second generation, however. Almost 30 per cent of the
Moroccan second generation currently between 30 and 36 years of age
report having spent more than three months abroad. By contrast, only 2
per cent of Moroccans aged eighteen to 24 years has been abroad for a
longer period. A similar pattern applies to the Turkish second genera-
tion in the TIES survey.
A crucial stage of school career in the Netherlands is the school re-
commendation students receive at the end of primary education. This
is the moment when students are tracked into different educational le-
Table 4.5 Ever repeated classes, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Yes 23.8 22.2 24.4 20.0 12.3 7.4
No 76.2 77.8 75.6 80.0 87.7 92.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 242 258 246 247 250 262
Table 4.6 Percentage ever spent more than three months abroad during primary education, by
age group and ethnic group
Second generation
Age Turks Moroccans Comparison group
18-24 3.4 1.8 1.6
25-29 8.5 11.9 2.3
30-36 18.5 29.4 2.7
Total 8.0 8.0 2.0
N 500 493 512
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vels. Table 4.7 gives a detailed overview of the school recommendations
that second-generation Turks and Moroccans and the comparison group
received by the end of their primary education.
The majority (about 60 per cent) of Turkish and Moroccan second-
generation youth get a recommendation for, at best, lower general sec-
ondary education level. By contrast, we find that 60 per cent of the
comparison group was recommended for higher general secondary edu-
cation or better. Only 19 and 25 per cent of second-generation Turks
and Moroccans, respectively, get this recommendation. The four most
common school recommendations received by both Turkish and
Moroccan young adults are for the lowest level, the middle level, a
mixed level or an in-between level. This indicates that such pupils can
access the middle level, though if they work hard, they could also com-
plete a higher level. It is apparent that overall recommendations for the
second generation are significantly lower than for the comparison
group. We find no differences in recommendation between the sexes
for any of the groups.
4.7 Secondary education
After students receive a recommendation from their primary school,
they begin the selection process of where to pursue secondary educa-
tion. Parents and children are free to choose the school, and secondary




Lower vocational education (vbo or vmbo basis or
vmbo kader)
24.3 26.2 13.5
Mixed advice: Lower vocational education and
lower general secondary education (vbo/mavo)
16.1 11.6 4.2
Lower general secondary education (mavo or
vmbo-theoretisch)
21.8 21.3 7.9
Mixed advice: Lower general secondary
education or higher general secondary education
(mavo/havo)
18.6 15.2 14.0
Higher general secondary education (havo) 7.5 9.8 14.0
Mixed advice: Higher general secondary education
and preparatory tertiary education (havo/vwo)
6.8 10.4 25.5
Preparatory tertiary education or gymnasium
(vwo or gymnasium)
5.0 5.5 21.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 458 465 491
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schools compete for new students. Again, we find that the most impor-
tant reason guiding the choice of a school for secondary education is its
proximity to home (Table 4.8). The second most common reason is the
reputation of a particular school, something a quarter of all respondents
among all groups mentioned. However, for the second generation, we
found that siblings’ attendance at the school and the primary school re-
commendation were the decisive factors in their choice. Although proxi-
mity to home was also mentioned by the comparison group, the primary
school recommendation was less often cited as a reason for their sec-
ondary school choice. Twenty per cent of the young adults of the com-
parison group state that their parents decided on the particular school;
the second generation mentions this reason significantly less often.
The composition of the secondary schools attended by the second-
generation and comparison group youth clearly differs, as is shown in
Table 4.9. The majority of the second generation attended schools
where at least half of the school population was of immigrant origin. By
far, the greater part of young adults of the comparison group were at
secondary schools where no or, at most, a quarter of the students had
an immigrant background. Over time, there seems to be an increase in
the concentration of the second generation in schools where more stu-
dents are of immigrant background. This is particularly clear for the
Moroccan second generation. Although the secondary schools of the
comparison group’s younger cohorts among young adults seem to be
more ethnically mixed, they continue to attend schools with small per-
centages of children of immigrants.
We further analysed whether there were differences in the reported eth-
nic background of the student population between those growing up in
Table 4.8 Reasons given for choosing a secondary school in %, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
School in neighbourhood 32.8 29.3 24.0
School without religious denomination 2.9 1.1 5.7
Good reputation 24.7 25.7 23.9
Educational philosophy 0.6 2.3 5.4
Religious denomination 1.1 0.6 6.1
Parents decided 10.3 5.2 19.9
Siblings already attended school 14.4 19.4 16.3
Friends from primary education went there 8.0 8.0 13.3
Few immigrants 1.7 1.1 0.8
Acceptance policy school 0.0 0.0 0.0
Because of school advice 16.1 19.4 11.4
N 500 492 512
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because respondents could give more than one
reason.
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the cities or elsewhere in the country (not in table). Young adults of the
comparison group who were not living in Amsterdam and Rotterdam be-
tween the ages of twelve and sixteen were significantly less likely to en-
counter children of immigrants in secondary education than those living
in the two main cities. For the second generation, we do not find differ-
ences among those living in Amsterdam, Rotterdam or anywhere else.
Changing secondary schools is not very common according to the re-
sults of the TIES survey (Table 4.10). We find that between 20 and 30
per cent of all students has ever changed their schools. Whereas the
percentages of change are pretty similar for the three groups in Amster-
dam, we find pronounced differences between the groups for those cur-
rently living in Rotterdam. Second-generation Moroccan young adults
in Rotterdam changed schools slightly more often than respondents of
the comparison group, though these differences are not statistically sig-
nificant. Second-generation Turkish young adults in Rotterdam, how-
ever, were more likely to have changed their secondary school than is
the case for the second-generation Moroccans and the comparison
Table 4.9 Share of children of immigrants at secondary school, by ethnic group and age group
Age Almost
none









18-24 6.8 13.6 35.2 27.3 17.0 100.0 253
25-29 5.4 17.9 35.7 25.0 16.1 100.0 156
30-36 17.9 25.0 32.1 14.3 10.7 100.0 73




18-24 2.6 14.9 35.1 34.2 13.2 100.0 317
25-29 9.8 14.6 41.5 26.8 7.3 100.0 117
30-36 18.8 31.3 43.8 6.3 0.0 100.0 50
Total 6.0 16.0 38.0 30.0 10.0 100.0 3.2 484
Comparison
group
18-24 40.9 28.9 17.9 7.5 4.7 100.0 153
25-29 47.4 36.4 14.2 1.7 0.3 100.0 156
30-36 58.3 30.2 7.8 2.5 1.2 100.0 201
Total 50.0 32.0 12.0 3.0 2.0 100.0 1.8 510
Table 4.10 Ever changed secondary schools, by city of residence and ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Amsterdam 23.9 23.1 23.0
Rotterdam 31.7 29.3 17.5
Total 29.0 25.0 21.0
N 500 492 512
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group. Stays abroad are much less common among all groups (not in
table). Just 2 per cent of the Moroccan second generation and 4 per cent
of the Turkish second generation reported staying abroad for more than
three months during their secondary education.
Having to repeat classes in secondary school is much more common
among all groups (Table 4.11) than it is in primary school. In total, 24
per cent of all second-generation Moroccans, 37 per cent of the second-
generation Turks and 32 of the comparison group say they repeated
classes in secondary education. Second-generation Moroccans, both
men and women, are significantly less likely to have repeated classes
than is the case for the other two groups. Among the Turkish second
generation and the comparison group, men are more likely to have re-
peated classes in secondary education than women. For second-genera-
tion Moroccans slightly more women than men have repeated classes,
though these differences are not significant.
Our survey includes substantial numbers of respondents who are still
in some sort of education. A third of the second-generation Turks and
comparison group and half of the second-generation Moroccans are still
receiving education (not in table). These figures reflect the fact that the
Moroccan respondents in the survey are younger than those in the Turk-
ish group and comparison group, and therefore are more likely to be in
school. Taking age effects into account, we find that second-generation
Turks are more likely to have left the educational system than is the case
for the other two groups. Our analysis of achieved educational level (de-
fined by having ascertained a diploma or certificate) pertains only to
those who are currently not in education. Table 4.12a provides a detailed
overview of realised educational level per group for those no longer in
education. The most common level for the Turkish second generation is
middle vocational education (mbo). The same applies for the Moroccan
second generation. Around 85 per cent of the young adults in both
groups have a diploma at the mbo level, at best. In contrast, we see that
three-quarters of the young adults of the comparison group has at least
an mbo diploma. For the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, we
find that about 10 per cent finished primary education. This indicates
that they dropped out in secondary education without acquiring a diplo-
Table 4.11 Ever repeated classes, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Yes 36.8 24.0 31.9
No 63.2 76.0 68.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100
N 500 495 512
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ma. Broadening the scope to young adults considered at risk – because
they were not able to get a diploma even at the mbo-1 level – we find
that half of the second generation and a quarter of the comparison
group belong to this at-risk group. The other half of the second genera-
tion was most likely to finish their education at the mbo level. Around
10 and 14 per cent of second-generation Turks and Moroccans, respec-
tively, have a higher vocational education (hbo) diploma.
We also analysed the current educational level of those young adults
who are still in the educational system (Table 4.12b). We find that a ma-
jority of all respondents is currently attending school at a minimum of
an mbo-4 level. Around a third of the second-generation youth who are
in education is at the hbo, while smaller percentages are found at the
Table 4.12a Highest educational level for those currently not in education, by ethnic group and
sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Primary school
(basisschool/lagere school)
8.5 8.6 10.0 10.3 0.8 0.8
Individual or special education
(prooa or ivbob or speciaal onderwijs)
2.1 3.4 5.0 0.0 0.5 0.3
Lower secondary vocational education
(vbo or lhno or lts or vmbo-basis
or vmbo-kader)
19.1 10.3 12.5 12.8 9.3 6.7
Lower secondary general education
(vmbo-gemengd or mavo or
vmbo-theoretisch)
19.1 10.3 20.0 10.3 4.0 4.7
Higher secondary general education
(havo)
4.3 5.2 2.5 2.6 3.4 5.2
Preparatory tertiary education
(vwo or gymnasium)
0.0 1.7 0.0 2.6 2.9 0.8
Short middle vocational education
(kmbo or mbo-niveau 1 or
mbo-niveau 2)
14.9 10.3 12.5 15.4 5.0 5.4
Middle vocational education
(mbo-niveau 3 or mbo-niveau 4
or mbo)
14.9 37.9 27.5 23.1 16.7 13.2
Higher vocational education
(hbo; propedeuse or hbo)




6.4 1.7 0.0 2.6 24.9 31.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 132 158 113 119 167 166
a Praktijkonderwijs
b Individueel Voorbereidend Beroeps Onderwijs
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university level. Although a similar share of young adults of the com-
parison group is found at the hbo level, they are significantly more of-
ten found to be pursuing the academic track.
4.8 Experiences at school
The school can shape the climate in which children are stimulated to
learn and develop themselves. Respondents in the survey were asked to
look back on their secondary education and report on their experiences.
First of all, we studied the percentage of students who received special
attention in school, through remedial teaching, or outside school, in the
form of homework tutoring (Table 4.13). Only a minority of the young
adults have had remedial teaching. We do not find differences between
the groups on this point. A much larger proportion of the young adults
has had homework tutoring at some point: 18 per cent of the second-
Table 4.12b Current educational level for those who are in education, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Individual or special education
(prooa or ivbob or speciaal onderwijs)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lower secondary vocational education
(vbo or lhno or lts or vmbo-basis
or vmbo-kader)
6.3 3.6 6.5 2.3 1.9 1.0
Lower secondary general education
(vmbo-gemengd or mavo or
vmbo-theoretisch)
6.3 7.1 4.3 9.1 0.0 0.0
Higher secondary general education
(havo)
0.0 0.0 4.3 2.3 0.0 1.5
Preparatory tertiary education
(vwo or gymnasium)
0.0 0.0 2.2 4.5 7.1 8.6
Short middle vocational education
(kmbo or mbo-niveau 1 or mbo-niveau 2)
15.6 14.3 13.0 9.1 1.9 2.5
Middle vocational education
(mbo-niveau 3 or mbo-niveau 4 or mbo)
25.0 28.6 30.4 29.5 9.6 10.6
Higher vocational education
(hbo; propedeuse or hbo)




18.8 3.6 13.0 9.1 50.6 39.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 100 92 126 123 77 89
a Praktijkonderwijs
b Individueel Voorbereidend Beroeps Onderwijs
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generation Turks and 24 per cent of the second-generation Moroccans
say they have had homework tutoring. These percentages are similar
for the comparison group. Unfortunately, we do not have information
on how often or for how long use was made of homework tutoring, nor
do we know how the students found their way to these homework tutor-
ing groups.
Table 4.14 provides an overview of how much respondents agreed
with three statements on their relationships with teachers in secondary
education. Overall, the young adults report that they could get along
well with their teachers; between 81 and 86 per cent of the respondents
agree or totally agree with this statement. The three groups do not dif-
fer among one other on this point. Women are generally somewhat
more positive about their relationship with teachers than men are; wo-
men more often agree totally with the statement that they could get
along well with their teachers (not in table). This difference is most pro-
nounced for the second generation and for students of Turkish descent,
in particular. In line with the overall positive evaluation of their relation-
ship with teachers is the finding that 60 per cent of all respondents re-
port that their teachers really listened to what they had to say. Another
quarter neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. We do not
find significant differences between the groups. Women, particularly
those of Turkish origin, are more likely to feel that teachers really
‘heard’ what they had to say (not in table). Finally, the young adults
were asked whether they received help from teachers when needed. As
many as seven out of every ten young adults state that they did receive
extra help when needed. The Moroccan second generation is somewhat
more positive about the help they received from teachers than is the
comparison group. In line with the positive evaluation of their relation-
ship with teachers overall, we find that women more often than men re-
port that teachers gave them help when needed (not in table). Although
this pattern is apparent for all groups, it is most pronounced among the
second generation.
Finally, our results show that a relatively small share of Turkish (15 per
cent) and Moroccan (6 per cent) second-generation respondents felt less
Table 4.13 Ever had remedial teaching or homework counselling at secondary school in %, by
ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Remedial teaching 6.0 8.0 8.0
Homework counselling 17.8 23.6 18.9
N 500 492 512
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welcome at school than their Dutch peers. The large majority of the sec-
ond generation report feeling at least as welcome at secondary educa-
tion as students of the comparison group (not in table): 75 per cent of
the second-generation Turkish and 87 per cent of the second-generation
Moroccan young adults. When asked about how often Turks or Moroc-
cans experience hostility or unfairness at school based on their origin,
we found that 40 per cent of all respondents think this occurs some-
times. One-fifth reported thinking such experiences are rare, while an-
other fifth thinks origin-based acts of bias happen regularly. We do not
find significant differences between the second generation and compar-
ison group on this point. In addition, reports by second-generation men
and women are not significantly different. For the comparison group,
we find that more women than men are of the opinion that Turks and
Moroccans experience more hostility at school. It is interesting to note
that Moroccans in Amsterdam feel that hostility at school takes place
more often than is the case for the Moroccans in Rotterdam (11 versus
6 per cent). For the Turkish second generation, we find the opposite:
those living in Rotterdam are more of the opinion that Turks and Mor-
Table 4.14 Description of relationships with teachers, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Could get along
well with teachers
Totally agree 37.4 32.8 28.3
Agree 43.7 52.9 54.7
Neutral 10.9 9.2 8.4
Do not agree 5.2 3.4 7.8
Totally disagree 2.9 1.7 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 500 492 512
Most teachers
really listened
Totally agree 19.5 14.9 9.4
Agree 42.0 50.3 52.5
Neutral 25.3 21.7 24.6
Do not agree 9.8 10.3 9.9
Totally disagree 3.4 2.9 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 500 492 512
Teachers provided
extra help when needed
Totally agree 20.7 23.6 16.3
Agree 55.2 57.5 55.5
Neutral 14.9 12.1 18.8
Do not agree 6.9 5.7 8.1
Totally disagree 2.3 1.1 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 500 492 512
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occans are experiencing hostility in school than those in Amsterdam (14
versus 7 per cent).
4.9 The parental home and education
Besides the experiences at school, it is important to know more about
the situation in the parental home. Parents and siblings may have an
important role in shaping the educational experiences of youth of differ-
ent origins. Asked about the possibility of having a quiet space in the
home to do homework, a large majority of respondents among all
groups indicated that they had such a place (not in table). Nevertheless,
we find that second-generation Turkish and Moroccans young adults
were less likely to have such a place than the comparison group (85 ver-
sus 95 per cent). The comparison group had many more books available
at the parental home. About half of all respondents of the comparison
group had more than 100 books at home, whereas a third of all Turks
and Moroccans had access to no more than ten books at home.
The respondents in the survey were asked to report how important
certain persons were for their education and schooling while they were
in secondary education. Table 4.15 gives an overview, by ethnic group,
of the importance attached to parents, teachers, peers and siblings.
Among all groups, around three-quarters of the young adults felt their
mothers were very important or important. Mothers seem to be most
important for the schooling of children. However, our results also point
to paternal importance: around two-thirds of the second-generation
Turkish and comparison group young adults and three-quarters of the
second-generation Moroccans felt their fathers were important.
Although fathers are important for two-thirds of respondents in all
groups, this does not significantly differ from the importance attached
to teachers across each of the groups. It is nevertheless clear that the
second generation evaluates teachers’ importance more highly than the
comparison group does. For peers and siblings, we find interesting dif-
ferences between the second-generation groups and the comparison
group. For the second generation, particularly among Moroccans, older
siblings are more important than peers, whereas the reverse is true for
the comparison group. One should certainly bear in mind here that
young adults of the comparison group are much less likely to have older
siblings than is the case for the second generation. When taking the
number of older siblings into account in the analyses, the expressed
group differences remain (not in table). Overall, we find that women
more often feel that family members and others were very important
for their schooling than men.
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Table 4.15 Description of others’ impact on education while in secondary school, by ethnic
group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Mother
Not important at all 7.2 4.5 3.4 2.4 2.4 2.5
Not important 8.4 5.7 6.9 7.2 12.1 3.5
Little important 14.5 14.8 10.3 9.6 18.8 12.8
Important 32.5 26.1 36.8 28.9 39.0 35.8
Very important 37.3 48.9 42.5 51.8 27.8 45.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 240 250 238 245 249 257
Father
Not important at all 7.6 7.0 3.5 4.9 5.7 6.9
Not important 15.2 11.6 7.1 6.2 14.9 6.9
Little important 19.0 12.8 12.9 9.9 26.5 13.8
Important 29.1 29.1 29.4 28.4 37.2 40.9
Very important 29.1 39.5 47.1 50.6 15.6 31.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 229 243 233 230 240 253
Teacher
Not important at all 3.7 0.0 2.3 2.4 4.4 3.4
Not important 11.0 9.1 8.0 7.1 13.3 6.6
Little important 28.0 17.0 14.8 17.6 25.6 32.0
Important 39.0 50.0 53.4 45.9 47.2 46.8
Very important 18.0 23.9 21.6 27.1 9.5 11.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 238 252 243 246 250 261
Peers
Not important at all 9.5 3.4 5.7 3.6 5.4 4.6
Not important 19.0 14.8 20.5 16.7 20.5 8.5
Little important 33.3 30.7 39.8 28.6 32.9 24.1
Important 29.8 39.8 28.4 38.1 34.2 43.0
Very important 8.3 11.4 5.7 13.1 7.0 19.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 239 251 242 245 248 262
Older siblings
Not important at all 7.1 9.3 3.0 1.6 8.1 6.3
Not important 12.5 7.4 10.4 12.5 33.9 22.7
Little important 25.0 24.1 20.9 15.6 30.2 23.6
Important 30.4 33.3 41.8 37.5 20.0 36.0
Very important 25.0 25.9 23.9 32.8 7.8 11.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 158 154 182 188 136 143
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Comparison of the relative importance of each of the parents (not in
table) shows that, among all groups, the importance attached to fathers
and mothers is equal: ranging from 58 per cent for the comparison
group to 73 per cent among the Moroccan second generation. However,
the percentage of young adults for whom the role of the mother was lar-
ger than that of the father is highest for the comparison group. Among
them, a third evaluates their mother as more important than their
father. Mothers are, in general, also found to be more important than
peers and teachers. At the same time, around a third of all respondents
in all three groups evaluates their mothers and teachers as being
equally important.
Parents can be involved in school and education in very different
ways. The young adults in the survey were asked about practical aspects
of parental involvement in their education (Table 4.16). Parents of the
second generation, particularly those of Moroccan origin, checked how
much time their children spent on homework significantly more often
than those in the comparison group. However, according to our respon-
dents, comparison group parents helped significantly more with home-
work than did Moroccan and Turkish parents. Education and schooling
were most often discussed in Turkish families, then followed by com-
parison group families and, finally, Moroccan families. Although
Moroccan parents reportedly did not speak with their children about
education, as was the case for the other groups, Moroccan parents were
more often in touch with teachers than was the case for the other two
groups.
The way in which parents are involved in their children’s education
is highly comparable overall. We find that Turkish and Moroccan par-
ents seem to be in touch with their daughters’ teachers somewhat more
often than is the case for their sons, and girls of the comparison group
seem to get somewhat more help with their homework than do boys.
The most striking gender differences are not directly related to school,
but are found in the involvement in household chores. In particular, in
Turkish families, boys are less likely to have to do household chores
than girls are.
In line with the importance attached to older brothers and sisters, we
find that siblings helped with homework most often among the second-
generation Moroccans followed by the Turkish and comparison group
(not in table). Similar patterns were found when talking about educa-
tion or school. Older siblings seem thus to be much more important
for the education of their younger siblings in Moroccan families than
they are in Turkish families and comparison group families.
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Table 4.16 Involvement of parents in schooling, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Parents checked how much time was spent on homework
Very often 13.3 12.4 15.9 22.4 5.3 6.6
Often 22.9 24.7 34.1 30.6 25.5 19.2
Sometimes 26.5 27.0 26.1 22.4 31.1 22.3
Not often 18.1 20.2 13.6 11.8 21.2 30.2
Never 19.3 15.7 10.2 12.9 16.8 21.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 240 253 243 246 250 261
Parents helped with homework
Very often 2.4 2.3 4.6 7.0 2.2 7.2
Often 8.4 10.2 10.3 11.6 11.9 22.3
Sometimes 21.7 17.0 25.3 25.6 36.6 42.3
Not often 18.1 19.3 20.7 19.8 34.0 19.0
Never 49.4 51.1 39.1 36.0 15.2 9.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 240 253 242 246 249 261
Parents talked about school and learning
Very often 11.9 17.2 20.5 26.2 4.8 15.5
Often 35.7 42.5 46.6 44.0 54.2 52.1
Sometimes 33.3 27.6 22.7 21.4 29.1 25.2
Not often 13.1 5.7 8.0 6.0 9.1 5.1
Never 6.0 6.9 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 240 251 242 246 249 261
Parents were in touch with teachers
Very often 6.0 12.6 8.2 13.1 4.3 6.3
Often 23.8 32.2 32.9 33.3 24.5 21.5
Sometimes 44.0 34.5 41.2 35.7 43.3 43.7
Not often 16.7 11.5 14.1 13.1 24.3 24.8
Never 9.5 9.2 3.5 4.8 3.5 3.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 240 250 241 246 249 260
Respondent performed household chores/babysitting
Very often 1.2 3.4 2.3 7.1 4.6 2.5
Often 7.1 15.9 12.6 16.5 24.9 17.6
Sometimes 23.8 28.4 36.8 36.5 41.4 49.1
Not often 26.2 23.9 23.0 22.4 18.8 18.8
Never 41.7 28.4 25.3 17.6 10.2 12.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 240 252 242 246 249 261
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4.10 Conclusions
Based on the overview of different indicators of school performance
presented in this chapter, we can draw some initial albeit cautious con-
clusions on the position of the second generation in education. The
TIES survey results can be interpreted in different ways. It is the classic
half-full-or-half-empty glass dilemma. When we look at the group of sec-
ond-generation young adults who have already left school, the results
are rather alarming: about half could officially be labelled as at-risk
youth. This percentage is twice as high as what we find among the com-
parison group. This very negative picture, however, changes when we
take those who are still in education into account: this group of the sec-
ond generation performs remarkably well. More than 40 per cent of
them is in higher education. Both trends seem to operate simulta-
neously: we find that a considerable group stays behind and an equally
large group performs remarkably well. The fact that such a substantial
share of the second generation seems to do pretty well in school is even
more outstanding when one considers how little schooling their parents
have generally had.
Another important observation from these first analyses relates to
changes over time. If we distinguish between different age cohorts of
the current second generation, we find remarkable developments. To
name the most important ones: over time, more second-generation
youth attend preschools, they are more often found in a segregated
school situation (both in primary and secondary schools) and they inter-
rupt primary school less often for a stay in Turkey or Morocco. A final
interesting finding is that the majority of second-generation youth, like
the comparison group, is very positive about the role of teachers in
school. In general, second-generation youth also stress the important
roles parents and siblings play in their success at school. Family mem-
bers being important actors in their lives, however, is more emphasised
among the second generation than the comparison group.
Notes
1 Voorbereidend Beroeps Onderwijs.
2 Middelbaar Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs; Voorbereidend Middelbaar Beroeps-
onderwijs-theoretisch.
3 Hoger Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs; Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs.
4 Leerwegondersteunend onderwijs.
5 We do need to take into consideration that some of the improvement stems from
more second-generation children entering the educational system from the
beginning.
6 Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs.
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5 Labour and income
Liesbeth Heering and Susan ter Bekke
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the labour market and income situation of the
three groups studied. We will present an overview of the current situa-
tion of the TIES respondents with respect to work. In section 5.4, we
will also look at the transition from school or study to work, as well as
job and unemployment levels. As section 5.5 shows, through work,
scholarships, unemployment or other social benefits an income is ac-
quired, and we will thus examine both the main source of respondents’
income and the amounts they earn. In section 5.6, we will report how
respondents describe feelings of personal and group discrimination in
the labour market. The aim here is to explore conditions for success or
failure in the Dutch labour market by analysing the extent to which peo-
ple of different ethnic backgrounds participate and have equal work ac-
cess. We will pay particular attention to differences between men and
women in labour behaviour, choices and experiences. Section 5.2 gives
a brief overview of Dutch labour market policies addressing ethnic
minorities and sketches the development of their situation in the labour
market in the past ten years. Because the two ethnic groups in our
study are part of a greater population of non-western ethnic minorities
– and information is only available for them as a whole – we will some-
times refer to this larger group of minorities. Section 5.3 portrays the
current situation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
5.2 Ethnic minorities in labour market policies
In the annual Integration Report 2007, Dagevos and Gijsberts remark
that, ‘The proportion of members of non-western ethnic minorities in
employment is substantially higher today than it was ten years ago,
while unemployment is substantially lower’ (Dagevos & Gijsberts 2007:
317). The level of unemployment among the population of non-western
descent is still high at 16 per cent, as compared with 4 per cent for the
population of Dutch descent. The gap in unemployment level between
the two populations has narrowed by 7 percentage points in this period.
The high unemployment of the ethnic minorities in the labour force is
mainly a problem of high youth unemployment. More than one in five
(22 per cent) of the ethnic minorities population between fifteen and 24
years of age are without work versus 9 per cent of their Dutch counter-
parts. However, this relatively high figure is a big improvement over
the situation of ten years earlier, when 35 per cent of the young ethnic
minorities was unemployed. The developments in the two ethnic
groups of our study are in line with the general trends. Ten years ago,
around one-third of Turks and Moroccans aged between fifteen and 65
had paid work for at least twelve hours a week, while, in 2006, around
45 per cent had paid work. While the improvements have been progres-
sive and are thus encouraging, there is still a great gap in net participa-
tion between the second-generation population and that of Dutch des-
cent – of which 67 per cent has paid work.
Long ago, the government began general labour market initiatives to
tackle youth unemployment by creating subsidised jobs for the bottom
end of the labour market. Ethnic minorities have always been explicitly
mentioned as a vulnerable group needing extra help due to high unem-
ployment. Most of the policies that benefit the second generation are
general policies. Since the second generation entered the labour market
at the beginning of the 1990s, we will only discuss the relevant policies
from that time onwards. With the publication of Contourennota (Con-
tours Report) in 1994, the socio-economic aspects of integration were
given more prominence, as evidenced by integration policies. Moreover,
the first Purple Coalition government (1994-1998) created measures
and launched projects to target young people from those ethnic minor-
ity groups with difficulties transitioning to the labour market (Smeets et
al. 1999: 33). The measures of this period aimed to remove barriers for
people with an immigrant background as well as to promote general fa-
cilities and programmes, such as subsidised job schemes. Municipali-
ties were responsible for the implementation and coordination. After
four years in existence, by 1998, 40,000 people had participated in the
biggest job scheme ever implemented, the Wet Inschakeling Werkzoe-
kenden (Act Involving Jobseekers). Two-thirds of the beneficiaries of
the scheme were people of Dutch descent and about a quarter had a
non-western background. In the latter group, 5 per cent was of Turkish
and 5 per cent of Moroccan descent. These programmes primarily
reached people of the first generation (Martens & Weijers 2000: 60).
To fight discrimination and to encourage companies to employ peo-
ple of immigrant descent, several measures were taken. The Wet Sa-
men (Act Stimulating Labour Participation of Minorities 1998-2004) as
well as its prior rendition, the Wbeaa 1994-1998 (Act Encouraging
Equal Labour Participation), are viewed by the government as two of
the programme’s most important instruments (Dagevos 2001: 90).
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From 1998 onwards, companies with more than 35 employees were ob-
liged to register their personnel according to their descent. Annual re-
ports had to include a plan of action that would improve the inflow of
personnel of foreign descent and encourage their promotion to better
jobs. Although companies initially resisted the law and were disinclined
to cooperate with reporting, the situation improved over the course of
time. An evaluation of the law in 2000 concluded that the Wet Samen’s
main achievement was its capacity to improve awareness of the issues
at stake. In general, personnel policies did not change very much, and
only rarely were quantitative targets set, except in governmental institu-
tions themselves (Dagevos 2001: 90).
The second Purple Coalition government (1999-2002) made an expli-
cit connection between urban and integration policies by instating a
Minister for Urban Policies and Integration based in the Ministry of
Home Affairs. In this period, Dutch-as-a-second language education be-
came a core activity in a variety of programmes and projects. Again, the
objective was to improve the chances people with a minority back-
ground had at acquiring jobs on the Dutch labour market. This initia-
tive took the form of offering the long-term unemployed among minor-
ity groups (Smeets et al. 1999: 16) internships that promote Dutch lan-
guage-learning as well as compulsory courses in language and
integration (known in Dutch as ‘inburgering’). This trend continued in
the successive Balkenende governments. In 2003, Dagevos and Turken-
burg observed that there was a tendency to drop specific measures for
ethnic minorities, partly because of the rapid decline of unemployment
in this group during the second half of 1990s. Dagevos and Turkenburg
assumed a certain fatigue also played a role vis-à-vis the specific atten-
tion and programmes for ethnic minorities in the labour market policy
(Dagevos et al. 2003: 257). Nevertheless, the high youth unemployment
remained on the policy (and research) agenda (Dagevos 2006) and, in
February 2007, the Social and Economic Council (SER) published up-
dated advice to the government on how to improve the labour market
position of ethnic minority youth. SER’s recommendations included
calling upon different parties in the labour market as well as in the field
of education to cooperate and make extra investments to improve the si-
tuation of these groups. The council also urged the government to
speed up plans to establish a national network of discrimination report-
ing centres (SER 2007).
LABOUR AND INCOME 89
5.3 The labour market position of Turks and Moroccans in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Over the years, Amsterdam’s and Rotterdam’s economies have grown
due to their important roles as ports. Both cities enjoy the reputation of
being international centres of trade and commerce, and this has re-
sulted in high percentages of people there employed in the trade and
transport sector. However, most people work in the business service
sector, namely 23 per cent in Amsterdam and 19 per cent in Rotterdam.
In Amsterdam, financial institutions are also important, as 10 per cent
of employed people works there.
Data on the working-age population at the city level that distinguish
the first from the second generations are available only for the year
2004. Given our interest in the second generation, we have chosen to
present these figures in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Second-generation Turks
and Moroccans still form a small part of the working-age population in
the two cities, though they have paid work more often than their prede-
cessors in the first generation do. The difference with the comparison
group is huge across all age groups, however. Participation in the labour
market is lower in Rotterdam in all age and ethnic age groups than in
Amsterdam.
Amsterdam and Rotterdam – two of the ‘big four’ cities, together
with The Hague and Utrecht – have the highest share of households
with a low income in the country. While 9 per cent of all households in
the Netherlands have a low income, 17 per cent of the households in
Amsterdam and 16 per cent in Rotterdam are in this unfavourable posi-
tion. On average, non-western households in Amsterdam are two-and-a-
half times more likely to have a low income than households of Dutch
Table 5.1 Working-age population with paid work in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in %, by age











15-24 41.3 45.1 45.1 48.4 59.2
25-35 51.4 65.9 51.9 63.5 85.3
Total 15-65 42.4 50.7 41.2 51.6 71.6
Rotterdam
15-24 36.0 38.3 36.7 38.2 62.5
25-35 47.6 61.0 42.0 56.4 84.8
Total 15-65 39.4 44.7 34.7 41.5 68.8
Source: Statistics Netherlands
90 LIESBETH HEERING AND SUSAN TER BEKKE
descent. In Rotterdam, the distribution is even more skewed. Non-
western households are three times more likely to have a low income
than Dutch households. In Amsterdam, about half of the non-western
households with a low income depend on the lowest social security ben-
efit known as the bijstandsuitkering. In Rotterdam, only 26 per cent of
the low-income households have paid work. Some 58 per cent of the
non-western households with a low income in Rotterdam receive a bij-
standsuitkering (Lautenbach & Siermann 2007).
Table 5.2 gives information about dependence on social security bene-
fits in the two cities. Similar to observations of the labour market, the
important differences are those between the comparison group and the
two foreign descent groups, with the latter more often dependent on
social security benefits. In this case, we only find small differences
between the two generations of each ethnic group.
5.4 Labour market position of the three study groups in the
TIES survey
All TIES respondents were asked whether they were active on the
labour market. The comparison group, being older on average, most
often had a job or jobs; second-generation Moroccans – being the
youngest – were more often still fulltime students, combining a job
with studies or following an apprentice track. The different age patterns
partly account for the statistically significant differences we find be-
tween the ethnic groups, as shown in Table 5.3. The second generation
faces higher unemployment than the comparison group, and a signifi-
cant proportion of women of Turkish descent participate in neither
Table 5.2 Working-age population with social benefits in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in %, by











15-24 7.2 5.0 7.4 5.1 3.0
25-35 24.2 21.1 25.2 24.2 17.5
Total 15-65 34.5 9.4 34.4 9.1 7.7
Rotterdam
15-24 11.5 8.7 14.4 8.5 4.5
25-35 29.0 26.5 35.3 30.9 16.8
Total 15-65 38.8 13.8 41.5 12.6 9.8
Source: Statistics Netherlands
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school nor work because they take care of children or other family
members. This scenario is rare below the age of 30 in the comparison
group. Second-generation Moroccan women are found to be in an inter-
mediate position when looking at age- and gender-specific patterns.
For the Turkish second generation and the comparison group, differ-
ences according to gender are statistically significant. Study is still im-
portant for people in the age group of eighteen to 35; however, three out
of four respondents reported already having experience with the transi-
tion from school or study to the labour market. The transition could be
categorised as either temporary, because the individual went back to
school after having worked for a while, or more permanent, after having
transferred from one job to another.
We asked respondents how many months it took before they found
their first job after having finished fulltime schooling, as well as what
they did right after school. Table 5.4 gives an overview of the answers.
It is interesting to observe that so many found a job right away. This is
the case for all ethnic groups, for both men and women, with the com-
parison group in the most favourable position. While the differences
among the three groups overall are statistically significant, within the
groups, they are not statistically significant according to sex.
Table 5.3 Labour situation, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Has one or more jobs 50.3 36.8 40.4 30.0 57.3 63.2
Has own business 3.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 8.1 0.0
Self-employed 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 5.4 2.2
Has job(s) and is in school 14.3 13.6 20.0 25.1 15.0 17.0
Following an apprentice track 6.0 4.9 6.7 7.9 2.1 2.3
Has unpaid family
work/family business
0.3 2.3 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.0
Unemployed
though not seeking a job
1.0 1.2 2.3 0.5 0.3 0.9
Unemployed and
seeking a job
9.6 9.7 9.7 7.1 1.6 1.7
Takes care of children or
family
0.0 17.1 0.0 11.5 0.0 3.9
Unable to work (sick or
disabled)
2.4 2.9 1.2 2.2 0.7 0.9
Fulltime student without
a job
9.2 9.3 16.5 13.8 8.7 7.8
Don’t know 1.2 0.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 242 258 246 246 250 262
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Only second-generation Turkish women report staying at home and
doing household work in substantial numbers, which is in line with
earlier observations. Being unemployed and spending a brief period ac-
tively looking for work is also found to be relatively evenly spread across
groups and gender. The reported time needed to find a first job after
finishing fulltime school was, on average, two months; the comparison
group had a slightly more favourable position, with an average of 1.7
months, and no differences were reported between men and women.
In the second-generation Turkish group, men reported a shorter waiting
period than women when it came to finding work, whereas the opposite
was found in the second-generation Moroccan group: women report an
average of 1.9 months and men, 2.6 months.
Thus, what are the main jobs of the currently employed respondents?
And in which sectors of the economy are they active? The Standaard
Beroepenclassificatie (the Dutch standard occupational classification
1992, i.e. SBC-92) used to classify the most important job. Table 5.5
gives an overview of job levels by ethnic group, showing that the obser-
vable differences are statistically significant. We have chosen to exclude
here those currently employed respondents who combine work with
study so as not to distort comparisons over the ethnic groups with such
respondents’ unequal distribution. Given that study and jobs are most
often combined in the second-generation Moroccan group, we lose a
third of the cases if we confine ourselves to those with work only. In
the comparison group, we lose only 18 per cent of the cases. Between
Table 5.4 Situation after finishing education and before first job, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Did household work 1.9 11.8 2.5 4.1 0.6 1.2
Was unemployed though
not seeking a job
7.0 12.3 9.9 10.1 4.4 2.6
Was unemployed though
actively seeking a job
27.0 17.7 20.3 18.2 14.7 17.5
Did short-term odd jobs 11.8 13.5 18.6 18.4 20.7 14.8
Helped in the family
business without pay
0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.5
Worked in the family
business for pay
2.3 0.2 0.3 1.7 0.7 1.3
Immediately found a job 47.3 44.3 47.2 47.1 58.8 62.1
Performed compulsory
army service
2.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 194 185 179 168 194 199
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45 and 47 per cent of Turkish and Moroccan second-generation respon-
dents is found in elementary and lower level jobs, and 17 to 19 per cent
is found in higher-level jobs. The occupations of the comparison group
show another distribution altogether; more than 50 per cent is in high-
er-level jobs.
The figures in Table 5.5 do not reveal differences between men and
women or according to age. By comparing mean occupational prestige
values, Tables 5.6a and b shed light on the development of prestige with
age (Table 5.6b) and differences in prestige according to gender (Table
5.6a). The Ultee and Sixma occupational prestige ladder (U&S-92) is
used to assign scores to all occupations coded in the SBC-92. The U&S-
92 scores are measured on an interval scale.
Table 5.5 SBC* level of current job for those who finished education, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Elementary 9.8 12.7 4.2
Lower 34.8 34.6 15.0
Secondary 35.9 35.4 26.6
Higher 14.7 15.0 39.2
Scientific 4.8 2.3 15.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 206 174 318
* Standaard Beroepenclassificatie 1992
Table 5.6a Average prestige score (U&S-92) of current jobs for those who have finished educa-
tion, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Mean 40.4 44.8 37.4 46.0 54.0 53.2
Standard error of mean 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 0.9 0.9
N 126 80 98 76 162 156
Table 5.6b Average prestige score (U&S-92) of current jobs for those who have finished educa-
tion, by ethnic group and age group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
18-24 25+ 18-24 25+ 18-24 25+
Mean 35.3 46.2 36.7 44.2 42.9 55.8
Standard error of mean 3.0 2.7 3.3 3.0 1.4 0.7
N 76 130 74 100 55 263
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Interestingly, women of Turkish and Moroccan descent have higher
prestige scores than men of the same ethnic group. This time, the op-
posite pattern is found for the comparison group, but the differences
are very small. While the differences between the three groups are sta-
tistically significant, those by sex in each ethnic group are not. With in-
creasing age, one would expect the prestige scores to improve, particu-
larly after the age of 25 (when people most have finished their educa-
tion). In line with this expectation, we find statistically significantly
higher scores with advancing age among young people of Turkish des-
cent and the comparison group. The differences between the groups
also increase, particularly between the two second-generation groups
and the comparison group.
The sectors in which men and women work differs, too; while there
are hardly any second-generation Turkish or Moroccan men found in
health care and social work or in education, a third of all women work
in these sectors. Men’s jobs involve manufacturing, construction and
work in the transport sector. The trade and financial sectors attract both
men and women of all groups in roughly equal amounts (10 to 15 per
cent).
The Netherlands is known for its high proportion of people – and
especially women – who work part-time. Do we find this pattern in our
young population, too? The general trend is confirmed if we look at the
figures by ethnic group and gender (not in table). Around half of the
second-generation women and 40 per cent of women in the compari-
son group have part-time jobs, while six to eight out of ten men work
fulltime. If we disaggregate by age, however, differences by gender hold,
yet they decrease substantially as age increases. Above the age of 25,
half of the second-generation women work more than 32 hours a week.
All respondents with work were asked about their satisfaction in
terms of how the level of skills their job required met the skills they
had to offer. For the comparison group, the match between the skills re-
quired and possessed was quite good: almost 75 per cent felt there was
a match (not in table). Consistency between skills required and skills
possessed was found for only about half of the second-generation
groups. In the second-generation Moroccan group, respondents most
often state that they were working below their own perceived level of
skills. This held true for men in particular (there is a 10 per cent differ-
ence with the women). The fact that the second-generation Moroccan
group has the youngest age distribution and the comparison group, the
oldest, does play a role here. As with fulltime versus part-time work, the
skills required and possessed become more balanced with increasing
age.
What are the future plans of those who are currently working? Table
5.7 presents the answers given to the question. It is striking that all of
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the groups are quite ambitious, i.e. a substantial number claim that
they aim for a promotion, a more challenging job or further education.
There are differences between men and women, as men more often say
that they want to start their own business. Second-generation Turkish
women and women of the comparison group mention wanting to pur-
sue additional training twice as often as their male counterparts. The
gender differences are only statistically significant for the comparison
group.
There is only a small group of respondents who are unemployed – 8
per cent across groups – though with substantial differences visible be-
tween the comparison group and the second-generation groups (see Ta-
ble 5.3). Because the comparison group is particularly small, with only
sixteen unemployed persons, this group is not considered further here.
In the second-generation groups, between 10 and 11 per cent are unem-
ployed. Between 83 and 88 per cent of those without a job are looking
for work. The unemployed report having been in this position for quite
some time already, on average, being ten months since the last paid
job. Second-generation Turks seem worse off, with around 60 per cent
without paid work for more than six months; for second-generation
Moroccans, this is true in 44 per cent of the cases.
Summarising, the picture of the labour market situation has positive
and negative aspects that are in line with the general picture. There is
more unemployment, and the level of jobs is lower for Turks and Mor-
occans of the second generation compared with the comparison group.
On the positive side, we find a lot of ambition to study and move up,
particularly among women of the second-generation groups.
Table 5.7 Future plans concerning working career of those who do paid work, by ethnic group
and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Continue current work 33.5 28.6 24.3 19.1 36.0 30.6
Part-time work/
work fewer hours
1.1 4.4 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.8
Look for promotion/
more challenging job
19.7 20.8 26.7 24.1 38.2 38.4
Start own business 17.0 8.3 20.1 11.6 10.0 8.8
Persue new or additional training 13.7 22.8 20.2 24.7 3.8 8.0
Become fulltime homemaker 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
Other 15.0 14.3 8.7 17.3 11.9 11.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 163 125 147 138 208 211
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5.5 Income position of the three ethnic groups in the TIES
survey
Most of the respondents have some sort of independent income such as
through work, a scholarship or a social benefit. Table 5.8 gives an over-
view of income sources per group. The second-generation Moroccans,
being the youngest, most often receive some sort of benefit, which is
only the case for 23 per cent of the older, comparison group. For the ma-
jority of cases – 75 per cent – this concerns student scholarships in both
groups. While slightly less than half of the second-generation Moroccan
women have some sort of benefit, for men, the rate is only 35 per cent.
These differences are not statistically significant, however. In the other
two ethnic groups we do not find gender differences. Those with a scho-
larship very often still live in their parental home; of those living with
their parents, between 82 and 92 per cent have a student scholarship,
and this is found across all groups. A conspicuous 10 per cent of sec-
ond-generation Turks mention receiving a disability benefit, which is
three times higher than the rate among second-generation Moroccans
and five times higher than the rate in the comparison group.
The survey collected information on the monthly net amount of
euros respondents earned. In line with earlier tables, we limit ourselves
here to those who have finished school and present net monthly in-
come from employment only. Table 5.9 gives an overall picture across
the three groups. The respondents in the comparison group earn quite
a bit more than those in the second-generation groups: while almost 65
per cent of the second-generation Moroccans earn below 1,500 euros
per month, this is true for only around one-third of those in the com-
parison group. Only in the comparison group do we find significant dif-
ferences between men and women. Given the larger numbers and high-
er position of the comparison group in the labour market, this is no
surprise. However, without taking the household situation into account,
this is a rather rough first indication. Consistent with analyses in earlier
chapters, we have therefore also looked at the income amounts accord-
ing to living arrangement.
Table 5.8 Reception of benefits, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Receives some sort of benefit 33.7 43.9 23.0
Receives no benefits 66.3 56.1 77.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 500 492 512
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Table 5.10 presents information about respondents who live in their
own household with a partner (and sometimes with children) and those
who live with their parents. These two groups represent about 60 per
cent of the respondents and illustrate the differences across groups and
situations.
Table 5.9 Net monthly income from employment for those who finished education, by ethnic
group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Less than C 550 4.5 6.2 7.5 12.5 1.6 5.1
Between C 550 and C 999 12.0 21.4 18.3 13.6 8.3 7.4
Between C 1,000 and C 1,499 31.8 42.4 34.8 45.9 19.4 22.6
Between C 1,500 and C 1,999 34.6 14.7 28.7 17.5 26.3 41.2
Between C 2,000 and C 2,499 6.8 1.0 1.6 1.5 23.4 8.9
Between C 2,500 and C 2,999 2.0 3.6 1.2 3.8 8.0 5.7
More than C 3,000 2.8 0.9 0.2 0.0 6.1 2.6
Don’t want to say 5.7 7.7 5.0 4.1 5.3 4.5
Don’t know 0.0 2.1 2.8 1.2 1.5 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 133 88 101 84 171 164
Table 5.10 Net monthly income from employment, by living arrangement (excluding single-
person households) and ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Own household with partner (and/or children)
Less than C 550 3.5 13.4 1.3
Between C 550 and C 999 11.5 8.3 9.3
Between C 1,000 and C 1,499 40.7 44.6 18.9
Between C 1,500 and C 1,999 33.6 28.9 36.6
Between C 2,000 and C 2,499 4.9 2.2 17.1
Between C 2,500 and C 2,999 2.9 2.5 11.1
More than C 3,000 2.8 0.0 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 115 59 161
In parental/grandparental household
Less than C 550 8.5 15.2 13.3
Between C 550 and C 999 30.3 22.0 27.3
Between C 1,000 and C 1,499 39.5 40.4 44.3
Between C 1,500 and C 1,999 18.5 21.5 11.4
More than C 2,000 3.2 0.9 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 54 54 22
98 LIESBETH HEERING AND SUSAN TER BEKKE
Respondents with their own household and a partner generally have
higher incomes. These individual incomes form just part of the house-
hold income, as partners may also be contributing income from work.
There are important differences between the ethnic groups as far as the
extent to which respondents’ partners earn an income. Respondents of
the comparison group more often have a partner who has completed
their education and earns a job-based income than do second-genera-
tion respondents. Partners who contribute to household income gener-
ally bring in more money than the respondent if the respondent’s in-
come is low to begin with, and about the same if the respondent already
earns a relatively good income. Given that partners of comparison
group respondents more often work and work for better pay than do
partners of second-generation respondents, one can safely conclude that
the income situation in the households of the comparison group is
much more favourable than that of the second-generation groups.
The lowest net incomes are found among respondents who live with
their parents: 18 per cent of the respondents who finished school and
have a job live with their parents. Only 16 per cent of them come from
the comparison group. This means that roughly one in four respon-
dents of Turkish or Moroccan descent who are no longer in school lives
with their parents. The conditions in these parental homes vary greatly
across the different groups. Ninety per cent of the fathers of the com-
parison group and 67 per cent of the mothers have paid work, while
this is true for only a third of the Moroccan fathers and 10 per cent of
the mothers. Of the Moroccan fathers, 27 per cent is retired and 25 per
cent receives a disability benefit. The situation in Turkish parental
households is slightly more favourable, with 56 per cent of the fathers
and 20 per cent of the mothers having paid work, and dependence on
retirement or disability benefits being lower at 31 per cent. Not pre-
sented in the table are those respondents who live alone. Although one
in five respondents with a job-based income work lives alone, 75 per
cent are found in the comparison group. Most of them also have a rela-
tively high income: 68 per cent has an income above 1,500 euros per
month.
5.6 Discrimination on the labour market
Discrimination can be a great obstacle for Turks and Moroccans trying
to enter the labour market. Monitor Rassendiscriminatie 2005, published
by the Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie (LBR,
National Bureau Against Racial Discrimination), notes that 60 per cent
of the people of Moroccan descent and 49 per cent of those of Turkish
descent who report irregularities say they felt discriminated against dur-
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ing job interviews at least once in the previous year because of their ori-
gin. In comparison, only 2 per cent of the population of Dutch descent
who report discrimination attributed it to their origin. On the work
floor, a quarter of the people of Turkish and Moroccan descent said they
experienced discrimination (Boog et al. 2006). The Netherlands has
several laws dealing with discrimination. The most important law is the
Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling (AWGB, Equal Treatment Act),
which came into effect in 1994. People who feel they are treated un-
equally at work or school and suspect it has to do with their race, reli-
gion, gender or political preference can call upon this law (www.cgb.nl/
cgb120.php).
In all life domains and in various ways, people may sense and experi-
ence open as well as disguised forms of discrimination. What are the
experiences of the respondents in our survey regarding hostility and un-
fair treatment in the labour market? Are there differences found be-
tween the three groups, between the two cities and between men and
women?
Table 5.11 presents answers, by ethnic group, to the question of per-
ceived discrimination when looking for a job. Between the cities, the
two ethnic groups and the two sexes, we do not find statistically signifi-
cant differences in perceptions, despite the fact that men more often ex-
press experiences of unfair treatment. Table 5.12 reports experiences at
the workplace for respondents who have a history of jobs.
As in Table 5.11, the differences between men and women are greater
than those found between the cities; this time, differences in percep-
tions between second-generation Moroccan men and women are statis-
tically significant.
Apart from personal experiences of discrimination, we also asked re-
spondents how they perceived entry into the labour market on a group
basis for people of Turkish or Moroccan descent compared with people
from the comparison group. This question – in a slightly different man-
ner – was asked of the comparison group also, being phrased as fol-
Table 5.11 Perceived personal discrimination in finding a job, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Men Women Men Women
Never 50.7 56.1 45.2 55.7
Rarely 18.8 18.6 14.3 18.7
Occasionally 22.1 11.9 24.6 13.7
Regularly 3.8 11.2 11.6 6.0
Frequently 4.6 2.2 4.4 5.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 176 139 161 158
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lows: ‘According to you, is it just as difficult, less difficult or more diffi-
cult for people of Turkish and Moroccan origin to find a good job than
for people of Dutch origin of the same age and qualifications? The
question posed to the second generation was: ‘According to you, is it
just as difficult, less difficult or more difficult for you to find a good job
than for people of Dutch origin of the same age and qualifications?’
The three groups have statistically significantly different perceptions on
these issues. Table 5.13 presents the results by ethnic group and city.
The second-generation groups in Rotterdam are more negative about
the chances their group has on the labour market than are their coun-
terparts in Amsterdam. But these differences by city are not statistically
Table 5.12 Perceived personal discrimination at the workplace, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans
Men Women Men Women
Never 42.0 56.9 46.2 59.1
Rarely 25.6 13.5 17.5 18.5
Occasionally 24.1 21.8 25.0 16.1
Regularly 4.3 6.5 6.3 4.8
Frequently 3.9 1.3 4.9 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 189 178 176 159
Table 5.13 Perceived group discrimination of Turks and Moroccans in finding a job, by ethnic
group and city
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Amsterdam
Much less difficult 1.7 0.8 0.5
Less difficult 7.0 2.8 1.7
As difficult 50.5 47.1 21.8
More difficult 30.4 36.0 68.1
Much more difficult 10.5 13.2 7.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 237 241 259
Rotterdam
Much less difficult 2.4 0.4 0.4
Less difficult 2.5 4.1 2.3
As difficult 40.8 37.4 30.3
More difficult 37.3 42.4 60.8
Much more difficult 17.0 15.8 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 263 251 253
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significant (nor are they by sex). What is most revealing in this table are
the views of the comparison group. As many as two-thirds to three-
quarters of the comparison group – particularly in Amsterdam – think
that people of Turkish and Moroccan origin have much more difficulty
finding a good job than do people of Dutch origin. Only in Amsterdam
do the perceptions among the three ethnic groups on discrimination of
Turks and Moroccans differ in a statistically significant way.
5.7 Conclusions
Amsterdam and Rotterdam have diverse local economies and relatively
high proportions of households that face poverty. Households of Turk-
ish and Moroccan descent are among at-risk groups for having low in-
come, due to high unemployment and low participation in the labour
market. The first generation – which is three times as big as the second
generation – determines the macro-picture of the labour market. Sec-
ond-generation Turks and Moroccans are still at the beginning of their
working life. Between the two ethnic groups and the comparison group
a gap prevails, though the second generation is in a better position than
the first one. Compared to the first generation, a substantially higher
percentage of second-generation Turks and Moroccans in the age group
25 to 35 enjoy paid work in both cities.
The labour market and income situation of the second generation in
the TIES survey are consistent with the bigger picture. There is greater
unemployment and lower-level jobs for Turks and Moroccans of the sec-
ond generation than for the comparison group. A real assessment of the
extent to which the Dutch labour market offers equal opportunities can
be made if future studies can jointly analyse labour and education char-
acteristics. An encouraging result from our survey is that many respon-
dents, particularly women, voiced their ambitions to study and move up
the occupational ladder. As the survey showed, when second-generation
women have paid jobs, they are employed at an equivalent or better level
than men in their ethnic group. Women are also more satisfied with
their work in terms of the skill level required. More often than men,
they express interest in enhancing their educational level through
further or additional training. One in two second-generation women
above the age of 25 with a job works fulltime. Compared with the
mothers of these women, the difference is huge. Men of the second gen-
eration perceive discrimination in the labour market more often than
women, both for themselves and for their group. One might argue,
though, that women are less exposed to such situations in the labour
market than men because of their lower participation rate to begin with.
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Lower-level jobs result in lower income, and it is therefore not surpris-
ing that respondents of the comparison group have better incomes than
the second-generation groups. The fact that the respondents of the com-
parison group are, on average, four to five years older than members of
the two second-generation groups plays an important role in these differ-
ences, and one should thus be cautious in interpreting this result. In-
stead of looking at age-specific figures, we chose to compare respondents
in the same household situation. We compared the individual incomes
of those with their own household and a partner and the ones who lived
with their parents, across ethnic groups. All respondents who live with
their parents have the lowest incomes, but it is noteworthy that one in
four respondents who have finished school and earn an income lives in
the parental home. The income situation is very different in the parental
homes of our second-generation respondents than in those of the com-
parison group. Whereas in the latter group, the majority of the parents
both work, this is not the case in Turkish and Moroccan households.
These households largely depend on a combination of social security
such as retirement, unemployment and disability benefits.
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6 Identities and intercultural relations
George Groenewold
6.1 Introduction
While the previous chapters dealt with contextual and structural dimen-
sions of the integration of the second generation, this chapter addresses
the socio-cultural dimensions. Specifically, it describes indicators for
ethnic and other group identifications as weak as for intercultural rela-
tions within Dutch society.
Differences in language, socio-political history, religious notions and
symbols have been important factors shaping the diversity in national
cultures and identities in European populations. More recently, immi-
gration in larger numbers has added new cultures and identities, contri-
buting to a further diversification. From a socio-cultural and psychologi-
cal perspective, this set off an ‘acculturation process’, which means that
contact between existing populations and immigrant groups leads to
adaptations in the cultural orientations of all groups concerned (Berry
1997; Rummens 2001). Contrary to traditional views (e.g. Gordon
1964), Glazer and Moynihan (1963) argue that cultural pluralism is a
more plausible view than presuming that assimilation is the inevitable
outcome of immigrant adaptation. This view was later elaborated by
Berry (1997), Bourhis et al. (1997) and Navas et al. (2007), who main-
tain that acculturation should be looked at from a multi-dimensional
and multiple life-domain perspective. Thus, persons may pursue differ-
ent acculturation strategies, thus implying that cultural identity is not
‘exclusive’: people from different groups may identify with different cul-
tural characteristics according to differing circumstances (Arends-Tóth
& Van de Vijver 2001, 2002; Berry 1997; Galchenko et al. 2006; Phalet
& Ter Wal, 2004; Phinney et al. 2001; Rudmin 2003; Verkuyten & Tijs
1999; Vedder & Van de Vijver 2003). In the TIES project, ‘identity’ is
therefore defined as a multi-component indicator of feelings and con-
structions of belonging to different ‘groups’ and ‘communities’ (includ-
ing nations and ethnic communities). Thus, at the conceptual level,
identity comprises multiple identities pertaining to different life do-
mains. When it comes to actual TIES survey measurements, this is re-
flected, for example, by asking about the intensity of respondents’ feel-
ings of simultaneous belonging to a variety of identities, including na-
tional, ethnic and local ones.
Section 6.2 begins with a narrative describing the Dutch context of
identity and intercultural relations. Section 6.3 analyses feelings people
express regarding belonging to certain social groups and their identifi-
cation with Dutch society. As identities are dependent on more aspects
than just ethnic origin, the analysis proceeds with other important cul-
tural dimensions of ethnic identity, such as language proficiency and
use (section 6.4), religious practices and religiosity (section 6.5) and
transnational relations (section 6.6). The chapter concludes with an
analysis of views on norms and values, the multicultural society at large
and members of other social groups (section 6.7).
6.2 Dutch context of identity and intercultural relations
The idiosyncratic Dutch language is an important element of Dutch
identity. So, too, are the norms, values and use of religious symbols and
paraphernalia inspired by the Protestant and Catholic religions. The im-
portance that most non-western immigrant groups in the Netherlands
give to religion and religiosity warrants a few sentences on the chan-
ging importance of religion in the Netherlands. At the time of the coun-
try’s latest constitutional reform in 1848, almost all Dutch citizens self-
affiliated with one of three main religious denominations: Protestant
(i.e Dutch Reformed), Calvinist (known as ‘Gereformeerd’) and Catho-
lic. A mass process of secularisation started in the second half of the
nineteenth century and accelerated from the 1960s onwards. By 2002,
about 40 per cent of the population did not affiliate with any religion,
while 31 per cent was Catholic, 21 per cent was Protestant (14 per cent
Dutch Reformed; 7 per cent Calvinist) and 5 per cent was Muslim. In
the Netherlands’ main cities, the proportion of Dutch people without a
religion is somewhat higher. For instance, in the Amsterdam region,
49 per cent are non-religious, while in Rotterdam, this is 59 per cent.
Protestants constitute the largest religious denomination in Amsterdam
(i.e. 22 per cent), followed by Catholics (14 per cent) and Muslims (10
per cent); in Rotterdam, Catholics constitute the majority (15 per cent)
followed by Muslims (13 per cent) and Protestants (9 per cent) (RIVM/
CBS 2003).
A study in Rotterdam among ethnic group members between eigh-
teen and 30 years old revealed that 55 per cent of the ‘native Dutch’
described themselves as not religious at all, while the corresponding fig-
ures among Turks and Moroccans are 1 per cent and 0 per cent.,
respectively In these ethnic groups, 73 per cent and 56 per cent, respec-
tively, reported that they were not actually practising their religion fully,
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while only about 26 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively, said they fol-
lowed the precise rules of their religion in daily life. These figures sug-
gest that forms of secularisation among the younger generation of
Turks and Moroccans may develop. Other studies reveal that almost all
Turks and Moroccans identify with Islam, and, though their active parti-
cipation in religious ceremonies varied, Islamic norms and practices re-
main important in domestic life (e.g. raising children, partner choice).
Affiliation with Islam appeared stable across generations, while partici-
pation in religious ceremonies was lower in the younger generations,
notably among better-educated and economically active persons. This
suggests an emerging individualisation in the form of a ‘Dutch’ Islam.
These studies also confirm the expected association between religious
and ethnic affiliation (Phalet et al. 2000; Phalet & Ter Wal 2004).
Among the comparison group, the situation is quite different. Religion
as a form of guidance in domestic and public life has lost much of its
prominence, similar to the situation elsewhere in Europe.
Policies in the Netherlands over the last ten years have shifted, spur-
ring on more obligations for newcomers. In 1998, a new policy was
launched in the form of the Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (WIN, Civic
Integration [Newcomers] Act). This act meant increased pressure on
new immigrants, as the government made mastery of the Dutch lan-
guage obligatory. Through special mandatory training courses, the gov-
ernment also expected immigrants to learn about the Netherlands’ na-
tional history as well as the established norms and values of Dutch cul-
ture,. After 2000, issues already politicised during and after the rise
and fall of Fortuyn’s political party led to an increase in restrictive im-
migration and integration policies. For instance, the WIN policy was ex-
tended in 2002 to include oudkomers (literally, ‘old-comers’), i.e. those
who immigrated before the launch of the 1998 WIN policy. Among
Turkish and Moroccan oudkomers, more than 75 per cent lacked suffi-
cient Dutch language proficiency and other skills to, in the eyes of the
government, successfully integrate into Dutch society (the implication
being that parents rarely if ever used Dutch to communicate with their
children (Erf & Tesser 2001; Tesser & Erf 2001; Tubergen & Kalmijn
2002)).
Problems were traced to the lack of social interaction between ethnic
groups. Problems that arose from cultural differences have been attribu-
ted by some (e.g. Koopmans 2002) to the failure of adequate policymak-
ing and implementation, while others attribute it to the larger differ-
ences between social norms and values underpinning Dutch culture
vis-à-vis those maintained by first-generation Turkish and Moroccan im-
migrants. The authors Van de Brink (2006) and Demant (2005) attest
to the latter argument in the case of the Netherlands. They describe
how differences in culture-driven attitudinal characteristics of people of
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Dutch ancestry vis-à-vis people of Turkish and Moroccan descent affect
the socio-cultural integration process in which all three groups partici-
pate. For example, it was found that people of Dutch descent scored
highest on such values as ‘pragmatism’ and ‘individualism’, while peo-
ple of Turkish and Moroccan descent scored highest on values like
‘orthodoxy’ and ‘group-centeredness’. This finding is consistent with
central values underlying Protestant ideology, including the belief in
personal autonomy, self-responsibility and meritocracy. Furthermore,
from the perspective of social dominance theory, the hierarchy-enhan-
cing Protestant ethic provides moral and intellectual legitimisation of
status hierarchy and inequality between ethnic groups, which is difficult
to reconcile with the kind of group-thinking and egalitarianism underly-
ing multiculturalism (e.g. see Katz & Hass 1988; Levin et al. 1998; Ver-
kuyten & Brug 2004).
6.3 Indicators of identity
Table 6.1 shows results of a set of similar questions addressing feelings
of belonging among the respondents. It describes the degree to which
respondents identify with their own ethnic group and other social and
spatial entities.
Although percentage distributions are given by ethnic group and by
sex, only a few distributions appear to differ in a statistically1 significant
way (i.e. the sex differences in religious identity among comparison
group members and sex differences in feelings of being Dutch among
members of the second generation).
Figures in Table 6.1 show that about 80 per cent of the second gen-
eration hold strong or very strong feelings of belonging to their own
ethnic group – which corresponds to similar figures on feelings of
‘being Dutch’ among the comparison group.
Not surprisingly, the distributions between second-generation Turks
and Moroccans differ when it comes to their affiliation with either the
Kurdish or Berber cultures, something that is very much influenced by
the ethnic origin of their parents. Kurds constitute about 20 per cent of
the population in Turkey, and Berbers comprise about 40 per cent of
the population of Morocco (Andrews 2002; MEOE 2007). About 14 per
cent of second-generation Turkish respondents identify strongly or very
strongly with the Kurdish ethnic group, while the figure for the second-
generation Moroccans is about 55 per cent.
The largest difference between the second generation and the com-
parison group is found in relation to religious identity. More than 80
per cent of the respondents identify strongly or very strongly with being
Muslim. By contrast, about two-thirds of the comparison group men-
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Turk Turksa Men 2.3 0.2 2.0 15.5 31.6 48.6 100.0 196
Women 0.9 0.9 2.5 20.7 31.1 43.9 100.0 224
Moroccan Moroccansb Men 0.3 2.6 0.9 9.1 41.7 45.3 100.0 200
Women 0.4 2.2 5.3 15.6 35.3 41.4 100.0 199
Kurd Turks Men 63.8 5.6 9.4 8.8 9.8 2.6 100.0 100
Women 45.7 14.1 6.6 18.8 6.1 8.8 100.0 99
Berber Moroccans Men 22.1 4.5 3.8 11.6 26.3 31.8 100.0 165
Women 10.3 13.4 6.0 17.9 22.3 30.1 100.0 133
Muslim/ Turks Men 1.7 4.3 4.3 10.3 30.2 49.3 100.0 176
Christian Women 2.5 2.4 1.5 13.5 22.7 57.3 100.0 201
Moroccans Men 4.1 1.8 0.8 8.8 29.5 55.0 100.0 195
Women 1.0 2.6 1.6 10.1 27.9 56.9 100.0 188
Comparison Men 57.8 7.8 8.1 9.9 5.5 10.9 100.0 218
group Women 36.9 11.3 9.6 16.4 10.3 15.5 100.0 241
Dutch Turks Men 9.5 5.9 15.4 35.8 28.1 5.3 100.0 191
Women 4.6 1.8 10.7 39.2 33.9 9.7 100.0 220
Moroccans Men 7.3 4.0 12.9 33.8 30.2 11.8 100.0 202
Women 0.8 5.7 9.1 36.3 30.1 18.1 100.0 209
Comparison Men 0.5 2.1 3.3 18.2 39.1 36.8 100.0 231




Turks Men 4.3 3.0 3.1 24.2 38.6 26.8 100.0 193
Women 5.7 2.5 3.2 23.1 38.3 27.3 100.0 215
Moroccans Men 2.1 1.2 5.6 15.1 39.1 36.8 100.0 204
Women 0.8 1.1 3.6 22.2 38.3 33.8 100.0 210
Comparison Men 0.7 2.1 13.2 22.4 31.9 29.7 100.0 228
group Women 1.6 5.1 6.2 25.6 39.7 21.8 100.0 248
European Turks Men 13.8 8.0 13.8 28.8 29.5 6.2 100.0 176
Women 6.2 8.9 8.5 39.6 29.2 7.5 100.0 201
Moroccans Men 15.6 9.3 15.9 22.3 31.6 5.4 100.0 195
Women 6.0 9.3 11.7 38.1 24.2 10.6 100.0 188
Comparison Men 3.6 5.4 14.7 34.3 33.2 8.8 100.0 218
group Women 1.4 4.8 11.8 32.7 40.2 9.0 100.0 241
a All instances of ‘Turks’ in this and other tables in this chapter refer to the second generation.
b All instances of ‘Moroccans’ in this table and other tables in this chapter refer to the second
generation.
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tion that they have no feelings at all, very weak feelings or weak feelings
of belonging to any religion. Both numbers are in accordance with offi-
cial statistics on religious affiliation and figures found in previous re-
search (RIVM/CBS 2003; Phalet & Ter Wal 2004; Phalet et al. 2000).
The high figures reflected in Table 6.1 for ethnic and religious affilia-
tions suggest that they are intertwined; being a second-generation
Moroccan (and to a lesser degree, a second-generation Turk) seems to
index a ‘cultural’ reference to being a Muslim (see also below). Another
genuine difference is apparent with regard to religious-identity feelings
among the comparison group: men more often say that they do not
have feelings of belonging to any religion.
With regard to feelings of being ‘Dutch’, about one-third of second-
generation Turkish men and almost one-fifth of their female counter-
parts have weak feelings, very weak feelings or no feelings of belonging
at all. Figures for second-generation Moroccans show slightly higher de-
grees of identification: one in four men and one in seven women iden-
tify weak feelings or none at all vis-à-vis feeling Dutch.
Table 6.1 also shows that many of the second generation have strong
or very strong feelings of belonging to their respective city – these feel-
ings are even stronger than among the comparison group. The same is
true for feelings of belonging to one’s neighbourhood of residence (data
not shown). This shows that strong feelings of belonging to one’s eth-
nic group do not contradict strong feelings of belonging to the place
where people live. The data seem to suggest that the second generation
may well combine strong feelings of belonging to their own ethnic
group with strong feelings of being Dutch, thus confirming what has
been suggested in the literature about persons having multiple identi-
ties (e.g. Berry 1997). Although this may be the case, this cannot di-
rectly be concluded from the table, seeing as the reported percentages
for both identity types may pertain to different respondents.
This issue is further explored in Table 6.2, showing that there is a
large proportion of second-generation Turks (38 per cent) and Moroccans
(45 per cent) who strongly identify with Islam but also identify with the
Netherlands. Another 37 per cent of the second-generation Turkish re-
spondents and 34 per cent of the second-generation Moroccan respon-
dents who report a strong identification with Islam indicate that their
feelings of belonging to the Netherlands are neither weak nor strong.
Thus, relatively more second-generation Moroccans combine a strong
identification with Islam with strong feelings of being Dutch.
The bottom panel of Table 6.2 confirms that respondents of the two
groups maintain stronger feelings more often for their city of residence
than for the Netherlands, per se. Furthermore, it shows that a strong
identification with Islam is more easily combined with a local identity
than with a national one.
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Identity data were also examined from the perspective of whether or
not respondents can simultaneously identify, whether strongly or very
strongly, with different types of identities. Our findings confirm the ex-
pectation that people have multiple identities and that identification
with one single identity is the exception rather than the rule. Of the six
types of identities listed in Table 6.1, second-generation Turks and Mor-
occans identify, on average, with three, whereas the comparison group
identifies with two. The comparison group does have a smaller number
of realistic options. These figures are also representative for men and
women and for the younger and older cohorts among the respondents,
as sex and age group differences appear to be negligible. About 5.9 per
cent and 3.9 per cent of the second-generation Turks and Moroccans re-
spondents, respectively, did not identify strongly or very strongly with
any of the identities as listed, while the figure for the comparison group
is slightly higher (8.9 per cent).
Table 6.2 Description of feelings of belonging to Islam combined with feelings of belonging to
the Netherlands and to Amsterdam or Rotterdam, by ethnic group
Strength of feelings of belonging to Islam
Strength of feelings of




Turks Weak 18.2 23.5 24.8 24.1
Not strong or weak 27.3 41.2 37.6 37.2
Strong 54.5 35.3 37.6 38.7
Total (N=392) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Group distribution 8.0 12.4 79.6 100.0
Moroccans Weak 11.1 15.4 21.6 20.3
Not strong or weak 22.2 53.8 33.6 34.8
Strong 66.7 30.8 44.8 44.9
Total (N=397) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Group distribution 6.5 9.4 84.1 100.0
Strength of feelings of belonging to Islam





Turks Weak 18.1 17.6 9.3 11.0
Not strong or weak 27.4 29.4 22.2 23.5
Strong 54.5 52.9 68.5 65.4
Total (N=391) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Group distribution 9.2 11.5 79.3 100.0
Moroccans Weak 0.0 15.4 6.8 7.2
Not strong or weak 12.5 38.5 15.4 17.4
Strong 87.5 46.2 77.8 75.4
Total (N=400) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Group distribution 6.3 11.3 82.5 100.0
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6.4 Language proficiency and use
Proficiency in Dutch as well as in the parental language and use of
these languages among peers are other indicators of group identifica-
tion. As described in section 6.2, the lack of Dutch language skills
among first-generation immigrants from Turkey and Morocco has been
a major impediment to their successful economic and socio-cultural in-
tegration in the Netherlands.
The situation of the second generation is entirely different. Table 6.3
presents the numbers on self-reported proficiency in Dutch and the
dominant language in the parents’ country of origin. More than 97 per
cent of the second-generation Moroccan and Turkish respondents say
that they have a good, very good or excellent command of the Dutch
language in terms of speaking, reading and writing.
A somewhat different picture emerges when the respondents are
asked about their proficiency in Turkish and Moroccan Arabic. At least
three of four second-generation Turkish and Moroccan respondents in-
dicate that they speak their mother tongue well, very well or even excel-
lently, while less than 5 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 8
per cent of the second-generation Moroccans say they do not speak the
language well. This is not surprising given that 96 per cent of second-
generation Turks state that Turkish was the main language used in their
upbringing and 71 per cent of second-generation Moroccans state that
Moroccan Arabic was used in theirs. The information in Table 6.3 is
also given by age and sex. Although the distributions differed slightly,
these differences were not statistically significant.






Good Excellent Total N
Dutch language
Speaking Turks 0.0 0.2 2.5 22.4 29.7 45.2 100.0 434
Moroccans 0.2 0.0 1.2 15.4 26.4 56.7 100.0 409
Reading Turks 0.2 0.9 1.6 16.6 28.3 52.3 100.0 434
Moroccans 0.2 0.0 0.7 15.4 19.6 64.1 100.0 409
Writing Turks 0.7 0.9 3.7 22.1 26.7 45.9 100.0 434
Moroccans 0.2 0.2 2.0 17.6 24.2 55.7 100.0 409
Ethnic group language
Speaking Turks 0.7 4.7 12.7 34.7 27.3 20.0 100.0 433
Moroccans 4.3 3.6 16.4 35.0 17.9 22.9 100.0 405
Reading Turks 3.3 6.0 17.2 29.1 21.9 22.5 100.0 433
Moroccans 28.1 14.4 22.3 18.7 7.2 9.4 100.0 405
Writing Turks 3.3 11.3 14.7 28.7 22.0 20.0 100.0 433
Moroccans 33.3 18.1 22.5 13.8 5.8 6.5 100.0 405
112 GEORGE GROENEWOLD
Particularly among second-generation Moroccans, some other local
languages were also mentioned as being used in upbringing, such as
Tamazight (14 per cent), Tashkelhiyt (6 per cent), and Classic Arabic (6
per cent). Among second-generation Turks, the percentage of respon-
dents reporting the use of other languages is negligible (e.g. Kurdish:
2.6 per cent). However, three of four respondents in both groups report
that Dutch was also used during their upbringing.
Overall, second-generation Moroccans use the Dutch language more
frequently in their communication than do second-generation Turks.
More than 90 per cent of the second-generation Moroccans use the
Dutch language when speaking with brothers, sisters and friends, while
this is the case for only 62 per cent of the second-generation Turks.
Slightly more than half of second-generation Moroccans also mention
that they predominantly or exclusively speak Dutch with their partner,
as opposed to the one-third of second-generation Turks who report
those. When it comes to addressing their fathers or mothers, 28 per
cent of second-generation Moroccans do so in Dutch, while this is the
case for only 13 per cent of second-generation Turks.
6.5 Religion
6.5.1 Affiliation with religion
As shown above, most of the second generation strongly identify with
Islam as the predominant religion in their parents’ country of origin.
Table 6.4 presents a closer look at religious affiliation during childhood
and adolescence and confirms that a vast majority of the second genera-
tion was raised with Islam. Conversely, almost 60 per cent of compari-
son group respondents say they were raised without any religion. Most
of the respondents raised with a religion are Catholics or Protestants.
Table 6.5 combines information obtained on religious affiliation dur-
ing upbringing with information on respondents’ current affiliations.
This may serve as an indicator of secularisation over time. The first two
rows indicate people who still have the same status with regard to reli-
gious affiliation as they did in their youth. The third row shows that
about 5 per cent of the responding second generation went from a reli-
gious upbringing to practising secularism. According to the last row, 5
per cent of the second-generation Turks and only 2 per cent of the sec-
ond-generation Moroccans turned to Islam after coming of age. Gender
differences appeared to be small and not statistically significant.
The distributional characteristics of the comparison group in Table
6.5 are consistent with strong general trends in secularisation among
the Dutch population (cf. Knippenberg 2004). Not only was more than
half of the comparison group raised in a non-religious family, but up to
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20 per cent of those raised religiously no longer have religious affilia-
tions. This does not necessarily mean that all are non-believers. By con-
trast, the secularisation trend among the second generation seems very
small.
6.5.2 Religiosity
Studies revealed that, despite variation in active participation in reli-
gious ceremonies, Islamic norms and values remain important in do-
mestic life (e.g. child-raising and partner choice). Affiliation with Islam
appears stable across generations, while the actual participation in cere-
monies is lower among younger generations, notably among better-
Table 6.4 Religious affiliation, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Raised with religion 88.2 92.7 41.2
Not raised with religion 11.8 7.3 58.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Raised as:
Christian: Catholic 0.9 0.9 45.8
Christian: Protestant 0.6 0.3 43.9
Christian: Orthodox 0.3 0.0 0.0
Christian: Other 0.3 0.2 6.0
Muslim: Sunna 41.3 44.0 1.3
Muslim: Shia 0.8 0.7 0.0
Muslim: Alevi 6.8 0.8 0.0
Muslim: Other 48.5 52.3 0.4
Jewish 0.0 0.0 0.3
Other 0.6 0.8 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 439 425 483
Table 6.5 Secularisation trends and differentials: religious affiliation during upbringing and
current status, by ethnic group
Religious affiliation Turks Moroccans Comparison
group
During youth Currently
No No 7.3 6.3 55.7
Yes Yes 83.3 86.7 15.7
Yes No 4.9 4.9 27.9
No Yes 4.6 2.1 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 439 425 483
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educated and economically active persons. This seems to suggest an
emerging individualisation in ‘Dutch practices’ of Islam. The bulk of
studies on secularisation shows that figures reflecting religious affilia-
tion should not be taken as measures of religiosity, for changes in reli-
giosity necessarily precede changes in the religious affiliation, mainly
because of conformation to peer-group pressure (cf. Knippenberg
2004). This is complicated by the above-mentioned fact: there is an as-
sociation between religious and ethnic affiliation (cf. Table 6.10 below;
Phalet et al. 2000; Phalet & Ter Wal 2004).
In the survey, respondents were asked about their attendance of reli-
gious services in a mosque, a church or some other place of worship
(excluding social festivities or funerals that might take place therein)
and the frequency of daily prayers. Responses to these types of beha-
vioural questions should be interpreted with care because they tend to
solicit ‘socially correct’ answers. Among respondents who stated having
a religion, the same proportion of second-generation Turks and Moroc-
cans – one in ten – said they pay a weekly (or more frequent) visit to
the mosque. Among the comparison group, visiting a place of worship
is more common, as one in four respondents stated they visited their
church on a weekly (or more frequent) basis.
About half of the religious second generation say that they never, or
rarely if that, visit a mosque, while the figure is significantly lower
(about one-third) in the comparison group. It should be noted again
that the group of practising Christians in the age range of eighteen to
35 is quite selective because it represents only 16 per cent of male and
22 per cent of female comparison group members. Second-generation
women more often than men say they seldom or never visit a mosque:
while this applied to 65 per cent of the second-generation women we
surveyed, it was the case for only about 40 per cent of their male coun-
terparts. Not surprisingly, only a small proportion (6 per cent) of Turk-
ish and Moroccan women mention visiting a mosque once a week or
more often. Age differences within each of the three groups regarding
attendance frequency are not statistically significant.
Asking about praying frequency may be more informative, though it
is a methodologically problematic question because it invites socially de-
sirable answers. About half of all second-generation Moroccans state
that they pray according to the sequence of prayers required by the Kor-
an, which involves praying five or more times each day. This practice is
done by only one in ten second-generation Turks, while four in ten even
reported that they never pray at all. A considerably smaller proportion
of second-generation Moroccans (26 per cent) said that they do not pray
at all. Within each group, significant differences by sex and by age are
absent. In addition to these behavioural indicators of religiosity, respon-
dents who stated having a religion were also asked to what extent they
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agree or disagree with a number of statements on the role religion plays
in personal life. The results are presented in Table 6.6.
The most striking finding is, again, the contrast between the compar-
ison group and the second-generation groups. For the second genera-
tion, the role religion plays in personal life is much greater than for the
predominantly ‘ethnic Dutch’ respondents. In general, second-genera-
tion Moroccans more often hold firmer positive attitudes towards the
importance of religion in their lives than second-generation Turks do,
although only the second, third and fourth items show statistically sig-
nificant differences between the two groups.
Table 6.6 Perceptions on importance of religion in personal life, by ethnic group








Turks 48.5 34.1 11.4 3.8 2.3 100.0 380
Moroccans 48.5 34.9 3.9 2.3 0.8 100.0 376
Comparison group 21.9 31.6 19.3 23.5 3.7 100.0 87









Turks 25.6 34.6 18.8 15.8 5.3 100.0 379
Moroccans 41.4 37.5 10.9 6.3 3.9 100.0 373
Comparison group 18.2 25.7 17.1 31.0 8.0 100.0 87








Turks 22.9 35.1 32.1 8.4 1.5 100.0 378
Moroccans 36.7 35.9 23.4 2.3 1.6 100.0 372
Comparison group 11.8 24.2 23.7 34.9 5.4 100.0 87








Turks 12.3 41.5 29.2 12.3 4.6 100.0 377
Moroccans 19.4 43.4 27.9 8.5 0.8 100.0 375
Comparison group 5.9 37.4 27.8 26.2 2.7 100.0 87








Turks 31.3 33.6 16.8 14.5 3.8 100.0 379
Moroccans 27.7 35.4 20.0 10.8 6.2 100.0 374
Comparison group 5.9 22.6 13.4 46.2 11.8 100.0 87
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Within each of these groups, age and gender differences were exam-
ined, but the differences are slight and mostly insignificant, though
with one exception: within each of the three groups, the younger co-
horts more often feel personally hurt when something bad is said about
their religion.
Finally, the questionnaire contained another set of statements on the
more general role and importance of religion in society and the use of
religious symbols in public life. Table 6.7 below presents the results.
Table 6.7 Perceptions on role of religion in wider society and importance given to the use of
religious symbols outside the home, by ethnic group








Turks 47.0 32.5 13.2 6.6 0.7 100.0 437
Moroccans 37.7 37.7 15.1 5.5 4.1 100.0 425
Comparison group 32.0 44.7 14.1 8.9 0.4 100.0 483
Religion should be represented in politics and society, along with other








Turks 4.6 20.5 34.4 27.2 13.2 100.0 436
Moroccans 6.8 21.9 36.3 19.9 15.1 100.0 423
Comparison group 2.0 14.6 23.0 34.0 26.4 100.0 483








Turks 2.6 9.9 31.1 30.5 25.8 100.0 436
Moroccans 3.4 8.2 30.1 31.5 26.7 100.0 421
Comparison group 0.5 0.5 6.1 19.2 73.7 100.0 483








Turks 4.6 10.5 23.0 34.2 27.6 100.0 437
Moroccans 2.7 6.8 17.1 33.6 39.7 100.0 425
Comparison group 5.5 6.6 18.5 54.5 14.9 100.0 483









Turks 10.1 10.7 35.6 21.5 22.1 100.0 436
Moroccans 13.7 16.4 36.3 19.2 14.4 100.0 424
Comparison group 6.8 10.9 22.2 46.8 13.3 100.0 483
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The first and probably most interesting outcome is that, in all groups, a
vast majority (around 80 per cent) agrees that religion should be a pri-
vate matter between an individual and God. The only outstanding result
among the groups in this aspect is that the position is strongest among
second-generation Turks. This is bolstered by the relatively low propor-
tion of respondents in favour of religion as ‘the only and ultimate politi-
cal authority’, which is around 12 per cent in both second-generation
groups.
Most of the items listed in Table 6.7 address issues that are common
subjects in public debate. As a result, individual preferences or view-
points may be biased towards one of the popular positions held in re-
current public debates on these issues. The question about whether Is-
lamic women should cover their heads outside the house, for example,
may be interpreted either as reflecting personal beliefs and preferences
or deferring to some popular position in the public debate regarding
freedom of belief or the role of women in Islam. This may explain why
the number of respondents opting for the extreme answer categories
‘totally agree’ or ‘totally disagree’ in most item questions is very low
and why most respondents opted for the middle category ‘neither agree
nor disagree’. However, the combined responses of some item ques-
tions do exhibit a much wider spectrum of positions, such as the one
on ‘religion as the ultimate political authority’. Almost 60 per cent of
the second generation and about 90 per cent of the comparison group
position themselves in the categories ‘disagree’ or ‘totally disagree’,
while more than 60 per cent of respondents in all three groups choose
firm positions in their rejection of laicism.
Regarding the representation of religion in politics and society ‘along
with other religious or political viewpoints’, answers for the second-gen-
eration groups are clustered around the central position. The question
garners neither clear agreement nor disagreement, which may be be-
cause of the many diverse connotations that the statement may arouse.
Here, only the comparison group shows higher percentages of respon-
dents who ‘totally disagree’ with the statement that religion should be
represented in politics and society. This is consistent with the over 90
per cent rate of rejecting religion as the only acceptable political author-
ity.
It is somewhat complicated to drawing firm conclusions about
people’s endorsement or rejection of the wearing of headscarves by
Muslim women outside the house. While a majority of the comparison
group (60 per cent) is against it, there is also a non-negligible percen-
tage (18 per cent) in favour of it. The latter percentage is only slightly
less than that observed among the Turkish second generation (21 per
cent) and considerably less than that among second-generation Moroc-
cans (30 per cent). And still, a considerable group of almost 45 per cent
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of second-generation Turks and Moroccans reject the wearing of head-
scarves by Muslim women outside the house.
This question was also examined from a gender and age perspective.
Only among members of the comparison group were statistically signif-
icant differences by sex found, as men more often than women ex-
pressed stronger opinions on the issues addressed. Differences by age
are small, notably among the second generation, and younger cohorts
more often tend to cluster in the middle category of ‘neither agree nor
disagree’.
6.6 Transnationalism
Another way of looking at the identification of the second generation is
by examining different types of linkages to their parents’ country of ori-
gin. This can be done through looking at their exposure to Turkish or
Moroccan media, examining visitation behaviour to Turkey and Morocco
and seeing whether the second generation sends remittances to, or in-
vests in, these countries. Such practices would be indicative of a trans-
national lifestyle orientation among the second generation.
It is assumed that the three groups we surveyed have equal access to
watching Dutch-, Turkish- and Moroccan-language TV channels. Most
cable TV and home-satellite systems in Rotterdam and Amsterdam pro-
vide this access. Generally, the frequency and intensity of watching TV
reflect no real difference between the three groups: about 97 per cent
of the respondents, irrespective of age and sex, watch TV ‘every now
and then’. With regard to the choice of TV channels, about 37 per cent
of the second-generation Turks mainly or exclusively watch Dutch-
language channels, and an additional 39 per cent watches both Dutch-
and Turkish-language channels. Second-generation Moroccans are
much more inclined towards Dutch-language channels, as 83 per cent
mainly or exclusively watches Dutch-language channels and only 11 per
cent watches Moroccan-language channels.
Second-generation Turks and Moroccans make frequent and periodic
visits to their parents’ country of origin. About nine out of ten second-
generation respondents replied that they visited Turkey or Morocco an
average of five to six times in the past five years. Main reasons were ‘va-
cation’ (60 per cent) and ‘family visits’ (37 per cent). These figures re-
present figures for women and men and for both age groups; statisti-
cally significant differentials are absent.
Remitting money or investing in property or business in Turkey and
Morocco is not something to be overlooked. An average of about 31 per
cent of the second-generation Turks and 25 per cent of the second-gen-
eration Moroccans say that they remitted money to their parents’ coun-
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try of origin which includes reference to the tradition of remitting
money on certain Islamic holidays. About 65 per cent say that the
amount remitted was less than 500 euros per year, while another 15 per
cent reported an amount between 500 and 1,000 euros per year. Only a
very small proportion, about 5 per cent, of the second generation says
that they actually invested money or bought property in those countries.
The fairly small number of cases involved prevents a meaningful statis-
tical analysis to examine sex and age differences.
6.7 Intercultural relations
6.7.1 Preferred norms and values
The survey posed four opinion questions to the respondents regarding
whether people of immigrant origin should observe norms and values
of the majority society or those of their own ethnic group inside or out-
side the home. Table 6.8 shows the percentage distributions of the re-
sponse categories.
About eight of ten respondents in each group studied agree or fully
agree that, at home, people of immigrant origin have the right to live as
Table 6.8 Perceptions regarding whether people of immigrant origin have the right to live as
much as possible in accordance with the cultural customs and norms of their country












Turks 43.7 37.7 13.2 3.3 2.0 100.0 434
Moroccans 49.0 35.4 12.2 2.7 0.7 100.0 425
Comparison
group
25.8 53.5 12.9 6.2 1.6 100.0 483
Dutch norms
and customs
Turks 4.0 17.3 28.7 29.3 20.7 100.0 434
Moroccans 3.4 21.9 21.9 30.1 22.6 100.0 425
Comparison
group





Turks 12.7 30.7 36.7 16.0 4.0 100.0 434
Moroccans 11.6 31.3 33.3 19.7 4.1 100.0 425
Comparison
group
2.2 15.3 24.1 46.9 11.4 100.0 483
Dutch norms
and customs
Turks 9.5 33.1 37.2 13.5 6.8 100.0 431
Moroccans 9.6 42.5 30.8 12.3 4.8 100.0 422
Comparison
group
19.4 46.6 21.4 10.6 2.0 100.0 493
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much as possible according to the norms and customs of their own eth-
nic group. However, about one in five second-generation Turks and
comparison group members as well as one in four second-generation
Moroccans also believe that persons of immigrant origin should live at
home according to Dutch norms and customs as much as possible.
Although opinions on how to act outside the home are less pro-
nounced, about 43 per cent of the second generation agrees or fully
agrees with the statement that immigrants should have the right to live
as much as possible according to the norms and customs of their own
ethnic group. This is quite different from the views held by almost 60
per cent of the comparison group.
A considerable share of the second-generation Turks (43 per cent)
and Moroccans (52 per cent) also perceive that people of immigrant ori-
gin should live as much as possible according to Dutch norms and cus-
toms outside the home. While 85 per cent of respondents of all groups
are clear about desirable behaviour inside the home, notable group dif-
ferences emerge when desirable behaviour outside the home is consid-
ered. Interestingly, Turkish and Moroccan respondents adhere in simi-
lar degrees to both options. Together with high rates for the ‘neither
agree nor disagree’ reply, this may indicate the explanation: ‘... it de-
pends on the specific situation outside the home...’.
6.7.2 Views on the multicultural society
Respondents were also asked about their opinions on different aspects
of living in a multicultural environment. The findings summarised in
Table 6.9 shows that second-generation Turks are the most positive
about the quality of current relations between Turks and Dutch, as
about 60 per cent perceive relations to be friendly, while this is 50 per
cent among second-generation Moroccans. Members of the comparison
group in the same neighbourhoods are less enthusiastic about relations
with people of Turkish or Moroccan descent, as only about 40 per cent
describe relations as friendly, or they are indifferent (46 per cent). A
few second-generation Turks (10 per cent) and comparison group mem-
bers (11 per cent) qualify relations as ‘not friendly’, while this number is
somewhat higher for second-generation Moroccans (18 per cent). Gen-
der and age differentials are slight, as are differences between the two
cities.
When asked about the development of relations between the Dutch
and people of Turkish or Moroccan origins, the views of the Moroccan
second generation stand out. Almost 60 per cent perceive relations as
having become ‘less friendly’. Second-generation Turks and the compar-
ison group are much less negative, though one-third in both groups still
believes that relations have become less friendly. Views of men and wo-
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men, irrespective of age, are alike, but second-generation Moroccans in
Amsterdam (60 per cent) believe that relations have become less
friendly more often than their ethnic peers in Rotterdam (51 per cent).
This view may reflect recent rising tensions between second-generation
Moroccans and other groups connected to incidents of violence.
With regard to the question of whether the presence of other cultures
is enriching or threatening for one’s own culture, a major difference be-
tween the comparison groups in the two cities is found. While 64 per
Table 6.9 Perceptions on the multicultural society, by ethnic group
Quality of current relationship between Dutch and members of Turkish/
Moroccan ethnic groups in Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Not friendly Indifferent Friendly Don’t know Total N
Turks 10.0 26.7 60.0 3.3 100.0 434
Moroccans 18.4 31.2 46.8 3.5 100.0 410
Comparison group 11.4 47.0 39.7 1.9 100.0 329
Development of relationship between Dutch and members of Turkish/
Moroccan ethnic groups in recent years in Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Less friendly Same More friendly Don’t know Total N
Turks 30.2 30.9 30.9 8.1 100.0 433
Moroccans 56.7 22.7 14.9 5.7 100.0 411
Comparison group 36.3 35.8 20.2 7.8 100.0 329
Opinion about the consequences for one’s own culture resulting from
people of different origins living together in Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Threatening No difference Enriching Don’t know Total N
Turks 9.3 42.4 33.1 15.2 100.0 437
Moroccans 10.9 36.1 44.9 8.2 100.0 425
Comparison group 15.9 29.1 51.9 3.1 100.0 481
Opinion about whether it is good or bad for the city economy that there
are people who originate from different countries living together
Not good No difference Good Don’t know Total N
Turks 8.6 35.1 39.1 17.2 100.0 437
Moroccans 4.8 32.2 51.4 11.6 100.0 426
Comparison group 14.4 36.0 37.7 11.9 100.0 483
Agreement with the statement that it is good that people of different
religions live together in Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Agree Neither agree
nor disagree
Disagree Don’t know Total N
Turks 48.3 21.2 9.9 20.5 100.0 436
Moroccans 71.2 13.0 6.2 9.6 100.0 425
Comparison group 52.6 27.5 15.1 4.7 100.0 484
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cent of such respondents in Amsterdam emphasise ‘enrichment’, this
applies to only 35 per cent of such respondents in Rotterdam. Only one
in ten comparison group members in Amsterdam perceive other cul-
tures as a ‘threat’, while it is one in four in Rotterdam. Differences in
the opinions of men and women, as well as by age, are negligibly small.
When specified for religion, the views respondents had of people
with different religions living together in their city are generally posi-
tive, which is remarkable in light of recent media attention and con-
cerns about religious extremism. Over 70 per cent of second-generation
Moroccans consider it good that people with different religions live to-
gether in the same city, while about half of second-generation Turks
and the comparison group share that opinion. Only 10 to 15 per cent of
second-generation Turks and members of the comparison group believe
that it is not such a good idea to have people of different religions living
together in the same city. Men and women have more or less compar-
able opinions on the matter. However, second-generation Moroccans
and comparison group respondents in Amsterdam (76 and 63 per cent,
respectively) express more often that it is ‘good’ that people of different
religions live together in the same city than members of the same
groups in Rotterdam do (62 and 39 per cent, respectively).
6.7.3 Views on members of other ethnic and social groups
Respondents were also asked to rate their feelings about different
groups in the society on a ‘thermometer scale’ ranging from 0 degrees
(very negative feelings) to 100 degrees (very positive feelings), with 50
degrees indicating a neutral position. Table 6.10 presents average tem-
perature ratings given by members of the three groups.
In line with expectations, members of the three study groups have si-
milar and positive feelings towards members of their own ethnic group
(i.e. 73 or 74 degrees). In the case of the two second-generation groups,
this is connected to a generally positive attitude towards Muslims,
which is consistent with the above findings about the role of Islam in
ethnic group identification for the second generation. The finding that








Turks 64° 73° 44° 59° 73° 58° 433
Moroccans 69° 64° 74° 69° 80° 69° 422
Comparison
group
73° 58° 48° 62° 49° 59° 482
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positive feelings towards members of other ethnic groups are generally
lower was also expected. However, second-generation Turks and Moroc-
cans have the same degree of positive feelings towards the ethnic Dutch
majority population, which is 64 to 69 degrees.
The average rating of feelings towards Muslim in the comparison
group in both cities is about neutral (49 degrees), being perhaps
slightly negative. Second-generation Turks (58 degrees) and members of
the comparison group (59 degrees) have equal and somewhat positive
feelings towards Christians. Interestingly, second-generation Moroccans
are significantly more positive towards Christians than second-genera-
tion Turks. Although feelings towards Blacks or people with a darker
skin in general, as the survey so categorised, are generally positive,
second-generation Moroccans express positive feelings more often than
second-generation Turks and members of the comparison group.
Among all the groups, Moroccans are rated the lowest by second-
generation Turks and members of the comparison group.
The above results are consistent with the predominantly negative
image of the Moroccan ethnic group in the current socio-political
climate. Overall, the ratings in Table 6.10 are located between ‘neutral’
and moderately ‘positive’.
Differences according to age and sex are generally small and negligi-
ble. The only meaningful difference was observed in age groups of the
comparison group, with the younger cohort of respondents between
eighteen and 24 years old more often expressing negative feelings to-
wards Moroccans and Muslims than members of the older cohort, in
the range of 25 to 35 years old.
6.8 Conclusions
This chapter addressed aspects of identity and issues of intercultural re-
lations. Analysis of the survey data reveals that both second-generation
Turks and Moroccans strongly identify with their ethnic group and with
Islam as an integral part of ethnic self-definition. This is not to say that
there is no identification with the wider society, though both second-
generation groups identify more with their city of residence than with
the Netherlands or Dutch culture at large. Their strength of city identifi-
cation is comparable to that of the comparison group. Respondents
from the comparison group unsurprisingly identify more often with
being Dutch because for them it is also an ‘ethnic reference’. Overall,
second-generation Moroccans more often exhibit a stronger identifica-
tion with their own ethnic group, religion and city than do second-
generation Turks. But, at the same time, they identify more strongly to-
wards Dutch culture compared with second-generation Turks, in the
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sense of using Dutch as the primary language for communication (even
within their families, as their proficiency in the language of their
parents is lower), watching Dutch-language TV and positively evaluating
Dutch customs and norms.
Findings show that respondents identify simultaneously, albeit it to
different extents of intensity, with various life domains, though the
second generation does this even more so than members of the com-
parison group. This provides support for the thesis presented in the in-
troduction of this chapter that identity is a multi-component indicator
of feelings and constructions of belonging to different ‘groups’ and
‘communities’.
The degree of ‘transnationalism’ was examined by analysing data on
visits to the country of origin of the parents and the amount of remit-
tances to and investment in that country. Almost all second-generation
respondents have relations with their parents’ country of origin in the
sense that they frequently visit that country, on average once per year.
Second-generation Turks more often remit money to Turkey. Only a
small fraction has also invested money or bought property in Turkey or
Morocco.
Results show that the rapid secularisation among people of Dutch an-
cestry is not evident (yet) among second-generation Moroccans and
Turks. The figures show that only a small proportion raised with Islam
does not currently affiliate any longer with that religion. Feelings or reli-
giosity are generally stronger among second-generation Moroccans than
among second-generation Turks, and far stronger than in the compari-
son group. Regarding the role of religion in society, a vast majority of
the respondents in all groups agree that religion should be primarily a
private relationship between the individual and God.
Views on the ‘multicultural society’ are predominantly positive in all
three groups, though stronger among second-generation Turks and
Moroccans. However, the trend in the developments in Dutch society is
seen as less optimistic, especially among second-generation Moroccans.
In light of various negative socio-political events in recent years, this is
probably not surprising. Moroccans are also the lesser positively rated
group among members of the Turkish and the comparison group. Most
respondents of the comparison group state that other cultures enrich
Dutch society, while the second generation is less in support of this.
And a majority of all respondents feel positive about people of different
religions living together in the same city.
Note
1 Non-parametric tests for ordinal data were used.
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7 Social relations
Liesbeth Heering and Susan ter Bekke
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the social relations main-
tained by second-generation Turks and Moroccans and the comparison
group respondents. Section 7.2 discusses friendships at secondary
school as well as current friendships with members of their own and
other ethnic groups. Section 7.3 analyses those organisations in the
public domain in which respondents reported being active during the
past year. We also examine the extent to which the organisations are
oriented towards one’s own ethnic group or not. Perceptions about
inter-group relations and discrimination are the central issue in section
7.4, while conclusions are presented in section 7.5.
7.2 Ethnic character of friendships in secondary school and at
present
Friendships are made in all phases of life, and very often the founda-
tions for long-term friendships are built in school. Respondents in the
TIES survey were asked a number of questions about their three best
friends at two different stages of their life: during secondary school and
at the time of the survey. By comparing these two situations, we assess
the extent to which changes have occurred over respondents’ lifetimes.
Given the diverse ethnic composition of the populations in Amster-
dam and Rotterdam, one might expect that the ethnic background of
secondary school friends of second-generation Turks and Moroccans
and comparison group respondents would also be diverse. However,
this is not the case, as Table 7.1 shows. In particular, the comparison
group says that most or all of their three best friends at secondary
school were of one ethnic group, in this case, being their own ethnic
group. One has to bear in mind that the majority of the comparison
group respondents did not live in Amsterdam or Rotterdam when they
were in secondary school, and their schools were thus not ethnically
mixed (see chapter 4). So the chances of meeting – not to mention in
engaging in friendships with – children of Turkish or Moroccan descent
were much smaller for the comparison group than the second-genera-
tion groups. Best friends at secondary school among second-generation
Turks and Moroccans had a more diverse ethnic background; 32 per
cent of the second-generation Turks and 40 per cent of the second-gen-
eration Moroccans mention three different ethnic groups for their three
best friends during this time. Two in three second-generation Turks say
their best friends at secondary school were of one or two ethnic groups,
however. Second-generation women – particularly, Moroccan women –
more often had best friends from the comparison group than did
second-generation men, though the differences are not statistically sig-
nificant. We further examined to what extent the second-generation
Turks and Moroccans differ vis-à-vis their friendships with comparison
group members. Second-generation Moroccans more often have Dutch
friends than second-generation Turks.
Besides asking questions about ethnic and educational backgrounds
of their best friends, we also asked how many Dutch friends the sec-
ond-generation Turks and Moroccans had in secondary school. In the
same vein, the comparison group was asked how many Turkish and
Moroccan friends they had during that period of life. Combined, the
‘none’ and ‘a few’ were given as answers by four in ten second-genera-
tion Turks and three in ten second-generation Moroccans (Table 7.2).
The answer ‘some’ was most often given in response to this question,
indicating that friendships across ethnic groups are not the rule but the
exception. Eighty per cent of the comparison group says that they had
‘none’ to ‘a few’ Turkish and Moroccan friends in this period of their
lives.
Almost all of the respondents had already left secondary school. For
those over 25 years old, this particular period was quite some time ago.
We thus asked the same series of questions about people’s best friends
at the time of the survey. In order to see the differences between the
composition of friends over time, we focus on the diversity of best
Table 7.1 Ethnic diversity in best friends at secondary school, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Same ethnic group 66.1 57.7 92.2
Turkish friends 52.9 0.2 0.1
Moroccan friends 4.8 42.1 0.3
Dutch friends 9.6 15.4 91.9
Diverse ethnic group 31.6 40.3 7.6
Still at school 1.2 0.9 0.0
Don’t know 1.2 1.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 433 425 483
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friends at present for those who were no longer in secondary school
and compare it with the ethnic diversity of best friends at secondary
school. As Table 7.3 shows, the ethnic composition has not changed
very much for the second-generation groups.
For these two groups, we find that there are more friendships with
members of their own ethnic group at present than in the secondary
school period, so the diversity has lessened a bit. The second-generation
Moroccan group still engages most in friendships across ethnic bound-
aries. One in three mentions three different ethnic origins for their
three best friends. Among the comparison group, we see the opposite
trend: 89 per cent currently has best friends from one or, at most, two
ethnic groups, whereas in secondary school, the rate was 92 per cent
(Table 7.1). Interestingly, we see that comparison group men have a di-
verse group of friends more often than comparison group women (13
versus 9 per cent, respectively, not in table). In their diverse groups of
friends, ethnicities other than Turkish and Moroccan were also men-
tioned.
Table 7.2 Number of Dutch friends at secondary school among second-generation Turks and
Moroccans and number of Turkish and Moroccan friends at secondary school among
comparison group members
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
None 17.5 14.9 59.7
Very few 25.3 18.6 20.2
Some 35.1 38.6 14.4
Many 13.7 18.0 2.2
Most 8.1 9.0 3.3
Don’t know 0.3 0.9 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 433 422 484
Table 7.3 Ethnic diversity in current best friends, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Same ethnic group 73.9 65.4 89.1
Turkish friends 63.5 0.5 0.8
Moroccan friends 2.4 53.9 0.5
Dutch friends 7.9 11.0 87.8
Diverse ethnic group 23.7 33.2 10.6
Don’t know 2.5 1.4 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 437 424 483
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Regarding the secondary school period, we asked second-generation
Turks and Moroccans how many Dutch friends they had at present, and
conversely, we asked the comparison group how many Turkish and
Moroccan friends they had at present (Table 7.4). We found that
second-generation Moroccans had fewer Dutch friendships at the time
of the survey than they did in secondary school. The comparison group
was still the group least engaged in friendships with people of Turkish
or Moroccan descent. Only about 5 per cent of the comparison group
members indicated that many or most of their friends are of Turkish or
Moroccan descent, and here we find very little difference between men
and women for the two answer categories combined.
Concluding, we see that friendships are, to a large extent, confined to
one’s own ethnic group. The results of Entzinger and Dourleijn on the
ethnicity of friendships of youngsters in Rotterdam are similar to ours
(Entzinger & Dourleijn 2008: 63-65). The comparison group has the
least contact with ‘others’, while the Moroccan group has the most. It is
only in the comparison group that men mention having cross-ethnic
friendships more often than women, and only in this group are the dif-
ferences statistically significant.
7.3 Participation in and ethnic orientation of social
organisations
The second aspect of social relations that we examined was respon-
dents’ participation in organisations in the public domain of their city.
We presented respondents with a list of organisations such as sport
clubs, student unions, religious organisations, community organiza-
tions and human rights groups, and asked them to identify which ones
they undertook activities in over the past year. Table 7.5 gives an over-
Table 7.4 Number of current Dutch friends among second-generation Turks and Moroccans
and number of current Turkish and Moroccan friends among comparison group
members
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
None 17.1 15.2 57.9
Very few 24.8 24.3 20.8
Some 36.5 37.2 16.1
Many 16.8 17.3 2.5
Most 4.4 5.5 2.6
Don’t know 0.4 0.7 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 439 426 484
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view of the number of organisations in which respondents undertook
activities. In general, participation in such organisations is low. More
than 40 per cent of the second-generation Turks and Moroccans did not
participate in any organisation at all. Given that many study or combine
study with jobs – particularly among the Moroccan group – it is possi-
ble that only limited time is left to engage in social activities. The com-
parison group members, being older and more often in a stable posi-
tion in terms of school, work and family life, are more active in the
public domain, with almost 70 per cent participating in one or more or-
ganisations. In Amsterdam, all ethnic groups are more active than in
Rotterdam, and the differences in participation between the ethnic
groups are significant only in Amsterdam. In the Moroccan group the
women are more active, whereas in the Turkish group, we find the op-
posite: men are more often active outside the home. Differences in par-
ticipation by gender are, however, not statistically significant.
Apart from the kind and the number of organisations, we also looked
into whether activities for each organisation were mostly oriented to-
wards their own ethnic group or not. Table 7.6 lists the top three most
popular organisations and shows whether or not there was an ethnic or-
ientation in the organisation or its activities. Sports clubs, which are
mentioned most often by the respondents, are, in general, not explicitly
oriented to one’s own ethnic group. Religious organisations, by con-
trast, often are. Second-generation Turks are more active than second-
generation Moroccans in sports clubs, arts, music or cultural activities
and religious organisations, which is in line with what we find in the
literature. We find gender differences within the two groups: men are
more active in sports clubs or teams, while women are more active in
organisations that involve art, music or cultural activities, though all
these differences are not statistically significant.
Table 7.5 Number of organisations (maximum of 9) in which activities were undertaken over
the past year, by ethnic group and city
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Amsterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam
0 43.0 49.1 40.8 46.2 22.4 41.7
1 30.6 29.3 37.5 27.7 31.3 33.6
2 12.5 12.8 11.8 16.9 28.3 14.1
3+ 13.9 8.8 9.9 9.1 18.1 10.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 237 261 242 251 259 253
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7.4 Perceptions on personal and group discrimination
A third and final feature of social relations has to do with perceptions
of discrimination in the different ethnic groups. By first reporting on
the work of others on these issues, we intend to put the perception data
we collected in their temporal and geographical context. The presenta-
tion of our own data starts with the personal experiences respondents
have with hostility or unfair treatment, followed by the perceptions of
discrimination of all kinds of groups in society. We explored and ana-
lysed perceived discrimination by gender and city.
The Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) collects data on opi-
nions and attitudes regarding the multicultural society on a regular ba-
sis. The survey ‘Culturele veranderingen in Nederland’ (CV) on cultural
changes in the Netherlands is one example. Another source of data is
the tele-panel survey ‘Beeldvorming over minderheden’ (BOM) that
looks at image-building with respect to minorities. In the 2003 report
on ethnic minorities issued by SCP, Van Praag described the opinions
and attitudes of different ethnic groups towards each other, relying on
the two data sources just mentioned. The data were collected in 2001
after 9/11 and again around the time of the murder of Pim Fortuyn in
2002 (Van Praag 2003: 363). The analysis comparing the opinions of
the indigenous population towards people of foreign descent over the
Table 7.6 Top three organisations in which activities were undertaken by second-generation
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decade 1991-2002 shows that the former have become more hostile to-
wards the latter.
From a time perspective of 25 years of CV opinion data on hostility
and discrimination, the conclusion is different, however: between 1981
and 2006 there is a significant decrease in perceptions of discrimina-
tion (Gijsberts & Vervoort 2007). These results are in line with reports
by Entzinger and Dourleijn comparing 1999 and 2006 data on per-
ceived personal and group discrimination by and of ethnic minorities,
as collected among immigrant and comparison group members be-
tween eighteen and 30 years old in Rotterdam (Entzinger & Dourleijn
2008: 78).
The survey ‘Leefsituatie allochtone stedelingen’ (LAS) on the living
conditions of city-dwellers of foreign descent started in 2004 during
the week Theo van Gogh was murdered by a young man of Moroccan
descent in Amsterdam. Van Gogh was a well-known moviemaker who
made the film Submission (part 1) together with Ayaan Hirsi Ali. All re-
spondents of the LAS survey were asked for their opinion on the mur-
der’s influence on the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims
in Dutch society. A clear majority of the respondents – irrespective of
their own descent – felt that the murder had affected the relationship.
Only a minority indicated that their own thinking had changed. A small
minority – primarily respondents of Moroccan descent – said that their
own lives, as well as those of their families, had been affected by the
event (Gijsberts 2005: 202).
Table 7.7 presents the results of our survey by ethnic group with re-
spect to personal experiences of hostility and discrimination. Of both
second-generation groups, 45 per cent says they have personally experi-
enced hostility or unfair treatment because of their ethnic background
at least once. Of the comparison group, 19 per cent says they have ex-
perienced discrimination. For all three groups we found that more men
than women claim to have experienced discrimination, though these
differences are not statistically significant. There are no significant city
differences on this issue either.
Apart from general questions on experiences with discrimination, we
also asked respondents about the extent to which they experienced hos-
Table 7.7 Personal experience with discrimination, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Yes 44.8 44.8 19.3
No 55.2 55.2 80.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 439 426 482
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tility or unfair treatment in particular situations. Four situations were
presented: in the neighbourhood where respondents live, while going
out (in cafes, restaurants and discotheques), in dealings with govern-
mental organisations such as the municipality and in dealings with the
police.
The top three situations, ordered from ‘most often’ to ‘least often’ in
terms of personally experienced hostility, are listed in Table 7.8. Here
men and women are distinguished, because the differences by gender
outweigh those by group and city. Men experience discrimination more
often than women. The overall level of personally experienced hostility
is low, with around 60 per cent answering that they never to rarely ex-
perienced hostility or unfair treatment. Both second-generation Turks
and Moroccans most often experienced discrimination while going out
and least often in their own neighbourhood. Second-generation Moroc-
cans, especially, express having frequently or regularly experienced dis-
crimination while going out: almost one in five has felt discriminated
against while going out at least once, while this is only the case for one
Table 7.8 Top three situations of experiencing personal discrimination, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Going out
Never 28.7 57.8 30.4 59.0 47.9 56.2
Rarely 17.6 27.6 17.7 22.6 30.8 26.1
Occasionally 32.2 13.6 18.8 13.7 18.5 15.6
Regularly 11.0 0.8 16.8 4.5 1.9 1.0
Frequently 10.4 0.2 16.3 0.2 1.0 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 200 232 209 211 228 252
Encounters with police
Never 53.0 78.8 51.1 78.1 79.5 89.2
Rarely 16.4 13.5 13.0 10.1 15.7 8.0
Occasionally 15.6 5.6 20.8 6.9 4.0 2.6
Regularly 5.6 1.7 5.6 2.2 0.5 0.0
Frequently 9.4 0.5 9.6 2.7 0.4 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 201 233 209 212 226 252
Contact with authorities
Never 52.0 59.1 58.3 65.3 83.0 82.2
Rarely 27.9 19.2 24.7 21.3 10.3 12.2
Occasionally 12.9 18.1 10.1 11.2 5.1 4.2
Regularly 2.0 2.9 3.6 2.2 0.6 0.5
Frequently 5.2 0.7 3.2 0.0 1.0 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 203 235 209 213 226 252
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in ten second-generation Turks. These differences are not statistically
significant, though the ones between men and women in each second-
generation group are.
In encounters with the police, all women experience discrimination
less often than men, though in contact with governmental organisa-
tions, the gender differences are not statistically significant.
Experiences in Amsterdam and Rotterdam are different, however, for
a few situations. When it comes to encounters with the police and con-
tact with governmental organisations, comparison group members in
Rotterdam more often experience discrimination than those in Amster-
dam (statistically significant, not in table). In Amsterdam, second-gen-
eration Moroccan and comparison group women feel discriminated
against less often in encounters with the police than their male counter-
parts, while this is not significantly so for second-generation Turks. In
Rotterdam, second-generation Turkish and comparison group women
experience less discrimination in encounters with the police than men
do, while these gender differences are not significant for the Moroccan
group.
To determine a hierarchy of discrimination of groups, all respondents
were asked how often they thought particular groups experienced hosti-
lity or unfair treatment because of their origin or background. The
groups listed were as follows: Muslims, Turks, Moroccans, Blacks/peo-
ple with darker skin in general and Dutch people. As Table 7.9 shows,
all respondents think the number one group in society to most often ex-
perience discrimination is Muslims. The second-generation groups
think Muslims experience discrimination frequently; half of the second-
generation Moroccans and four of ten second-generation Turks believe
this is the case. Of the comparison group one in three thinks Muslims
experience discrimination frequently, and only a small proportion
thinks that this group is never discriminated against. In Amsterdam,
more respondents think Muslims are frequently discriminated against
than in Rotterdam. However, only for the comparison group are the dif-
ferences in opinions by city statistically significant.
The second group in society most often perceived to experience dis-
crimination is Moroccans. Compared with the second-generation Turks,
among which six out of ten think Moroccans are regularly or frequently
discriminated against, a larger proportion of the comparison group
(eight out of ten) and the second-generation Moroccans themselves (al-
most seven out of ten) think the same. The differences between the ci-
ties reveal that a larger proportion of all ethnic groups living in Amster-
dam than those in Rotterdam think that Moroccans are regularly or fre-
quently discriminated against. Concerning the Moroccan group, we also
find that the city and gender differences are statistically significant only
for the comparison group. The third group in the discrimination hierar-
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chy is the Turkish group. In this case, we see that second-generation
Moroccans and comparison group members have a different perception
of discrimination against Turks than the second-generation Turks them-
selves have. More comparison group members (six out of ten) and sec-
ond-generation Moroccans (five out of ten) think Turks are regularly or
frequently discriminated against, while only four in ten second-genera-
tion Turks perceive the situation this way. More second-generation
Turks in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam believe Turks never or rarely
experience discrimination, though the city difference is not statistically
significant.
Perceived discrimination of groups is clearly different from people’s
personal experience. On an individual level, few second-generation have
perceived being personally discriminated against, though, as a group,
Table 7.9 Top three groups in society that are perceived to be discriminated against, by ethnic
group and city
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Amsterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam
Muslims
Never 10.7 11.5 7.8 6.3 1.5 2.8
Rarely 3.0 3.9 4.8 3.8 3.0 2.4
Occasionally 13.5 12.9 8.3 16.8 17.2 16.1
Regularly 24.7 25.3 19.7 25.2 35.4 45.2
Frequently 42.9 41.6 54.0 46.4 38.9 27.6
Don’t know 5.2 4.8 5.5 1.5 4.0 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 203 230 197 225 248 232
Moroccans
Never 9.4 11.6 7.7 8.4 0.7 1.3
Rarely 2.2 4.8 4.8 6.5 3.4 4.5
Occasionally 13.4 20.6 11.8 19.2 13.9 15.7
Regularly 30.3 28.9 34.3 33.4 39.8 51.0
Frequently 36.6 27.0 37.5 29.6 39.1 22.4
Don’t know 8.0 7.1 3.8 3.0 3.2 5.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 202 228 197 225 248 232
Turks
Never 9.6 14.4 8.0 7.6 2.4 2.1
Rarely 8.2 10.3 9.4 8.3 4.9 5.2
Occasionally 40.8 34.9 26.2 29.2 28.3 28.2
Regularly 22.7 24.6 32.7 33.4 48.7 49.1
Frequently 12.0 11.2 16.4 15.1 12.6 10.3
Don’t know 6.7 4.7 7.3 6.4 3.2 5.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 202 227 196 225 248 232
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they think their ethnicity is subject to more discrimination than the
Turkish. Second-generation Turks also feel that their group is discrimi-
nated against more often than they personally are, at least in experi-
ences up until the time of the survey.
The situations in which discrimination most often takes place were
also analysed. All respondents were asked how often they thought peo-
ple of Turkish and Moroccan origin experience hostility or unfair treat-
ment in six different situations: at school, at the workplace, when look-
ing for work, when going out, in their neighbourhood and in encoun-
ters with the police. The top three situations in which Turks and
Moroccans were believed to experience discrimination are found in
Table 7.10. The table presents the situations in order from most often
mentioned to least often mentioned. Given that the city and gender di-
mensions did not lead to significant differences in the analysis, we pre-
sent results by ethnic group.
Table 7.10 Top three situations in which Turks and Moroccans are perceived to be discriminated
against, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Looking for job
Never 6.9 4.7 1.8
Rarely 8.6 9.2 5.1
Occasionally 22.8 15.6 23.8
Regularly 30.6 30.3 44.6
Frequently 31.1 40.1 24.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 430 418 470
Going out
Never 9.0 5.4 1.4
Rarely 13.7 8.8 4.6
Occasionally 30.0 18.8 30.8
Regularly 22.4 30.5 39.9
Frequently 24.8 36.6 23.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 422 418 468
At work
Never 9.5 10.7 2.6
Rarely 15.0 13.6 18.1
Occasionally 41.1 39.7 46.4
Regularly 22.5 21.5 26.6
Frequently 11.8 14.4 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 430 417 466
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Three in ten second-generation Turks and four in ten second-genera-
tion Moroccans say that their ethnic groups frequently experience un-
fair treatment or hostility when looking for a job, whereas almost one
in four comparison group members say this is the case. We find that
more second-generation Turks and Moroccans than comparison group
members say that their ethnic group never experiences discrimination
when looking for a job.
The number two situation for occurrences of discrimination is identi-
fied as taking place while going out. Almost seven out of ten second-
generation Moroccans and six out of ten comparison group members
think this happens on a regular or frequent basis. More than two of ten
second-generation Turks believe this is never or rarely the case.
The number three situation is identified as being at the workplace.
For all three groups, a little over 30 per cent believe discrimination of
Turks and Moroccans at work happens regularly or frequently. Looking
only at the ‘frequently’ scores, we see that there are somewhat more
second-generation Moroccans and Turks giving this answer than the
comparison group. One out of ten second-generation Turks and Moroc-
cans says, however, that their ethnic group is never discriminated
against at work.
Second-generation Turks and Moroccans are generally more negative
about the discrimination against their groups than the comparison
group, especially with respect to the primary situation in the discrimina-
tion hierarchy: when looking for jobs. Interestingly, the opinions with
respect to discrimination at the workplace are much less negative.
7.5 Conclusions
Ethnic orientation in social relations and perceptions of discrimination
against ethnic groups in various situations were the two central themes
of this chapter. Two aspects of social relations have been explored: the
ethnic composition of friendships and the activities and ethnic orienta-
tion of social organisations in the public domain in which respondents
were active. The gender and city dimensions were always explicitly ta-
ken into account in our analyses.
Friendships are, to a large extent, ethnically confined to one’s own
group. The comparison group has the least contact with members from
other ethnic groups, while the Moroccan group has the most. In the
comparison group, men mention having cross-ethnic friendships more
often than women. Second-generation Moroccans most often mention
having Dutch friends. The Turkish group is more oriented towards their
own group than the Moroccan group, both in friendships and in the so-
cial organisations in which they participate. In Amsterdam, respondents
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of all three groups are more active in social organisations than in Rot-
terdam.
Muslims are viewed by all respondents as being the object of hostility
and are therefore most often perceived as a group that is discriminated
against, which is consistent with the results discussed in the previous
chapter and demonstrated by other studies. We found differences in
perceptions by city, though only for the comparison group. Comparison
group members in Amsterdam more often than their counterparts in
Rotterdam have the feeling that Muslims and people of Moroccan des-
cent are discriminated against. With respect to personal experiences of
hostility, the gender differences are the most significant. Men have per-
sonal experiences with discrimination more often than women.
The Moroccan group is in an awkward, if not paradoxical, situation
in that they are the most integrated group at the personal and the socie-
tal levels. More than the second-generation Turks, they engage in inter-
ethnic friendships and are less oriented towards their own ethnic group
as far as their activities in social organisations. At the same time, these
investments and ties are not rewarded in the public domain. On the
contrary, due to the tense national climate and deviant behaviour of a
small group of young male Moroccans, their ethnic group as a whole is
negatively stereotyped.
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8 Union and family formation
Helga de Valk
8.1 Introduction
Union formation and partner choice of the second generation are
highly debated topics. It is often assumed that union formation among
children of immigrants follows more traditional lines than is the case
for Dutch young adults. How choices are made and how the factors of
influence differ between the second generation and the comparison
group are, however, still largely unexplored. The TIES survey provides
information on partners living in the same household as the respon-
dents.
This chapter gives an initial descriptive overview of findings on union
and family formation. We start by questioning how many young adults
live with a partner, what type of union they have and how they met their
partners. Secondly, we focus on the role families may play in the part-
ner choice process. Finally, we study family formation and task divi-
sions within the household among young adults from the second gen-
eration and those of Dutch origin.
8.2 The context of union and family formation among
immigrants
The largest share of non-western immigrants settling in the Nether-
lands comes to join family (also known as family reunification) or to co-
habit with a partner already residing in the Netherlands (also known as
family formation). Although family reunification used to be one of the
main reasons immigrants came to the Netherlands, since 1997, the
number of people settling in the country under this premise has de-
creased. From 2000 onwards, the number of immigrants arriving in
the Netherlands for family formation has come to exceed the number
of those coming for family reunification; in 2004 there were twice as
many family formation immigrants than those of family reunification
(Garssen & Wageveld 2007).
Immigration to the Netherlands is restricted in different ways, and
its legislation is laid down in the 2001 Aliens Act. In principle, people
can immigrate on the basis of work, family reunification, family forma-
tion and asylum seeking. The Dutch government pursues a strict immi-
gration policy regarding family reunification and family formation. Leg-
islation with respect to the latter is based on the internationally accepted
right to pursue and maintain a family life. The person applying for fa-
mily reunification or family formation must meet certain criteria in
terms of age and a long-term means of income, factors that were rede-
fined in 2004. In order to apply for family formation nowadays, both
partners must be at least 21 years old (eighteen for family reunification).
In addition, the couple must be married or have a registered partner-
ship. To be able to acquire a residence permit and settle in the Nether-
lands, all immigrants (except asylum seekers) between the ages of six-
teen and 65 need an authorisation for temporary stay known as a Mach-
tiging tot Voorlopig Verblijf (MVV). Nationals from certain countries
(such as EU member states and the US) are waived from this require-
ment (IND 2007). As of 15 March 2006, all individuals wanting to live
in the Netherlands for a longer period will also have to take (and pass)
the civic integration examination abroad (IND 2006). Knowledge of the
Dutch language and Dutch society is tested by means of an exam, to be
taken at the Dutch embassy or consulate in the country of origin. There
are substantial costs involved in taking the exam (350 euros) and secur-
ing the residence permit (IND 2008).
In general, people tend to marry within their own ethnic group. Look-
ing at the marriages conducted in 2003, this is most clearly the case for
people of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Netherlands: only one
in fifteen women from these groups married a person of Dutch des-
cent. The share of marriages with Dutch persons is substantially higher
for Surinamese and Antillean women: one in three and one in two, re-
spectively, married a partner of Dutch descent (Garssen & Wageveld
2007; see also De Valk et al. 2001). Recent data from Statistics Nether-
lands show that second-generation Turks and Moroccans do not marry
a Dutch partner any more often than do the first generation. For exam-
ple, 86 per cent of both first- and second-generation Turkish men mar-
ried a Turkish woman in 2003. The Surinamese and Antillean second
generation are more likely to marry a Dutch partner than the first gen-
eration. At the same time, it is clear that Turkish and Moroccan second-
generation members choose a partner from their parents’ country of
origin less often than do members of the first generation. Of those get-
ting married in 2006, between 63 and 71 per cent of second-generation
Turkish and Moroccan men chose a partner already living in the Neth-
erlands from their same group of origin. Overall, the figures for 2006
showed that more Turkish men than Moroccan men brought over their
partner from the parents’ country of origin; 17 versus 9 per cent, re-
spectively (Van Huis 2007).
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First-generation Turkish and Moroccan women in the Netherlands
started family formation at an earlier age and had more children than
did women of Dutch descent. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of Turkish
women has clearly decreased in the past decennia. The current first-
generation Turkish women (who mainly came to the Netherlands for fa-
mily formation) still have their children at a relatively young age, and
teenage (meaning under age twenty) pregnancies are rather common
(though the majority of these women is married). The Turkish second
generation clearly postpones childbearing, and the age at first birth
among this group is getting closer to that of women of Dutch descent.
Similar patterns are also found for first- and second-generation
Moroccan women. Childbearing is also postponed among Moroccan
women, and the fertility of the second generation has especially de-
clined (even more so than among Turkish women). Like women of
Dutch descent, many second-generation Moroccan women in their thir-
ties are childless (Garssen & Nicolaas 2006).
8.3 Union formation among the TIES respondents: timing and
type of current relationships
The first part of the descriptive analyses on union formation focuses on
the percentage of young adults who currently have a partner who is a
member of the household. This can be a married or an unmarried part-
ner. Table 8.1 provides an overview, by sex, of the percentages of young
adults who have a partner. Almost half of the second-generation Turks
and young adults from the comparison group currently have a partner
who is a member of their household. The percentage seems to be lower
for the Moroccan second generation, of whom 22 per cent report hav-
ing a partner. When we distinguish between three age groups, 18-24,
25-29 and 30-35, we find that the Moroccan second generation is least
likely to have a partner in any of these age groups (not in table). Differ-
ences between them and the other two groups are, however, most pro-
nounced in the youngest age group; 8 per cent of the second-generation
Moroccans between eighteen and 24 have a partner, as compared with
20 per cent of the second-generation Turks and young adults of the
comparison group in this age category. Among the two oldest age
groups, we find similarities between the percentages of those with a
partner (between 50 and 60 per cent) for second-generation Moroccans
and those of the comparison group. At the same time, we find that
three-quarters of the Turkish second generation aged 25 or older has a
partner. Further multivariate analyses (not in table) also reveal that the
apparent differences between the groups are largely attributable to the
younger age structure of the Moroccan respondents in the TIES survey.
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When we control for the age of the respondents, we find that the likeli-
hood of Moroccan respondents having a partner does not differ from
that for the comparison group, whereas the second-generation Turkish
respondents are somewhat more likely to have a partner.
Finally, Table 8.1 shows that there are no sex differences in the com-
parison group when it comes to chances of having a partner. Women of
the second generation, by contrast, are more likely to be in a union than
are second-generation men.
In line with findings of the share of young adults with partners, we
find that second-generation Turks were the youngest group to start liv-
ing with their current partners (Table 8.2): they were, on average, 21.8
years old, while their Moroccan counterparts were, on average, 22.6
years old. The comparison group was clearly older with an average age
of 25.3 years, though the difference is not significantly different from
second-generation Moroccan men. In addition, we find that, among the
groups, women are younger than men when they start living with a
Table 8.1 Young adults living with or without a partner in the same household, by ethnic group
and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
With partner in same household 42.9 51.1 14.4 29.4 46.0 45.0
Without partner in same household 57.1 48.9 85.6 70.6 54.0 55.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 242 258 246 247 250 262
Table 8.2 Mean age and age difference between partners when starting to live with current
partner, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Mean age living together 22.8 20.9 24.6 21.6 25.6 25.0
Standard deviation 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.9 4.0
N 93 127 36 76 105 114
Mean age difference
between partners*
1.9 -3.6 2.9 -6.6 0.7 -2.8
Standard deviation 2.2 3.7 3.3 3.4 2.9 4.0
N 24 44 20 23 51 55
* Positive values indicate respondent being older than partner; negative values indicate
respondent being younger than partner.
146 HELGA DE VALK
partner. This finding is consistent with what we found regarding wo-
men’s tendency to leave the home at an earlier age and start a union.
Sex differences in the mean age are the smallest for the comparison
group. For the second generation, men were clearly older than women
when starting to live with a partner: two years older in the case of Turk-
ish respondents and three years among Moroccan respondents.
The second part of Table 8.2 provides insight into the age difference
between partners for those respondents who reported their partners’
age at the start of their cohabitation. In line with what is known from
the literature, men are generally older when they start living with a part-
ner. Age differences are the smallest among the comparison group and
the largest for the Moroccan couples.
Beside the ages at which partners started to cohabit, the TIES data in-
clude information on the current type of union for couples. Table 8.3
provides insight into the mean ages at marriage. As follows from the to-
tal number of respondents at this question, the majority of the second
generation lives with a married partner, whereas around a third of the
comparison group couples lives in an unmarried union. Overall,
second-generation Turkish young adults marry the youngest, at the aver-
age age of 21.3, followed by second-generation Moroccans and young
adults of the comparison group (on average, 22.5 and 27.7 years old, re-
spectively). Again, we find that women of all groups marry at a younger
age than do their male counterparts. We find about a two-year age dif-
ference for second-generation Turks and comparison group respon-
dents. At four years, the age difference between men and women is the
largest for the Moroccan second generation.
When we compare ages at marriage with those at cohabitation (see
Table 8.2), we find that, for the second generation, they are almost the
same. In general, these young adults get married and then start living
with their partners. The only exception is found among second-genera-
tion Moroccan men: we find that the average age at marriage is six
months plus the age at which they began living with their partner. This
indicates a period of unmarried cohabitation among this group. Accord-
ing to the averages ages, the comparison group clearly delays marriage:
they start living with their partners around 25 and got married to their
Table 8.3 Mean age at marriage to current partner, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Mean age at marriage 22.5 20.5 21.3 25.2 21.3 22.5 28.7 26.9 27.7
Standard deviation 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6
N 80 113 193 28 65 93 33 42 75
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current partners about 2.5 years later. Men from the comparison group
seem to postpone marriage even more than do women from this group
in the TIES survey.
8.4 Meeting places and family influence
Where did those with current partners meet this person? Table 8.4
gives an overview of this information according to group of origin. It is
clear that a fifth of the second-generation young adults met their cur-
rent partner during a vacation in their parents’ country of origin. For
second-generation Turks, the second most common place to meet their
partner was at a family event; the third was at school. Meanwhile, for
second-generation Moroccans, family events are the third most com-
mon meeting place and meeting through friends ranks second. One-
fifth of the comparison group met their partners at school, another fifth
did so through friends, and another fifth, while going out. The work-
place proved to be another important meeting place for young adults of
the comparison group.
The decision to get married is made by the couple themselves,
though it may also involve family influences. When asked about influ-
ences by their own family or their spouse’s family to get married, the
second generation clearly reports more pressure than the comparison
group (Table 8.5). A third of the second-generation respondents say
their family or their in-laws encouraged them to get married. At the
same time, their own family or their spouse’s family also put pressure
Table 8.4 Place of meeting current partner, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
At school 13.3 7.9 18.7
At work 7.2 7.9 14.5
Through friends 9.6 18.4 18.7
At a sports club 1.2 5.3 5.7
Going out 1.2 5.3 18.9
At a family reunion/festivity 15.7 10.5 1.3
Introduction through parents 7.2 2.6 0.0
On vacation in parents’ country of origin 22.9 21.1 1.3
On vacation elsewhere 7.2 2.6 3.2
Through network of friends 2.4 2.6 0.4
In the neighborhood 3.6 2.6 3.2
In a public place 2.4 5.3 1.3
Other 6.0 7.9 12.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 223 114 220
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on the second generation to abstain from marriage, especially among
Turkish young adults. Although it is often assumed that young adults
in the comparison group make independent decisions without much in-
volvement of their families, 14 per cent of the respondents of this group
said their family encouraged them to get married. Just a few of these
young adults felt that their family pressured them to refrain from get-
ting married to their current partner.
A small number of respondents (N = 70) also provided information
about how the decision to get married was made (not in table). The ma-
jority among all groups, including 100 per cent of the second-genera-
tion Moroccans, said they, themselves, wanted to get married. Some 15
per cent of the second-generation Turkish and 6 per cent of the compar-
ison group respondents said they did not want to get married, but
agreed to it eventually. These figures suggest that most pressure is put
on the Turkish second generation, either through support of or dis-
agreement with the marriage.
8.5 Partner choice: partner characteristics
The ethnic origin of the second generation’s current partners generally
match findings on a couple’s place of meeting. Overall, we find that
slightly more than two-thirds of all respondents has a first-generation
partner from their own group (last column of Table 8.6). However,
there are clear differences when we distinguish between the age groups.
Of the Turkish respondents in the oldest age groups, 81 per cent has a
first-generation partner, whereas the number comprises 58 per cent for
the youngest age groups. Changes are even more remarkable for the
Moroccan second generation: 88 per cent of the oldest group has a
first-generation partner compared to a third of the youngest age group.
Table 8.5 Family influences on decision-making regarding marriage, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Pressure to get married by own family/in-laws
Yes 34.7 32.3 13.9
No 65.3 67.7 86.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 195 96 76
Pressure to abstain from marriage by own family/in-laws
Yes 15.3 6.5 2.9
No 84.7 93.5 97.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 195 96 76
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From their ages at migration, it is obvious that a quarter of first-genera-
tion partners came to the Netherlands before the age of fifteen. Thus,
the majority of these first-generation partners were not raised in the
Netherlands.
The decreasing percentage of first-generation partners across the co-
horts is accompanied by a clear increase in the percentages of respon-
dents who have a second-generation partner. Around 10 per cent of
those aged 30 or above has a second-generation partner, whereas for
those between eighteen and 24 years, the number rises to 31 per cent
for the Turkish second generation and 44 per cent for the Moroccan
second generation. The level of inter-partnering with a person of Dutch
origin is also found to be extremely low among the second generation.
All in all, this seems to indicate an increasing preference to choose a
partner from the second generation among the youngest cohorts. At the
same time, one must be aware that the sharp increase in the number of
second-generation youth in the Netherlands in recent years also offers
more options to choose a second-generation partner than would have
been available to the oldest respondents in the TIES survey. Finally, we
should be cautious with interpreting these findings and trends, as the
number of respondents in each of the age groups is rather limited.
Concerning the ethnic origin of partners of the comparison group,
we find rather stable patterns across the age cohorts. The majority of
the respondents (three-quarters) has a partner who is of Dutch origin.
Others have partners of first or second generations, but none of them
Table 8.6 Origin of partner, by ethnic group and age group
Second generation
Turks Moroccan Comparison group
Partner’s origin 18-24 25-29 30+ 18-24 25-29 30+ 18-24 25-29 30+
Dutch origin 0.0 2.4 4.8 11.1 0.0 0.0 79.4 80.1 69.8
Second generation own group:
one foreign-born parent
5.3 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Second generation own group:
two foreign-born parents
26.3 26.8 9.5 33.3 20.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Second generation: born elsewhere 10.5 0.0 4.8 11.1 5.0 0.0 9.5 7.0 12.3
First generation own group:
one foreign-born parent
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
First generation own group:
two foreign-born parents
57.9 68.3 81.0 33.0 65.0 87.5 0.0 0.6 0.0
First generation: born elsewhere 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 11.1 12.3 17.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 47 113 58 27 56 30 30 74 113
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is of Turkish or Moroccan origin. These patterns are found to be stable
among different age groups.
In line with findings on the second-generation partners’ country of
origin, results show that a majority of the partners holds the nationality
of the country of origin: 78 per cent of the partners of the Turkish sec-
ond generation and 68 per cent of the partners of the Moroccan second
generation (not in table). Additionally, we find that a third of the Turk-
ish second generation and 46 per cent of the Moroccan second genera-
tion report that their partners have dual nationality: Dutch and Turkish
or Dutch and Moroccan.
The survey also assessed the educational level of the partner. Com-
pared with the other groups, partners of the second-generation Turkish
respondents have the lowest educational level and those of the compari-
son group, the highest; second-generation Moroccans take an inter-
mediate position (not in table). Each of the groups differs significantly
from one another. Research has shown that people nowadays often have
a partner with the same educational background. We therefore included
the educational level of both partners in the analyses. We assessed the
current level for those respondents who were receiving education and
the final level for those who left the educational system. Those respon-
dents who had the same educational level as their partners were la-
belled homogamous couples. Table 8.7 shows that the Turkish second
generation has the lowest level of educational homogamy; a fifth of the
partners in these unions has the same educational level. This percen-
tage is clearly higher for the Moroccan second generation and the high-
est for the comparison group respondents, of whom a third and two-
fifths, respectively, are in an educationally homogamous union. How-
ever, the level of educational homogamy is not significantly different be-
tween the Moroccan second generation and Dutch. We did not find any
significant differences in the level of educational homogamy between
age groups.
The second generation was also asked about whether their partners
were related by blood to their own families. Table 8.8 gives the percen-
tages of partners who were related to their spouses by blood. The major-
ity of the second generation, 81 per cent of the Turks and 88 per cent of
Table 8.7 Couples with same educational level, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
No 80.5 71.1 58.7
Yes 19.5 28.9 41.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 223 114 220
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the Moroccans, report that their partners were non-family members.
The Turkish second generation is more likely than the Moroccan to be
in a union where partners were cousins or of some other blood relation.
Nevertheless, the differences between the second-generation groups are
not significant.
Finally, we looked at the current situations of partners of the second
generation and the comparison group. Table 8.9 gives an overview of
their current daily activities. For all three groups, we find that women
overall report having partners who have a job or their own business.
The percentage with a paid job is highest among the comparison group
and lowest for the partners of second-generation Turkish men. The
partners of the second-generation Turkish women have the highest le-
vels of entrepreneurship. A substantial number of second-generation
Moroccan women (17 per cent) report that their partners are unem-
ployed and looking for a job.




Other family relationship 11.1 6.3
No family 80.6 87.5
Total 100.0 100.0
N 223 114
Table 8.9 Current situation of the partner, by ethnic group and sex of the respondent
Second generation
Turks Moroccan Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Has one or more paid jobs 32.4 67.4 54.5 70.8 70.6 79.6
Has own business 0.0 15.2 0.0 4.2 4.4 5.1
Works freelance 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 5.6 4.7
Has a job and is in school 5.4 4.3 9.1 4.2 2.8 6.6
Has internship related to education 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.8
Has unpaid work 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployed though not
seeking a job
2.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployed and seeking a job 2.7 4.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 1.5
Takes care of the children 40.5 0.0 27.3 0.0 5.2 0.0
Is unable to work 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Is a student 5.4 0.0 9.1 4.2 9.1 0.4
Don’t know 5.4 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 94 129 38 76 105 115
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When looking at the activities that men report of their partners, we
find that having a paid job and looking after children are the most com-
mon activities among all groups. However, the comparison group’s la-
bour force participation among women is much higher than that
among the second generation. Whereas 71 per cent of the female part-
ners of the comparison group are reported as having a paid job, this is
the case for only 55 per cent among second-generation Moroccans and
32 per cent among second-generation Turks. Substantial shares, be-
tween 27 and 41 per cent, of the partners of second-generation men are
reported to take care of the children.
Although being a student is the activity of female partners mentioned
third most frequently, the percentage of male partners who are in edu-
cation is slight. Partners seem to start living together only once they are
no longer studying. The differences between men and women are no
doubt related to the fact that the men are, on average, older (and thus
less likely to still be in education) than women, though it may also indi-
cate that having a more stable job position is linked to cohabiting more
so for men than for women.
8.6 Family formation
An important decision in a young adult’s life is the choice of whether
and when to have children. The analyses show that the majority of
young adults in the TIES survey do not have children yet (Table 8.10).
Second-generation Turks are most likely to have children, while compar-
ison group members are the least likely. Taking the somewhat younger
age structure of the Moroccan respondents into account shows that sec-
ond-generation Moroccans do have children more often than the com-
parison group. Almost a quarter of the Turkish second generation has
at least one child and 13 per cent has a second child already. These find-
ings are an indication that this group starts family formation earlier
and generally will have more children than the comparison group.
The second part of Table 8.10 shows the mean ages at birth of the
first child for men and for women. Second-generation Turkish women
are the youngest to have their first child, and women from the compari-
son group are the oldest. One must bear in mind that the mean ages at
first birth for the whole group will be higher. Those who already have
children are likely to prove a select group: by far, the majority of young
adults in the TIES survey did not have children.
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8.7 Task division
Couples living together must decide who will do the household chores,
who will take care of the children and who will participate in the labour
force. Table 8.11 gives an overview of who mainly takes care of certain
tasks, according to group of origin. The results show that among the
second generation, around 40 per cent of household tasks are per-
formed by the woman. The majority of the second-generation Moroc-
cans and the comparison group say household chores are shared among
family members. This does not imply that the sharing is equal. Respon-
dents could also choose to answer that both partners shared this task
equally, though none did so on any of the task division items.
For the second generation, we find that cooking is typically a respon-
sibility of the woman; couples in the comparison group mainly share
this task. Respondents were also asked who takes care of finances. For
each of the groups, we find that larger shares of men than women take
up this task. Although at least a third of the couples do share the task,
the Moroccan couples and comparison group couples, in particular, re-
port that family members take up this task together. Earning an income
is the joint responsibility for the majority of Moroccan (71 per cent) and
comparison group couples (79 per cent). Almost half of the Turkish re-
spondents state that it is the man who primarily takes care of this.
Finally, those respondents who were parents were asked about who
primarily takes care of the children. Among the second generation, it is
Table 8.10 Current number of children and mean age at birth of first child, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Number of children
0 62.6 78.9 80.1
1 22.4 12.0 13.8
2 12.6 5.1 5.3
3 2.3 3.4 0.9
4 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.6 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 500 493 512
Mean age at birth of first child
Men 24.4 27.1 29.4
Standard deviation 3.0 3.4 3.6
N 58 16 29
Women 22.4 22.8 27.0
Standard deviation 3.4 3.9 4.5
N 99 60 60
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mainly the woman, although around one-third of the second-generation
couples shares in the childcare. Though couples of the comparison
group are more likely to care for children together, still one-third indi-
cates that it is primarily the woman taking up this task.
As already mentioned, the fact that many tasks are shared among
household members does not imply equal sharing. In addition, house-
hold chores and taking care of children cover a range of activities. It
could very well be that the division of specific tasks follows clear gender
lines.
When respondents were asked about whether they were happy with
the current household division of tasks, the overwhelming majority in-
dicated that they were (Table 8.12). In general, men were happier with
the arrangement than the women were, though sex differences are neg-
Table 8.11 Division of tasks in the household, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Household chores
Man 26.6 13.5 16.2
Woman 39.2 37.8 22.8
Family members together 34.2 48.6 60.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 213 107 208
Cooking
Man 38.0 25.0 31.5
Woman 44.3 50.0 22.0
Family members together 17.7 25.0 46.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 213 105 192
Finances and administration
Man 36.8 31.0 31.3
Woman 27.9 27.6 21.8
Family members together 35.3 41.4 46.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 182 90 190
Earning income
Man 46.6 21.4 14.1
Woman 5.2 7.1 6.4
Family members together 48.3 71.4 79.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 152 85 186
Taking care of children
Man 31.5 15.0 21.7
Woman 40.7 55.0 35.5
Family members together 27.8 30.0 43.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 143 63 76
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ligible for the comparison group. A substantial share, however, of the
Turkish and Moroccan second-generation women (17 and 20 per cent,
respectively) were not happy with the way tasks were divided between
themselves and their partners. Unfortunately, we do not have informa-
tion on what they would like to change.
Finally, respondents who have children were asked about whether
they themselves or their partner held a paid job before having their first
child. Table 8.13 shows that the majority of men had a paid job before
the birth of their first child. Labour force participation by Moroccan
men is the lowest and that by men of the comparison group, the high-
est. When asked about the labour force participation by their partners
before they had children, one-third of the second-generation men re-
ported their partners having a job. Compared to the self-reported parti-
cipation of the second-generation women in the TIES survey, this is
rather low. It may very well be related to the fact that a substantial share
of the partners of the second-generation men in the study are of the
first generation (see paragraph on partner characteristics). Two-thirds of
the second-generation women in the study say they had a job before
giving birth. Women of the comparison group in our survey participate
at a somewhat higher rate; 90 per cent had a job.
The last table of this chapter (Table 8.14) shows the change in labour
force participation for second-generation men and women after having
their first child. Second-generation men are mainly found to keep to
the same working hours as they had before. Substantial shares of sec-
ond-generation men also increase their working hours; 17 per cent of
the Turks and 10 per cent of the Moroccans work more hours, com-
pared with only 5 per cent of the men of the comparison group. A re-
verse pattern is found among women. A minority does not change
working hours. Second-generation Turkish women are most likely to
Table 8.12 Whether respondents are happy with division of tasks between household partners,
by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men
Yes 97.2 92.3 95.6
No 2.8 7.7 4.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 94 38 105
Women
Yes 82.6 80.0 95.3
No 17.4 20.0 4.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 129 76 115
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keep their previous working hours, and second-generation Moroccan
women are least likely. Around a third of the second-generation women
quit the labour market, and another third reduces the number of hours
worked. Women of the comparison group most often choose to reduce
the number of hours. Only a minority of women of the comparison
group, at 13 per cent, stopped their paid job when they had their first
child.
Table 8.13 Labour force participation of men and women before birth of first child, by ethnic group
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Male respondents
themselves Yes 88.5 75.0 97.7
No 11.5 25.0 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 70 33 33
Female partners according
to male respondent Yes 36.0 33.3 85.3
No 56.0 66.7 14.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 65 18 30
Female respondents
themselves Yes 64.1 68.0 90.2
No 35.9 32.0 9.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 107 74 64
Male partners according
to female respondents Yes 78.8 82.4 92.9
No 18.2 11.8 6.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 92 53 50
Table 8.14 Change in labour force participation after childbirth, by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans Comparison group
Men Women Men Women Men Women
More hours 16.7 0.0 10.0 5.9 4.7 0.0
Fewer hours 0.0 33.3 20.0 35.3 37.6 59.7
Stopped working 0.0 33.3 0.0 35.3 0.0 13.2
No change 83.3 33.3 70.0 23.5 57.6 27.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 60 71 24 51 31 55
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8.8 Conclusions
This chapter provided some impressions on union and family forma-
tion among the second generation and the comparison group. We find
that the second generation is more likely to have a married partner,
whereas the comparison group lives with a partner in an unmarried un-
ion. When it comes to partner choice, we also find clear changes be-
tween the different age cohorts of the second generation. The youngest
age groups, for example, have a second-generation partner more often
than do the oldest age group, whose partners are mostly of the first gen-
eration.
Furthermore, it is often assumed that Turks and Moroccans marry a
partner who is related by blood to their own family. According to the
TIES data, this is still rather common among the Turkish second gen-
eration, one in five of whom has a spouse they share pre-marital family
links with. Marrying a family member seems to be less common
among the Moroccan second generation.
With respect to childbearing, we find that Turks start family forma-
tion at a younger age than do Moroccans or the comparison group.
More than a third of the Turkish second generation in our sample al-
ready had at least one child, as compared with about 20 per cent among
the Moroccan second generation and the comparison group.
When it comes to task division in the household, we find that many
tasks are shared between partners. Given the limited labour force parti-
cipation of Turkish and Moroccan women from the first generation, it
is interesting to find that earning an income is a joint task for most of
the TIES respondents. Again, Turks seem to follow the male-as-bread-
winner model more often than the other two groups do. The Moroccan
second generation also seems to behave rather similarly to the Dutch.
Overall, we can conclude that the union and family formation pro-
cesses of the Turkish second generation still follow more traditional pat-
terns than is the case for their Moroccan counterparts. When it comes
to different aspects of union and family formation, the Moroccan sec-
ond generation finds themselves in an intermediate position, between
Turks and the comparison group.
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9 Conclusions and implications1
Maurice Crul, George Groenewold and Liesbeth Heering
The second generation of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Nether-
lands is currently coming of age, and the older cohorts have already
made the transition from education to the labour market. This means
that, for the first time, we can make a genuine assessment of the posi-
tion of second generations in Dutch society. The TIES project aims to
engage in such an assessment by examining a variety of topics. Its fore-
most interest lies in aspects of structural integration: analysing access to
and participation in domains such as education and the labour market.
Additionally, the survey includes topics relevant to social integration,
such as social relationships, family formation and partner choice, reli-
gion and identity. The TIES survey was directed at three different
groups of respondents in the two major cities of Amsterdam and Rot-
terdam: the Dutch-born direct descendents of immigrants from Turkey,
the Dutch-born direct descendents of immigrants from Morocco and a
comparison group with no migration background at the parent level.
The selected age group was that of eighteen to 35 year olds.
The term ‘comparison group’ was used throughout this report rather
than ‘native Dutch’ or simply ‘Dutch’. The most important reason for
this is the fact that the second generations included in the TIES study
are – by definition – also native-born, and many thus have the national-
ity of their country of birth.
In the domains of education and the labour market, the dominant pub-
lic image of the second generations oscillates between feelings of con-
cern and feelings of optimism. It is the classic half-full or half-empty
glass dilemma. The main findings indicate that the dilemma corre-
sponds with reality: a considerable part of the second generation is
doing very well, while others lag behind. Perhaps the most striking out-
come is the degree of polarisation within the second-generation groups.
Short educational careers have proven to be an important indicator of
staying behind. Among those who completed their education, about 50
per cent did not obtain the entrance qualification (startkwalificatie) that
is defined as the minimum level of completed education required to
successfully enter the labour market. Children without such entrance
qualifications are officially labelled ‘at-risk’ youth, and they make up ap-
proximately a quarter of the entire sample. As can be expected, the at-
risk group also figures prominently among the long-term unemployed,
and they tend to remain dependent on financial support from the gov-
ernment. Also overrepresented in this group are married women,
whose principal activity is to raise their children. This group is largest
among second-generation Turkish women.
Those who are doing well are usually still enrolled in educational pro-
grammes. This is most clearly visible among the second-generation
Moroccans who are pursuing careers in higher education or have just
made the transition from higher education to work. Half of the mem-
bers of this group did not move straight through the school system, but
took the long route, starting at lower secondary vocational education or
general secondary education and continuing through middle vocational
education to finally end up in tertiary education (mostly higher voca-
tional education). Pursuing this long route requires persistence and am-
bition, as exemplified by women who finished higher education and
found they could convert their educational success into favourable la-
bour market positions. These women postpone getting married and
having children. Average marriage ages among Turkish and Moroccan
second-generation women are rising primarily because of this phenom-
enon.
A similar picture emerges when we look at labour market positions.
While the great majority of second-generation Turks have already com-
pleted their transition to the labour market, this applies to only half of
the Moroccan second-generation group. Furthermore, we see both posi-
tive and negative outcomes on the labour market; unemployment is re-
latively high in both groups. Ten per cent of the second-generation
Turks is unemployed and actively seeking work; for second-generation
Moroccans, the figure is 8 per cent. This is four to five times higher
than the figures for the comparison group. Also, the educational posi-
tion of the comparison group is much better: only 10 per cent does not
have an entrance qualification (i.e. they leave school prematurely).
Second-generation Turks and Moroccans predominantly occupy lower
and secondary job positions. This offers a stark contrast with the com-
parison group, more than 50 per cent of whom works in highly skilled
and scientific jobs. In the other two groups, this applies to a mere 20
per cent.
The Moroccan second-generation group would seem to occupy the
worst position in the labour market. Here, more people hold elementary
jobs. Though at the same time, in this group, the younger cohorts in
our study are overrepresented, and – as stated above – they remain en-
rolled in education longer than second-generation Turks. Thus, the
comparison may change drastically once those in higher education have
completed their education and join the labour market.
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In the second-generation groups, women on the labour market do
slightly better than men. Women are more likely to work in service sec-
tors such as health care, social work and education, all of which are cur-
rently in desperate need of employees. Moreover, and particularly in the
major cities, employers are especially wont to recruit employees from
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds in order to meet the ever-
increasing demand for social and health care needs among first-genera-
tion immigrants.
A comparison of income levels shows a clear improvement for the
Turkish second generation over their Moroccan counterparts. Again,
this can partly be explained by the fact that more second-generation
Moroccans are still enrolled in education, living off study grants and/or
small part-time jobs. The moment more highly educated Moroccans en-
ter the labour market, the difference between the Turkish and Moroccan
second generation may disappear, or even become inverted. Final con-
clusions can only be drawn after the necessary follow-up research into
this issue has been completed.
More favourable income situations lead to a larger proportion of sec-
ond-generation Turks becoming homeowners. This holds true for one-
third of those Turkish respondents who live outside their parents’
households. This is a remarkable finding, considering the fact that Am-
sterdam and Rotterdam have such a large public housing sector. Sec-
ond-generation Turkish homeowners live in single-family dwellings
more often than the comparison group, and almost half of them even
own fairly new homes (built less than 25 years ago).
In line with the trend towards leaving school earlier, second-genera-
tion Turks also marry and have children at younger ages than do
second-generation Moroccans. More than half of the second-generation
Turkish women who left their parents’ household did so because they
got married. By contrast, members from the largest group among
second-generation Moroccan women who live separately from their
parents did so in order to undertake studies in higher education or to
live on their own.
With regard to partner choice and family formation, the Turkish sec-
ond generation seems most oriented towards its own group and their
parents’ country of origin. Members of this group often find their part-
ners while on family holidays in Turkey or at community events. In
about half of the marriages, Turkish parents exerted some degree of po-
sitive or negative pressure. One in five partners is a blood relative. In
terms of gender roles, the Turkish second-generation group seems to
be most traditional. Some 41 per cent of second-generation Turkish
wives have not entered the labour market and take care of the children,
while, among the comparison group, the share of female working part-
ners is twice as high. Interestingly, the majority of Moroccan second-
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generation men also have a working partner. Most second-generation
respondents married someone from their own ethnic background. The
most notable trend here is that our respondents increasingly seem to
opt for partners who, like themselves, are second-generation. Still, the
majority of partners who have so far been selected are immigrants.
With regard to identities and identification, the study confirms the
expectation that people may have strong feelings of belonging at simul-
taneously different levels. For most respondents, feelings of being
‘Moroccan’ or ‘Turkish’ blend well with a local and/or a national iden-
tity. The same is found for the combination of Muslim identity with lo-
cal and national belonging. The second generation does not seem to see
these identities as being mutually exclusive – inasmuch as the general
societal discourse on the topic seems to suggest differently. Possibly as
the result of being less contested, local identity is particularly strong,
especially when compared with national identity. Two-thirds of the
second-generation respondents express that they experience a strong or
very strong identity as ‘Amsterdammers’ or ‘Rotterdammers’. Further-
more, respondents who still live with their parents also express a strong
neighbourhood attachment.
Religion plays a major role in the lives of second-generation Turks
and Moroccans. This is particularly true for the latter group, among
which almost half the respondents state that religion is of major impor-
tance to them. This does not necessarily mean that religious practices
play an equally important role: the majority sees religion predominantly
as a private matter and never or only rarely do they visit a mosque. A
large proportion of the second generation never prays at all. Those who
do pray daily or weekly and are active in other religious practices never-
theless form a considerable minority, being about a quarter of the re-
spondents from Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds.
Another question is whether religious identity translates into political
viewpoints or attitudes concerning gender roles. Although the second
generation differs from the comparison group on a number of societal
issues, the differences found are not very large. For instance, as regards
gender roles, very few second-generation respondents perceive educa-
tion to be more important for boys than it is for girls. Only a small min-
ority feels that women should not have jobs if they have young children
(a stance not uncommon among conservatives in the majority society,
either). Less than 10 per cent says they would find it a problem if they
had a female superior at work. And only a small minority says they
want Islam to play a more political role in society.
Often ignored, however, has been the group for which religion plays
no role at all, and this is where the main difference is found between
the two second-generation groups and the comparison group. Only one
in ten second-generation respondents states that they have no religion
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at all, while more than eight out of ten respondents in the comparison
group claim not to belong to any religious denomination. This differ-
ence could pose a major challenge for cross-group relations in the ma-
jor cities. In Amsterdam, however, the comparison group, which is
mostly secular, is quite positive about religious diversity: almost two-
thirds agree that having different religions coexisting in the city is a
good thing. Meanwhile in Rotterdam, this opinion is shared only by 39
per cent. The Rotterdam comparison group proves to be much more
negative in other statements related to the multicultural society; they
are also less willing to admit that racism and discrimination occur on
the labour market for people of Turkish or Moroccan descent. The sur-
vey thus seems to support the widespread stereotype that Amsterdam is
a more tolerant place than Rotterdam. Nevertheless, this does not mean
that the second-generation group members would feel very comfortable
in Amsterdam. It is particularly the second-generation Moroccans who
think that the city’s climate has become less friendly over the past few
years.
9.1 Study implications
The most disturbing result for policymakers must be the fact that one-
quarter of the second-generation respondents in the survey has no prop-
er entrance qualification to the labour market. Their position in society
is highly vulnerable and socially insecure. They run high risks of re-
maining at the bottom of the hourglass economies of the major cities,
hardly rising above the socio-economic status of their immigrant
parents. They will most probably continue to live in the same type of
neighbourhoods in which they grew up, and these neighbourhoods will
have become more segregated over time. Their children will visit
schools that are more likely to be qualified by school inspectors as the
‘worst-performing schools’. Moreover, the majority of this group is
likely to marry a partner from their parents’ country of origin, who will
likely be generally ill-prepared for the Dutch labour market. In sum, the
future for one-quarter of the second-generation population does not
look promising. Because of unstable job situations, members of this
group will most probably become or remain dependent on social hous-
ing, if not welfare, and their children will grow up at or around the pov-
erty level.
The relatively large proportion of at-risk respondents among the sec-
ond generation contrasts strongly with the comparison group. Here, the
vast majority is highly educated, and often both partners have paid jobs.
This obviously also leads to considerable differences in income, causing
a potential ‘ethnic split’ in society in which we may witness the rise of a
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group of poor people of primarily immigrant background versus the
rise of predominantly ‘white’ upper and middle classes.
The key to counteracting this undesirable development is education.
Too many children of immigrant parents leave school prematurely. The
educational institutions are not equipped to keep these children aboard.
As the TIES survey shows, more than half of the at-risk youth were ori-
ginally enrolled in lower general secondary education (vmbo-t) or higher
levels. They should therefore, in theory, be able to finish a two-year
middle vocational education track based on their proven abilities in sec-
ondary school. The fact that a large group does not succeed in doing so
suggests considerable institutional problems in middle vocational edu-
cation in the Dutch school system.
The development of a middle class of migrant backgrounds (be they
first-, second- or third-generation) will prove crucial for cities in coun-
tering possible ethnic polarisation. The TIES findings reported here
give reason for optimism. Almost one-third of the second generation is
either enrolled in higher education or has already finished their studies.
Members of this group will be the future agents of upward social mobi-
lity in their communities. They will find high-level jobs. They will be-
come entrepreneurs and company owners. They will be active as repre-
sentatives of immigrant or religious organisations. They will marry at a
later age, and their partners will often also be well-educated and work-
ing, thus increasing the number of double incomes. They will often
move out of their childhood neighbourhoods or occupy apartments in
the better parts of their old neighbourhoods. The children of these par-
ents will subsequently grow up in financially steady, middle-class fa-
milies and enjoy favourable prospects for the future. Moreover, because
of their studies and work, they are also likely to develop more contacts
outside their own ethnic community circles.
It is important to note that among this successful second-generation
group, many have followed the so-called long route through education,
starting in lower vocational education to finally arrive in higher educa-
tion. This educational itinerary takes up to three years longer than the
direct route. Although it is significant that this route is available – a
road which has traditionally been a main mobility path for Dutch work-
ing-class children as well – many pupils nevertheless drop out in this
phase. The fact that many successful students in higher education were
originally advised to enter lower vocational education also raises ques-
tions about the validity and the application mechanisms of that recom-
mendation process.
The transition to the labour market of the at-risk group in our survey
alerts us to two important insights. On the one hand, the labour market
does not simply work as a return on the educational investment. Some
respondents with low educational achievements have obtained regular
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jobs on the labour market or even made it into skilled professions. Pre-
cisely how this has happened should be the subject of further analyses,
but it shows the inclusive effect of the labour market. On the other
hand, there are obviously additional exclusive effects, such as discrimi-
nation, to which the at-risk group is most vulnerable.
With regard to polarisation within the second-generation groups – be-
tween a growing successful middle class and a stabilising at-risk group
– the two crucial questions for the future will be whether the middle-
class second-generation groups can be kept in the cities, and whether it
is possible to have these groups act as a sort of cement between the at-
risk group and the wider society. The use of their social and cultural ca-
pital may well be a decisive factor in building a socially cohesive urban
society.
What can be said about the willingness expressed by second-genera-
tion youth to be part of Dutch society? Our findings show that almost
half of the second generation agrees or totally agrees with the statement
that migrants and their children should live their lives outside the home
according to Dutch norms and values as much as possible. It should be
kept in mind that a large group is making a strong statement here. At
the same time, however, many of them also feel that migrants and their
children should live their lives outside the home according to Turkish or
Moroccan norms as much as possible. Although not measured by the
survey, these respondents may distinguish between public behaviour to-
wards their own group members (for example, at a Turkish wedding)
and public behaviour towards Dutch people. Also, one in five second-
generation youngsters disagrees with the statement that migrants and
their children should live their lives outside the home according to
Dutch norms and values. Instead, they feel that Turkish or Moroccan
migrants and their children should live their lives outside the home ac-
cording to Turkish or Moroccan norms and values. This position, of
course, severely limits their interaction with other ethnic groups.
Equally important, however, is the attitude of the majority society.
Here, differences in the attitudes expressed among the comparison
groups in Rotterdam and in Amsterdam towards multicultural society
and immigrants suggest differences in city contexts.
We should not look just at the relationship between the second-gen-
eration groups and what is frequently referred to as the ‘native Dutch’.
The major cities are becoming increasingly heterogeneous and, espe-
cially in the younger cohorts, the ‘native Dutch’ are becoming as much
an ethnic minority group as the others. Thus, part of the climate in
which the second-generation Turks and Moroccans grow up in Rotter-
dam and in Amsterdam is also defined by their relationship with the
large communities originating from Indonesia, Surinam, the Antilles
and other nations. Moreover, as a result of interaction and intermar-
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riage, people with mixed ethnic backgrounds are becoming more and
more visible in urban life. Of the comparison group in our survey, one-
quarter of the respondents has a partner with a ‘non-Dutch’ back-
ground.
As a final point, TIES also shows that it is members of the compari-
son group who are in fact newcomers to the city. Contrary to what was
seen in the second-generation groups, a majority was not born and/or
raised in Amsterdam or in Rotterdam. Thus, it is mostly this group
who must adapt to the new city environment. Given the fact that many
of these individuals will also leave the city again at some point in time,
either for professional or family reasons, they might be called the ‘so-
journers’ of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
Note
1 A Dutch translation of this chapter can be found at the end of this volume.
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The survey in the Netherlands focussed on generating statistically repre-
sentative data on second-generation Turks and Moroccans in the main
urban areas of concentration of these two groups: Amsterdam and Rot-
terdam. The level of statistical representativeness is the combined popu-
lation of both cities, including the second generation of both ethnic
groups and a comparison group of similar persons with both parents
born in the Netherlands. Below, the latter is addressed in more detail.
Data collection and processing were subcontracted to the professional
survey company Bureau Veldkamp in Amsterdam.
The minimum effective sample size was set at 1,500 persons, with 750
in each city and 250 persons of each ethnic group within each city.
Thus, city of residence and ethnic group membership were explicit stra-
tification variables.
In the case of the Netherlands, a sampling frame of members of the
aforementioned groups is readily available in the form of a municipal
population register (GBA). This register contains basic information on
all persons who are legal residents in the municipality. The de jure po-
pulation is recorded, and this differs to some extent from the de facto
population because of the presence of unrecorded immigrants originat-
ing from other cities in the country or from abroad and because of the
absence of residents who failed to inform the municipal authorities
about their move away from the city. However, because most adminis-
trative dealings with the municipal or central government require citi-
zens to present a ‘proof of legal residence’, it is in the interests of most
residents to ensure that their registration is properly done and up-to-
date. Several pieces of information are recorded in the population regis-
ter, such as date of birth, sex, country of birth, country of birth of father,
country of birth of mother, full address, nationality and marital status.
This makes the register an obvious choice for sampling addresses of
members of ethnic groups (BPR 2006).
To determine the gross sample size, studies on response behaviour in
the Netherlands were examined. These show that response rates to gen-
eral social science surveys have been declining in the past decades but
also that marked improvements have occurred since the mid-1990s as a
result of applying new fieldwork strategies and instruments (De Heer &
De Leeuw 1999; Stoop 2005). For instance, the most recent European
Social Science Survey (2004) conducted in the Netherlands resulted in
a 64.3 per cent response rate, similar to rates in Belgium (61.2 per
cent), Austria (62.4 per cent) and Sweden (64.4 per cent), and consider-
ably higher than in France (43.6 per cent), Switzerland (48.6 per cent),
Germany (51.0 per cent) and Spain (54.9 per cent). Various studies
show that place of residence and not ethnic affiliation is the most im-
portant predictor for response rates. For instance, Schmeets and Van
der Bie (2005) show that response rates in the large cities are consider-
ably lower than elsewhere in the Netherlands and that response rates
among first-generation and second-generation descendants of non-wes-
tern immigrants are below average. They demonstrate that differences
between the response rates of ethnic groups within the large cities are
far less striking than is generally assumed. In fact, they show that the
observed ethnic differences in response rates in the country are mainly
due to place of residence and not so much to ethnic origin. This is be-
cause most ethnic minority groups live in the largest cities where the
response rates are the lowest, including those of people of Dutch des-
cent. The 2004 Permanent Living Conditions Survey (POLS) shows that
the response rate of second-generation descendants of non-western im-
migrants in Amsterdam was 33 per cent, while the rate of those of
Dutch descent was not much higher, being 41 per cent. Figures for Rot-
terdam were 52 and 53 per cent, respectively. Within the group of des-
cendants of non-western immigrants, figures for second-generation
Turks and Moroccans appear to be below average. Furthermore, recent
research (Crok et al. 2004; Gemeente Amsterdam 2006) on the integra-
tion of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam shows that, among residents of
non-western origin, members of the Moroccan and Turkish ethnic
groups show the least progress in terms of indicators of socioeconomic,
cultural and political integration, including spatial segregation. This
may further contribute to lower than expected response rates among
members of these groups. Therefore, it was decided to increase the
minimum effective sample sizes in both cities by a factor of four, lead-
ing to a gross sample size of 6,271. This includes a supplementary sam-
ple of addresses of second-generation Moroccan men in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam to cope with the rapid depletion of the address pool due
to higher than expected non-response in that group. The sampling strat-
egy is described below in four main stages.
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In the first stage, one important substantive decision was to ensure
that the sample design sampled members of the two ethnic groups –
second-generation Turks and Moroccans – and the comparison group
in the same context, i.e. neighbourhood. The survey objective was to
generate statistically representative results at the level of both cities. In
probability samples, all elements (i.e. neighbourhoods and ethnic group
members) must have a non-zero chance of selection, so that neighbour-
hoods included in the sampling frame must have members of each of
the three groups as residents. In general, the probability of selecting a
member of a particular study group is determined by the product of the
following two chances: (1) that a member of a particular study group is
selected within the neighbourhood and (2) that the neighbourhood is
selected from the sampling frame of neighbourhoods. The issue of
sample selection is taken up in detail below.
Not all neighbourhoods of the two cities were included in the sam-
pling frame. Consultation of population statistics published by the mu-
nicipal population register (GBA) showed that two neighbourhoods in
Amsterdam and eleven neighbourhoods in Rotterdam did not have
members of all three groups as residents, and thus were excluded from
the sampling frame. However, it must be noted that the excluded neigh-
bourhoods are very sparsely populated, totalling only 104 inhabitants in
Amsterdam and 523 in Rotterdam, as most of these neighbourhoods
are industrial areas.1 Thus, bearing the above in mind, the survey re-
sults are statistically representative of more than 99.5 per cent of all
members of study groups living in both cities. Put more precisely, the
survey results are representative of all members of the three study
groups who live in the neighbourhoods included in the sampling
frames of both cities.
A closer look at the spatial distribution of Turkish and Moroccan eth-
nic group residents in both cities shows that there is high correlation
(r2 = .95 and r2 = .87 in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, respectively). Be-
cause of this, the combined total of Turkish and Moroccan ethnic group
residents in the age range 15-44 (in Amsterdam) and age range 18-35
(in Rotterdam) was taken as a measure of size (MOS)2 for the 90 and
77 neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, respectively, and to
represent the distribution of unobserved numbers of second-generation
Turks and Moroccans in both cities.3 In this way, neighbourhoods could
be sampled with selection probabilities proportional to this measure of
size, so that areas with higher concentrations of Turkish and Moroccan
ethnic group members would be allocated a larger proportion of the
gross sample size. Once neighbourhoods are sampled, fixed numbers
of addresses (i.e. clusters; see below) of Turks, Moroccans and Dutch
people would then be sampled within these neighbourhoods.
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In a second stage, a decision was taken on cluster size: 30 personal
addresses would comprise three groups, each with ten persons of Turk-
ish descent, ten of Moroccan descent and ten of Dutch descent. This
size was a compromise guided by two main interests. The first concern
was to avoid the risk of drawing a ‘bad’ sample of neighbourhoods,
which would be more likely if the cluster size was large. The threat of
running this risk would have thus limited the number of neighbour-
hoods to be sampled. The second concern was indeed to ensure that a
sufficient number of neighbourhoods would be sampled, allowing sur-
vey results to be aggregated to the next higher administrative/planning
level, the stadsdeel (‘city district’). This would allow the stadsdelen to be
compared, for instance, in matters regarding the differential effect that
city policies have on integration variables.
In a third stage, the systematic selection method was applied to the
geographically sorted list of neighbourhoods, separately for each city, to
ensure an optimal spatial spread of the sample over cities and neigh-
bourhoods. As the minimum effective sample size for each city was set
at 750 respondents, 750/30 = 25 clusters would need to be allocated to
neighbourhoods by means of the systematic selection method or, in
other words, allocation. Using the aforementioned population statistics
on numbers of residents of Turkish and Moroccan descent in neigh-
bourhoods, the list was transformed into a cumulative list of numbers
of persons of these two ethnic groups. A sampling interval (k) was then
computed, and a random start number obtained, so that all 25 clusters
could be allocated to the neighbourhoods in a random manner (i.e.
every k-th neighbourhood, e.g. see Cochran 1977: 205-231). This re-
sulted in a sample of 23 of the remaining 90 neighbourhoods in Am-
sterdam (about one in four) and 24 of the 77 neighbourhoods in Rotter-
dam (about 1 in 3). The method ensures that areas with large numbers
of Turkish and Moroccan ethnic group members have a higher prob-
ability of being selected and could be selected even more than once.
The latter is precisely what happened, and resulted in the allocation of
two clusters (2 x 30 persons) to the same neighbourhood in two neigh-
bourhoods in Amsterdam (Landlust and Geuzenveld) and in the case of
one neighbourhood in Rotterdam (Nieuwe Westen). To compensate a
priori for a potential non-response rate of 75 per cent, the actual cluster
size was increased by a factor of four and therefore became 4x30 = 120
persons. Once neighbourhoods were sampled, the municipal population
registers were requested to provide the actual numbers of second-gen-
eration Turks, Moroccans and the comparison group in the age range
18-35 years old residing in the sampled neighbourhoods, as well as in
the city around the time of the selection of the sample (1 April 2006).
In the final stage, 1,000 addresses of members of each group living
in the sampled neighbourhoods, totalling 6,000 addresses in both ci-
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ties, were sampled from the population register. Because more than
one second-generation person may live at the same address, it was
decided to select only one person per ethnic group per address, using
the last-birthday method (Kish 1965). This led to a reduction of the
number of addresses of potential respondents. During fieldwork this
number was reduced further to 4,999 addresses, mainly as a result of
the fact that many addresses were no longer valid.4 This number (n),
the gross effective sample size, distributed over the sample neighbour-
hoods and ethnic groups, is presented in the table below. Eventually,
completed or partially completed interviews were obtained from 1,505
persons ( = net effective sample size), implying an overall response rate of
30.1 per cent.
Table A.1 summarises main population and sample statistics such as
the size of the second-generation Turks and Moroccans in both cities
and of the comparison group at the time of sample selection in April
2006 and according to the municipal population register (GBA). Re-
garding representation, it can be deduced from the figures that the
sampled neighbourhoods are home to more than 60 per cent of the
second-generation Turks and Moroccans residing in these cities (e.g.
Amsterdam, second-generation Turks (3,266/5,088)  100 = 64.2 per
cent). In a similar way, it can be deduced from these figures that about
one in three members of the comparison group lives in the sampled
neighbourhoods.
The way the sample was allocated according to cities, ethnic groups
and neighbourhoods, and the finding that response rates differed con-
siderably between neighbourhoods and cities, imply that the design and
implementation was non-self-weighting. Therefore, an ex post correction
factor or compensation weight was allocated to each of the 1,505 respon-
dents. This weight consists of several components, each reflecting a
stage in sample design and implementation leading to unequal selec-
tion probabilities, such as the allocation of the sample to cities, ethnic
groups, neighbourhoods and clusters, and the finding that response
rates varied considerably across cities, ethnic groups and neighbour-
hoods. The average weights of the second-generation Turks and
Moroccan respondents appeared to be 0.348 and 0.354, respectively,
and for the comparison group, 2.258. These compensation weights
were eventually used to produce the results in this report, meaning that
the presented figures are reflective of second-generation Turks and Mor-
occans and members of the comparison groups in the two cities (ESS
2007; Purdon & Pickering 2001; Lee et al. 1989).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.2 TIES survey implementation
The fieldwork in the two cities lasted almost fourteen months, from
May 2006 through July 2007. The fieldwork was organised, implemen-
ted and documented by Bureau Veldkamp in Amsterdam (Schothorst
2007), in close consultation and collaboration with NIDI staff. In a pilot
phase, the questionnaire was tested and adjusted after interviewing
twelve respondents belonging to the intended ethnic and age groups. In
total, 83 interviewers (43 in Amsterdam and 40 in Rotterdam) were re-
cruited and trained to conduct the interview with a portable computer
(CAPI). Interviewers were mainly Dutch, and many of them had served
as professional interviewers and had experience with interviewing
members of ethnic minority groups. In addition to their training on the
subject matter covered by the questionnaire and on the code of conduct,
interviewers were instructed to pay particular attention to verifying
whether the potential respondent at the address they received was in-
deed the person whom they were about to interview. This issue is of
particular relevance because it is estimated that between 10 and 20 per
cent of the housing accommodation, notably in Amsterdam, is rented
out by the registered tenant or owner to a third party, without formal
notification to the register. Shortly before the interviewers went into the
field, invitation letters were sent to all sampled person addresses in
which the objectives of the study and interview were explained, the im-
portance of cooperation stressed, and the forthcoming visit of an inter-
viewer announced. Mentioned, too, was the fact that respondents would
receive ten euros as a token of gratitude for their collaboration.
Overall, obtaining a successful interview from the sampled respon-
dents proved to be a cumbersome undertaking. The main problems en-
countered were:
– Addresses (at a rate of almost 15 per cent) appeared to no longer be
valid (potential respondent had moved elsewhere or died).
– Difficulties in actually reaching the doorstep of potential respon-
dents, particularly in large apartment buildings.
– Suspiciousness and sometimes even hostility on the part of poten-
tial respondents.
– Length and complexity of the questionnaire, as well as coverage of
topics that were perceived by respondents to be ‘sensitive’. A typical
interview would take about one hour and fifteen minutes, leading
to a low total output of between 24 and 50 interviews per week.
– Respondents trying to postpone the interview in hopes that the in-
terviewer would eventually abort the appointment. The general rule
was that the interviewer should try at least five times to fulfil an in-
terview appointment with potential respondents.
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Among others, the following measures were taken to improve fieldwork
performance:
– Reducing interview time by dropping certain questions from the
questionnaire.
– Splitting the interview into two components: a face-to-face CAPI in-
terview and the written version of the CAPI questionnaire, which
the respondent completed in private and on the spot or in private
though at some later time and to be submitted to the survey bureau
(this was considered mix-mode interviewing). Furthermore, an on-
line webpage-based version of the questionnaire was developed, so
that respondents had control over when they responded to the ques-
tionnaire. Overall, 50 per cent of the completed interviews came
from CAPI face-to-face interviews, 42 per cent from mix-mode in-
terviews and 8 per cent from online interviews.
– To deal with refusal/non-response conversion, various measures
were taken to retrieve an interview from respondents: a reminder
invitation-to-participate letter, an increase of the token gift to twenty
euros, providing additional training to interviewers in ‘persuasion
communication techniques and strategies’.5
1.3 TIES survey evaluation
Although the overall response rates in the two cities are similar, aver-
aging 30.1 per cent (see Table A.1), differences between the groups are
considerable. In both cities, respondents of the Moroccan ethnic group
performed the poorest with, on average, a 25.0 per cent response rate
in the sampled neighbourhoods, as compared with the 30.2 per cent
and 37.3 per cent response rates of members of the Turkish second gen-
eration and the comparison group. Analysis of response rates by neigh-
bourhood showed that such rates vary considerably between neighbour-
hoods, and that it mattered whether a member of a particular ethnic
group was contacted in one neighbourhood or in another. For instance,
in Rotterdam, the response rate of the second-generation Moroccans in
the Spangen neighbourhood was twice as high (50.0 per cent) as the re-
sponse rate of that same study group in the nearby neighbourhood of
Oude Noorden (23.1 per cent). This large discrepancy may be due to
general differences in the personal characteristics of ethnic group mem-
bers living in different neighbourhoods, due to particular neighbour-
hood characteristics or due to inconsistencies in interviewer perfor-
mance.
As non-response was high in the survey, it is worth looking at differ-
ences between respondents and non-respondents. Often this is a diffi-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX: SAMPLE DESIGN, TIES SURVEY 177
of non-respondents. However, population registers hold some informa-
tion that can be used to make a basic comparison between respondents
and non-respondents. This is shown in Table A.2.
As compared to the situation in the general population of both cities
(last column), men are overrepresented among non-respondents in all
groups, most notably, among the second-generation Moroccans. As a
consequence, women are somewhat overrepresented in the dataset of
1,505 successfully interviewed persons. Age does not seem to be a dis-
criminating factor in all three groups when it comes to comparing re-
spondents and non-respondents. It is interesting to note, though, that
members of the comparison group are, on average, three to four years
older than members of the other two groups, which may be relevant to
the interpretation and explanation of differences found between ethnic
groups regarding certain socioeconomic survey characteristics. Further-
more, married or cohabiting persons are somewhat overrepresented
among responding persons, notably among the second-generation
Turks, which is not surprising, as such people tend to be at home more
often and thus more likely to come into contact with a visiting inter-
viewer. Thus, differences between respondents and non-respondents re-
garding personal characteristics as recorded in the population register
are slight and match expectations.
Notes
1 In brackets the total populations (as of 1 January 2006) of Amsterdam’s excluded
neighbourhoods are given: Spieringhorn (2), Bedrijventerrein Sloterdijk (102);
Rotterdam: Noord Kethel (74), Kralingse Bos (128), Rijnpoort (79), Spaanse polder
(176), Eemhaven (29), Waalhaven-Zuid (12), Botlek (3), Europoort (5), Maasvlakte (0),
Bedrijvenemp. RNW (17), Rivium (0).
2 Differences in age range of MOS data are due to inconsistencies between the two
municipalities’ inclusion of details in their published data.
3 The latter are smaller in number because the age range 18-35 also includes first-
generation individuals (e.g. brides and grooms of second-generation Turks and
Moroccans who are brought over from Turkey or Morocco).
4 Due to problems and delays in fieldwork operations, the survey period extended to
about thirteen months (May 2006-June 2007). With the relatively high mobility of
persons in the age range 18-35, it came as no surprise that interviewers were often
unable to locate an intended respondent at his or her given address, particularly if
there was a long time lapse between selection of the sample (1 April 2006) and the
intended interview date. In this regard, population register staff point out that the
validity of provided sample addresses becomes questionable if used beyond a period
of more than two months.
5 There are limits to refusal/non-response conversion in that such efforts tend to focus
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Conclusies en aanbevelingen1
Maurice Crul, George Groenewold en Liesbeth Heering
De Nederlandse tweede generatie van Turkse en Marokkaanse afkomst
is momenteel volwassen aan het worden en de oudere cohorten hebben
inmiddels de overstap van het onderwijs naar de arbeidsmarkt gemaakt.
Dit betekent dat we nu voor het eerst werkelijk de balans op kunnen
maken van de positie die de tweede generatie inneemt in de Neder-
landse samenleving. Het TIES project behandelt dit vraagstuk door een
grote verscheidenheid aan onderwerpen te onderzoeken. De primaire
interesse richt zich op de aspecten van structurele integratie, zoals de
toegang tot en deelname aan het onderwijs en de arbeidsmarkt. Daar-
naast richt het onderzoek zich op onderwerpen die van belang zijn voor
de sociale integratie, zoals sociale relaties, partnerkeuze en gezinsvorm-
ing, religie en identiteit. Het TIES onderzoek is uitgevoerd in de twee
grootste steden, Amsterdam en Rotterdam, onder drie verschillende
groepen respondenten: de in Nederland geboren kinderen van immi-
granten uit Turkije en Marokko en een vergelijkingsgroep van jongeren
met twee in Nederland geboren ouders. De leeftijd van de respondenten
ligt tussen de achttien en 35 jaar.
In dit rapport wordt steeds de term vergelijkingsgroep gebruikt, en
niet de term ‘Nederlanders’. De belangrijkste reden hiervoor is het feit
dat de respondenten van de tweede generatie betrokken bij het TIES on-
derzoek – per definitie – geboren zijn in Nederland en in veel gevallen
ook de Nederlandse nationaliteit hebben.
Op het gebied van onderwijs en de arbeidsmarkt weerspiegelt het
dominante beeld van de tweede generatie in de publieke opinie afwisse-
lend bezorgdheid en optimisme. Het is het klassieke dilemma: is het
glas halfvol of halfleeg? De belangrijkste uitkomsten van ons onderzoek
laten zien dat dit dilemma ook de realiteit weerspiegelt: een aanzienlijk
deel van de tweede generatie doet het zeer goed, terwijl een ander deel
duidelijk achter blijft. Misschien wel de meest opvallende uitkomst is
de sterke mate van polarisatie binnen de tweede generatie groepen.
Het is een gegeven dat een korte onderwijsloopbaan een belangrijke
indicator voor achterstand is. Onder de jongeren die hun onderwijscar-
rière reeds hebben afgesloten is de groep die geen startkwalificatie be-
haalde aanzienlijk: ongeveer de helft. Een startkwalificatie wordt gedefi-
nieerd als het minimum onderwijsniveau dat succesvol moet zijn afge-
sloten om een kans te maken op de arbeidsmarkt. De jongeren zonder
een dergelijke startkwalificatie worden officieel gezien als ‘risicojonge-
ren’. Zij vormen ongeveer een kwart van onze onderzoekspopulatie.
Zoals te verwachten valt zijn zij ook prominent aanwezig in de groep
die langdurig werkloos is en blijven vaak afhankelijk van een uitkering.
Getrouwde vrouwen, wier belangrijkste activiteit het verzorgen van de
kinderen is, zijn eveneens oververtegenwoordigd in deze groep. Deze
situatie komt het meest voor onder de tweede generatie Turkse vrou-
wen.
Zij die succesvol zijn, volgen meestal nog onderwijs. Dit is het duide-
lijkst zichtbaar onder de tweede generatie Marokkanen die doorgegaan
zijn met studeren en die nu te vinden zijn op het hbo en de universi-
teit, of die net de overgang van hoger onderwijs naar de arbeidsmarkt
hebben gemaakt. De helft van de jongeren uit deze groep is niet direct
doorgestroomd naar het hoger onderwijs, maar heeft een lange route af-
gelegd en heeft eerst vmbo of mavo gedaan, is daarna doorgegaan in
het mbo om uiteindelijk in het hbo of aan de universiteit te studeren.
Hun volharding en ambitie zijn karakteristiek. Zeker de vrouwen die
het hoger onderwijs succesvol doorlopen hebben, vertalen hun onder-
wijsprestaties in goede posities op de arbeidsmarkt. Deze vrouwen stel-
len het huwelijk en het krijgen van kinderen uit. De gemiddelde huwe-
lijksleeftijd onder Turkse en Marokkaanse vrouwen van de tweede gen-
eratie stijgt voornamelijk door dit fenomeen.
Een vergelijkbaar verschil tussen de tweede generatie Marokkanen en
Turken wordt zichtbaar als we kijken naar de arbeidsmarktposities. Ter-
wijl van de Turkse tweede generatie de grote meerderheid hun overstap
naar de arbeidsmarkt al heeft gemaakt, is dit slechts voor de helft van
de tweede generatie Marokkanen het geval. Bovendien zien we zowel
positieve als negatieve uitkomsten op het gebied van de arbeidsmarkt.
Werkloosheidscijfers zijn relatief hoog in beide tweede generatie groe-
pen. Tien procent van de tweede generatie Turken is werkloos en actief
op zoek zijn naar een baan, voor de tweede generatie Marokkanen ligt
dit percentage op acht. Dit percentage ligt vier tot vijf keer hoger dan
dat van de vergelijkingsgroep. Ook is de onderwijspositie van de verge-
lijkingsgroep veel beter: slechts tien procent heeft geen ‘startkwalifica-
tie’ en kan beschouwd worden als voortijdig schoolverlater.
Tweede generatie Turken en Marokkanen die de overstap naar de
arbeidsmarkt al gemaakt hebben werken voornamelijk in lager
geschoolde en ongeschoolde beroepen. Maar één op de vijf heeft een
hooggeschoolde of academisch geschoolde baan. Dit staat in sterk con-
trast met de vergelijkingsgroep waar meer dan de helft in deze twee ca-
tegorieën terug te vinden is.
De Marokkaanse tweede generatie lijkt de slechtste positie in te ne-
men op de arbeidsmarkt omdat meer mensen een baan hebben in la-
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gere ongeschoolde beroepen. Tegelijkertijd zijn in deze groep de jongste
cohorten oververtegenwoordigd in ons onderzoek en – zoals hierboven
al gesteld – studeren zij langer door dan tweede generatie Turken. Daar-
om kan de vergelijking wel eens drastisch veranderen op het moment
dat de groep die nu nog in het hoger onderwijs studeert de overstap
naar de arbeidsmarkt maakt.
Binnen de tweede generatie groepen doen de vrouwen het iets beter
op de arbeidsmarkt dan de mannen. Zij werken vaker in de dienstverle-
nende beroepen zoals de gezondheidszorg, het sociaal werk en het on-
derwijs, sectoren waar momenteel een nijpend tekort aan arbeidskrach-
ten is. Bovendien zijn, zeker in de grote steden, werkgevers in het
bijzonder op zoek naar werknemers van verschillende culturele achter-
grond om in te kunnen gaan op steeds grotere behoefte van de eerste
generatie migranten op het gebied van sociale zorg en gezondheids-
zorg.
Als we kijken naar het inkomensniveau dan zien we dat de Turkse
tweede generatie duidelijk voorop loopt vergeleken met de Marokkaanse
tweede generatie. Dit kan opnieuw ten delen verklaard worden uit het
feit dat een groter aantal tweede generatie Marokkanen nog in het on-
derwijs zit en dientengevolge leeft van een studiebeurs en wat kleine
bijbaantjes. Wederom kunnen we voorspellen dat als de hoger opgeleide
Marokkanen de arbeidsmarkt eenmaal betreden, het verschil tussen de
Turkse en Marokkaanse tweede generatie waarschijnlijk verdwijnt, of
zelfs kantelt. Een uiteindelijke conclusie kan dus pas getrokken worden
na vervolgonderzoek.
De betere inkomenssituatie wordt ook zichtbaar in het grotere aan-
deel tweede generatie Turken dat in het bezit is van een eigen huis. Dit
geldt voor een derde van de Turkse respondenten die geen deel meer
uitmaken van het huishouden van hun ouders. In aanmerking geno-
men dat in grote steden als Amsterdam en Rotterdam het aandeel so-
ciale huurwoningen zeer groot is, is dit een opmerkelijke bevinding.
Tweede generatie Turkse huiseigenaren wonen vaker in eengezinswo-
ningen dan de vergelijkingsgroep en bijna de helft woont in relatief
nieuwe woningen (minder dan 25 jaar oud).
In lijn met de trend om vroeger het onderwijs te verlaten trouwen
tweede generatie Turken ook op jongere leeftijd en krijgen zij ook jon-
ger kinderen dan de tweede generatie Marokkanen. Meer dan de helft
van de Turkse meisjes van de tweede generatie die het ouderlijk huis
heeft verlaten, deed dat om te gaan trouwen. Daartegenover staat dat de
grootste groep Marokkaanse meisjes van de tweede generatie die niet
meer bij hun ouders wonen, het huis verliet om in het hoger onderwijs
te gaan studeren of om zelfstandig te gaan wonen.
Met betrekking tot partnerkeuze en gezinsvorming lijkt de Turkse
tweede generatie het sterkst georiënteerd op de eigen groep en het land
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van herkomst van de ouders. De jongeren vinden vaak hun partner via
familievakanties of op feesten in de Turkse gemeenschap. Bij ongeveer
de helft van de huwelijken hebben de Turkse ouders enige mate van po-
sitieve of negatieve druk uitgeoefend. Eén op de vijf partners is een
bloedverwant. Ook op het gebied van de rolpatronen van man en vrouw
lijkt de Turkse tweede generatie het meest traditioneel. Eenenveertig
procent van de echtgenotes van de Turkse tweede generatie mannen is
niet actief op de arbeidsmarkt, maar zorgt voor de kinderen. Onder de
vergelijkingsgroep is het aandeel vrouwelijke partners dat werkt twee
keer zo hoog. Interessant genoeg hebben ook de Marokkaanse mannen
van de tweede generatie in meerderheid een partner die werkt. De
meeste tweede generatie respondenten huwden iemand met hun eigen
etnische achtergrond. De meest opvallende trend in dit geval is dat onze
respondenten steeds vaker trouwen met iemand die, net als zij, uit de
tweede generatie afkomstig is, hoewel nog steeds de meerderheid van
de huwelijkspartners zelf migrant is.
Met betrekking tot identiteiten en identificatie bevestigt ons onder-
zoek de verwachting dat mensen zich tegelijkertijd op verschillende ni-
veaus sterk kunnen identificeren. Zo blijkt voor de meeste responden-
ten een sterke groepsidentiteit (Marokkaans of Turks) zeer wel samen
te gaan met een sterke lokale (Amsterdamse of Rotterdamse) of natio-
nale ( Nederlandse) identiteit. Hetzelfde geldt voor een sterke moslimi-
dentiteit gecombineerd met een sterke lokale en nationale identiteit. De
tweede generatie ziet deze duidelijk niet als elkaar uitsluitende identitei-
ten, al lijkt de huidige maatschappelijke discussie over dit onderwerp
anders te suggereren. Wellicht als gevolg van het feit dat de locale iden-
titeit minder betwist is, wordt deze bijzonder sterk gevoeld, zeker verge-
leken met de nationale identiteit. Tweederde van de respondenten van
de tweede generatie geeft aan een sterke of zeer sterke Amsterdamse of
Rotterdamse identiteit te hebben. Voorts geven respondenten die nog
bij hun ouders thuis wonen aan ook een sterke band met de buurt te
hebben.
Religie is van groot belang in het leven van de tweede generatie Tur-
ken en Marokkanen. Dit geldt vooral voor de laatste groep, waarin bijna
de helft van de respondenten stelt dat religie een grote rol speelt in hun
leven. Dit betekent niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat de religieuze praktijk een
even grote rol speelt: feitelijk ziet de meerderheid religie vooral als een
persoonlijke zaak en bezoekt zelden of nooit de moskee. Een groot deel
van de tweede generatie bidt nooit. Zij die wel elke dag of elke week
bidden en actief zijn op andere religieuze gebieden vormen echter een
niet onaanzienlijke minderheid van ongeveer een kwart van de respon-
denten van Turkse en Marokkaanse afkomst.
Een andere vraag is of hun religieuze identiteit zich vertaalt naar poli-
tieke gezichtspunten of in hun visie op de rol van man en vrouw. De
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tweede generatie verschilt weliswaar van de vergelijkingsgroep in hun
visie op een aantal maatschappelijke kwesties, maar de gevonden
verschillen zijn niet groot. Met betrekking tot onderwijs, bijvoorbeeld,
denkt vrijwel geen respondent van de tweede generatie dat een oplei-
ding voor mannen belangrijker is dan voor vrouwen. Slechts een kleine
minderheid vindt dat vrouwen niet zouden moeten werken als zij
kleine kinderen hebben (een opvatting die overigens ook niet ongewoon
is onder autochtone conservatieven). Nog geen tien procent spreekt uit
dat zij het problematisch zouden vinden om een vrouw als superieur te
hebben op het werk. Slechts een kleine minderheid vindt dat de Islam
een meer politieke rol in de samenleving zou moeten spelen.
Vaak wordt de groep die helemaal niet religieus is genegeerd. In de
tweede generatie stelt echter één op de tien jongeren dat zij geen enkele
religie hebben. Over het geheel genomen vormt de rol die religie speelt
in hun levens het belangrijkste verschil tussen de tweede generatie
groepen en de vergelijkingsgroep. Van de laatste groep zeggen acht op
de tien jongeren dat zij geen enkele religie hebben. Dit contrast lijkt
een grote uitdaging voor de grote steden te vormen. Het is in dit licht
interessant dat de meerderheid van de vergelijkingsgroep instemt met
de stelling dat het positief is als mensen van verschillende religies sa-
menleven in de stad. Dit is echter één van de onderwerpen waarop de
vergelijkingsgroepen uit Amsterdam en Rotterdam een aanmerkelijk
verschillende mening zijn toegedaan. In Amsterdam onderschrijft 63
procent de stelling, in Rotterdam slechts 39 procent. Ook in andere stel-
lingen over de multiculturele samenleving, uit de Rotterdamse vergelij-
kingsgroep zich veel negatiever en is minder geneigd om te onderken-
nen dat er sprake is van discriminatie op de arbeidsmarkt ten opzichte
van mensen met een Turkse of Marokkaanse achtergrond. Het onder-
zoek lijkt dus het stereotype beeld van Amsterdam als meer tolerante
stad te ondersteunen. Dit betekent echter niet dat de tweede generatie
zich erg prettig voelt in Amsterdam. In het bijzonder de tweede genera-
tie Marokkanen vinden dat er de laatste jaren een minder vriendelijk
klimaat is ontstaan.
Implicaties van de onderzoeksresultaten
Voor beleidsmakers zal het meest verontrustende onderzoeksresultaat
zijn dat een kwart van de tweede generatie niet in het bezit is van een
‘startkwalificatie’ voor de arbeidsmarkt. Hun maatschappelijke positie is
zeer kwetsbaar en onzeker. In de ‘zandloper’ economie van de grote ste-
den lopen zij groot risico op de bodem te blijven en zij zullen amper
boven de economische positie van hun ouders uitkomen. Ze zullen
hoogstwaarschijnlijk wonen in hetzelfde type woonwijken waarin zij
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zelf zijn opgegroeid, alleen zullen deze wijken nu nog meer gesegre-
geerd zijn. Hun kinderen zullen naar scholen gaan die vaak in de ter-
men van de onderwijsinspectie de ‘slecht presterende scholen’ heten.
Het is in dit verband ook problematisch dat de meerderheid een partner
uit het land van herkomst van de ouders trouwt, die over het algemeen
niet goed is toegerust voor de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt. Zodoende ziet
de toekomst voor dit kwart van de tweede generatie jongeren er niet
veelbelovend uit. Vanwege hun onzekere positie op de arbeidsmarkt
zullen zij zeer waarschijnlijk afhankelijk zijn van sociale huurwonin-
gen, of zelfs van een uitkering en hun kinderen zullen opgroeien in
een financiële situatie op de armoedegrens.
De relatief grote groep ‘risicojongeren’ onder de tweede generatie
staat in sterk contrast met de vergelijkingsgroep die in meerderheid
hoog is opgeleid en waar beide partners vaak werken. Dit leidt vanzelf-
sprekend ook tot aanzienlijke inkomensverschillen en dit zou de
maatschappij kunnen splijten in een groep armen die voornamelijk uit
mensen met een immigratie achtergrond bestaat en een voornamelijk
‘witte’ midden- en hogere klasse.
Het sleutelwoord in het voorkomen van deze situatie is onderwijs. Te-
veel kinderen van migranten verlaten school voortijdig. Het lukt de
scholen niet om de jongeren binnen boord te houden. Zoals het TIES
onderzoek laat zien volgde meer dan de helft van de ‘risicojongeren’
aanvankelijk het vmbo-t of hoger. Zij zouden daarom, gezien hun bewe-
zen capaciteiten in het middelbaar onderwijs, in staat moeten zijn om
een mbo-2 niveau of hoger te behalen. Het feit dat dit een grote groep
niet lukt vormt een duidelijke aanwijzing dat er aanzienlijke institutio-
nele problemen bestaan in het middelbaar beroepsonderwijs binnen
het Nederlandse schoolsysteem.
Het opkomen van een middenklasse van mensen met een migra-
tieachtergrond (om het even of deze nu van de eerste, tweede of derde
generatie zijn), zal cruciaal voor de steden blijken te zijn in het keren
van een mogelijke etnische polarisatie. De resultaten van het TIES on-
derzoek op dit vlak stemmen optimistisch. Iets minder dan een derde
van de tweede generatie studeert in het hoger onderwijs of heeft al een
studie in het hoger onderwijs succesvol afgesloten. Zij zullen in hun ge-
meenschappen de voortrekkers zijn op het gebied van de opwaartse so-
ciale mobiliteit. Ze zijn te vinden in de betere banen, hebben een eigen
bedrijf of zijn actief als vertegenwoordiger in migranten organisaties of
religieuze organisaties. Ze trouwen op een latere leeftijd en hun part-
ners zijn vaak eveneens hoog opgeleid en hebben een baan, dus zij heb-
ben vaak een dubbel inkomen Ze verlaten vaak hun oude buurt, of gaan
wonen in de betere delen van hun oude wijk. De kinderen van deze ou-
ders zullen opgroeien in financieel stabiele middenklasse gezinnen en
zij hebben daardoor goede vooruitzichten voor de toekomst. Bovendien
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ontwikkelen zij via hun studie en werk over het algemeen meer contac-
ten buiten de eigen etnische gemeenschap.
Het is belangrijk om op te merken dat in de succesvolle tweede gene-
ratie groep velen de zogenaamde ‘lange route’ door het onderwijs heb-
ben gevolgd. Zij begonnen in het lager beroepsonderwijs, gingen door
met middelbaar beroepsonderwijs om uiteindelijk aan te komen in het
hoger beroepsonderwijs en de universiteit. Het stapelen van opleidin-
gen neemt drie jaar langer dan de directe route. De lange route was van
oudsher eveneens belangrijk voor Nederlandse kinderen van de arbei-
dersklasse. Het is van belang dat deze route in Nederland bestaat, al val-
len er veel kinderen in deze fase uit. Het feit dat veel succesvolle stu-
denten uit het hoger onderwijs aanvankelijk een vmbo-advies kregen
roept echter vragen op over de mechanismes in de toepassing van dat
basisschool advies en de geldigheid ervan.
De overgang naar de arbeidsmarkt van de ‘risico’-groep in ons onder-
zoek brengt onze aandacht op twee belangrijke inzichten. Enerzijds be-
taalt de arbeidsmarkt niet altijd uit wat er op het gebied van onderwijs
is geïnvesteerd. Een deel van de laaggeschoolde respondenten heeft een
vaste baan bemachtigd, of zelfs een baan op geschoold niveau. Hoe ze
dit hebben bereikt zou onderwerp van verder onderzoek moeten zijn,
maar het duidt op het inclusieve effect van de arbeidsmarkt. Aan de an-
der kant zijn er duidelijk ook uitsluitende effecten van de arbeidsmarkt,
zoals discriminatie, waar de ‘risico’ groep het meest kwetsbaar voor is.
Met betrekking tot de polarisatie binnen de tweede generatie groepen
tussen een groeiende succesvolle middenklasse en een stabiliserende
‘risico’ groep zullen de twee cruciale vragen voor de toekomst zijn of de
steden de middenklasse tweede generatie groepen aan zich kunnen bin-
den en indien dit mogelijk is, of deze groepen als een bindmiddel wil-
len fungeren tussen de ‘risico’ groep en de bredere samenleving. Het
gebruikmaken van hun sociale en culturele kapitaal zou wel eens beslis-
send kunnen zijn voor het bouwen van een sociaal samenhangende ste-
delijke samenleving.
En hoe staat het met de bereidwilligheid van de tweede generatie jon-
geren om deel uit te maken van de Nederlandse samenleving? Onze
uitkomsten tonen aan dat bijna de helft van de tweede generatie het
eens of zelfs volkomen eens is met de stelling dat migranten en hun
kinderen buitenshuis zoveel mogelijk volgens de Nederlandse normen en
waarden zouden moeten leven. Het is een omvangrijke groep die een
dergelijke sterke uitspraak ondersteunt. Tegelijkertijd vindt echter een
grote groep van hen dat migranten en hun kinderen ook zoveel moge-
lijk naar de Turkse of Marokkaanse normen en waarden moet leven bui-
tenshuis. Wellicht maken zij een onderscheid tussen hun gedrag in de
publieke ruimte ten opzichte van hun eigen groep (bijvoorbeeld op een
bruiloftsfeest) en ten opzichte van mensen van Nederlandse afkomst.
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Tegelijkertijd is één op de vijf tweede generatie jongeren het niet eens
met de stelling dat migranten en hun kinderen buitenshuis zoveel mo-
gelijk volgens de Nederlandse normen en waarden zouden moeten le-
ven. In plaats daarvan stellen zij dat Turkse en Marokkaanse migranten
en hun kinderen volgens de Turkse of Marokkaanse normen en waar-
den moet leven buitenshuis. Deze positie beperkt hun interactie met
andere etnische groepen vanzelfsprekend aanzienlijk. Van een even
groot belang is echter de houding van de meerderheidssamenleving.
Hier wijzen de verschillen tussen de vergelijkingsgroep in Rotterdam
en Amsterdam, in hun houding ten opzichte van de multiculturele sa-
menleving en migranten in het algemeen, op een verschil in stadscon-
text.
Het is van belang om te benadrukken dat we niet alleen moeten kij-
ken naar de relatie tussen de tweede generatie groepen en de groep die
vaak wordt aangeduid als ‘van Nederlandse afkomst’. In de grote steden
is in toenemende mate sprake van diversiteit en zeker in de jongere
leeftijdscategorieën vormt de groep met een ‘Nederlandse afkomst’ een
minderheid zoals alle anderen. Dus een deel van het klimaat waarin de
tweede generatie Turken en Marokkanen opgroeien in Rotterdam en
Amsterdam wordt ook gevormd door hun relaties met de grote ge-
meenschappen uit ondermeer Nederlands-Indië, Suriname, de Antillen
en andere landen. Daarnaast vormen mensen met een gemengde et-
nische afkomst ook een steeds groter deel van de stedelijke realiteit.
Een kwart van de vergelijkingsgroep in ons onderzoek heeft al een part-
ner met een ‘niet-Nederlandse’ afkomst.
Tot slot laat het TIES survey zien dat het de mensen van de vergelij-
kingsgroep zijn die feitelijk de nieuwkomers zijn in de stad. In tegen-
stelling tot de tweede generatie groepen zijn zij in merendeel niet gebo-
ren en/of opgegroeid in Amsterdam of Rotterdam. Zij zijn het dus
vooral die zich moeten aanpassen aan de nieuwe stad en zij zouden
met meer recht nieuwkomers genoemd kunnen worden in de twee ste-
den, ook gezien het gegeven dat velen van hen de stad op een gegeven
moment weer zullen verlaten vanwege hun werk of wanneer ze een ge-
zin vormen.
Noot
1 Dit hoofdstuk is de Nederlandse vertaling van hoofdstuk 9 van dit boek.
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